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ABSTRACT
The concept that God is personal is an important part of religious belief. If God were not
personal, it would be odd to think of him as moral or loving; it would also seem counterintuitive
to speak of him as One with whom humans can have a personal relationship, One who can be
trusted, cares for the people he created, listens to their prayers, acts on their behalf, has their best
interests at heart, and so on. In short, to talk of such matters in a sensible manner and to
experience them in everyday life seemingly requires that God is personal.
Is there evidence that a personal God actually exists? Enter the moral argument. The
moral argument, like other classical arguments for God’s existence, is able to provide evidence
for believing in God’s existence, but—unlike other arguments, or perhaps better than the other
arguments—is able to shed an incredible amount of light on God’s character (i.e., what God is
like). For example, in order to account for morality, God must be good, loving, and holy.
Additionally, by surveying the moral landscape—specifically, categories such as moral
knowledge, moral values, moral obligations, and moral transformation—it becomes apparent that
the deeply personal nature of morality points in the direction of a personal source, and most
appropriately, a source personal to the highest degree possible.
If the moral argument suggests that a personal source is needed in order to account for the
personal nature of morality, naturalism is in a difficult position because of its impersonal or nonpersonal nature. Similarly, Platonism is a non-personal metaphysical system and therefore faces
a challenge in accounting for the personal nature of morality. Although there are several belief
systems that set forth the notion of a personal God, with some conceptions coming nearer to
adequately accounting for what is required of a personal God than others, Christianity uniquely
demonstrates that not only is God personal, but that he has always been personal. If the only
vii

sense in which God is personal is in his personal interactions with human persons, then one
could say that God’s personality was frustrated before he created human persons or that God
became personal only after he created human persons. To say these sorts of things presents all
sorts of theological and philosophical problems, namely, that God is dependent on something
other than himself and therefore not self-sufficient.
A Trinitarian conception of God, which is a distinctly Christian concept, solves the sorts
of problems alluded to above, suggesting that God has always been personal in and through the
inner personal relations of the three Persons of the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This is
the fundamental reason why the Judeo-Christian God, the God of the Bible, is the best
explanation for the deeply personal nature of morality: he is intrinsically personal himself.
While there is certainly more involved, there are two key tasks to this version of the
moral argument: (1) demonstrate that morality points in the direction of a personal source; and
(2) explain how a Trinitarian conception of God provides the best explanation for the deeply
personal nature of morality.

viii

“[T]o expound the thought of God as personal, and to help to restore it to a more living and
central place in the experience and witness of Christian men and women, is one of the major
tasks of the theologian today.”
H. H. Farmer, The World and God

“. . . Personality and Morality go together.”
Clement Webb, God and Personality
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In addition to the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, the moral
argument is one of the classical arguments offered by theists in favor of God’s existence. By
referring to the “moral argument,” one usually assumes that there is only one moral argument.
However, a careful study of the history of this argument, beginning with Immanuel Kant (17241804) and moving toward the present day, reveals that a variety of moral arguments have been
formulated by philosophers, theologians, and apologists over the past three centuries. 1
Regardless of the form that the moral argument takes, the underlying logic of moral arguments
for God’s existence is that the phenomena of morality are able to provide veridical insight into
the nature of ultimate reality. Does God exist? Are there many gods that exist? What is God (or
the gods) like? Does God (or do the gods) have expectations of human beings? What about good
and evil? These are the sorts of questions that individuals have wrestled with throughout history,
and they are the kinds of inquiries that ultimately frame humanity’s quest to determine the nature
of reality as a whole. Interestingly, these are the questions that the moral argument also attempts
to answer.
Although there are numerous questions that the moral argument addresses, the primary
goal of the moral argument involves examining the data of morality, which are readily available
to virtually everyone, in an effort to provide warrant for believing in God’s existence. 2 A moral
argument usually begins by acknowledging that there are certain moral features about the world

1

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls identify several precursors to Kant in the field of moral apologetics,
including individuals such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, among others. For an extended look
at these precursors, see David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, The Moral Argument: A History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), 8-18.
2

This dissertation will also provide reasons for taking Christianity seriously as a specific version of theism.
Opposing views will be also be addressed throughout, with the final chapter (chapter 7) examining some of the
opposing views in a more focused manner.
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that are as real and important for human existence as things such as gravity, Earth’s position in
relation to the sun, and the water cycle. Of course, one can object by stating that humans might
physically exist without morality. However, humans are more than physical beings; there is more
to a human person than a person’s physical makeup. This is why human beings possess a deep
desire for things like meaning and purpose, have an awareness of right and wrong while also
being able to characterize things as one or the other, feel and express emotions such as gratitude
or guilt in response to good or evil, and have a need for loving relationships with others.
Whereas theistic arguments from nature, such as the cosmological or design arguments, are “out
there,” the moral argument possesses force because it is “in here.”3 In other words, humans feel
the force of the moral argument because it resonates deeply with the fabric of their own
humanity. Yet again, humans might physically exist apart from morality, but they would not
exist in any meaningful sense or possess the ability to operate in any decent or orderly manner.4
Simply put, human beings are fundamentally different from the stars, planets, and gravity—all of
which are physically existing things. A major difference, however, is that stars and planets do not
possess a deeply felt desire for meaning and purpose, and gravity does not express approval or
feel guilty when other things (e.g., people or animals) fly or fall.

This discussion leads one to consider Immanuel Kant’s famous quote: “Two things fill the mind with ever
new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens
above and the moral law within.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 170. Taken together, arguments from nature (i.e., arguments focused on
“the starry heavens above”) and arguments from morality (i.e., arguments from “the moral law within”) form a
strong cumulative case for God’s existence. These types of arguments are not in competition with one another;
rather, they are on the same philosophical team, working together in order to clear the path for belief in God (or
deeper belief and trust in God).
3

4

It could be supposed for pragmatic reasons that humans might treat each other decently if they came to
see that doing so, though not ontologically rooted, has prudential benefits. But then again, that would all quickly go
away with free riders or folks who think they can get away with subterfuge.

2

Morality is important, and human beings are moral creatures. To be moral and to possess
the ability to be immoral is part of what it means to be human. If these things are true, then it
makes sense to ask where morality comes from. Is it the product of social convention,
educational upbringing, a transcendent source, or something else? It also makes sense to ask
what the source of morality is like. Does the source of morality possess a certain sort of character
or set of attributes? Ultimately, these questions are the entire aim of this project and the moral
argument as a whole. Though there are various approaches to answering these questions among
moral apologists (i.e., philosophers who have postulated moral arguments for God’s existence),
the approach that will be taken in this project involves considering whether morality is personal
or non-personal, and then, given the nature of morality, whether the source is personal or nonpersonal.5 In order to set the stage for the moral argument that follows—namely, a moral
argument for the existence of a personal God—there are a few important preliminary matters that
need addressing.

The Rich History of the Moral Argument
The moral argument has a rich history, and it would be unwise for anyone presently
working in moral apologetics to neglect reflecting on how numerous luminaries in the field make
it possible for present work on the argument to prove fruitful. Anything less than a deeply felt
gratitude for the work of these thinkers is a significant oversight, as these thinkers largely shape
and significantly influence present writings on the topic. Although the insightful words of many
of these thinkers will appear throughout the moral argument for a personal God that is the focus

5

Attention will be given later in this chapter to the terms “personal” and “non-personal.”

3

of this dissertation, a few names and writings are worth mentioning at the outset, especially those
who emphasized a personal God as the ground or source of morality.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
Although there were precursors to Immanuel Kant, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
and Aquinas, among others,6 the moral argument largely emerged on the philosophical scene
through the writings of Kant. There are two key thoughts regarding Kant’s work on the moral
argument that are worth noting in light of the present project. First, there is a type of moral
argument stemming from Kant that will be emphasized in chapter 6 when the category of moral
transformation is discussed. The argument goes something like this:
(1) Morality requires human beings to achieve a standard that is beyond their reach
without some sort of outside assistance—this presents what John Hare calls “the moral
gap.”
(2) Exaggerating human capacities, lowering the moral demand, or locating a secular
form of assistance are inadequate for closing the moral gap.
(3) Divine assistance is sufficient to close the moral gap.
(4) Therefore, it is rational to postulate God’s existence. 7
Kant’s “argument from grace” is intimately connected with concepts such as human guilt, hope
of moral transformation, and divine forgiveness, which are themselves seemingly personal
concepts and therefore potential indicators that God (or the source of the moral law—whoever or
whatever it may be) is personal as well.

6

In addition to these precursors, Baggett and Walls present a number of other luminaries in the field
throughout their Moral Argument: A History who have made present work on the moral argument possible and
fruitful. To date, this is the best, and really the only extended treatment of the historical development of the moral
argument.
This “argument from grace” is laid out in Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument: A History, 24. For a
thorough detailed look at this argument by Kant, see John Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and
God’s Assistance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
7
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Second, moral apologists also have Kant to thank for his “categorical imperative,” which
has three versions and provides a helpful basis for speaking on topics related to morality, such as
moral realism. These are the three versions of Kant’s categorical imperative: (1) Act as if the
laws of your actions should become, by your will, universal laws; (2) Regard humanity, whether
in your own person or in that of others, as ends and never as means only; and (3) Act as a
member of a kingdom of ends. 8 Of course, it is possible to list and debate the pros and cons of
Kant’s categorical imperative,9 but that is not the purpose here; rather, the purpose is to simply
acknowledge Kant as an important contributor in this field—and by many accounts, its most
important. Kant is likely a harbinger to much of what moral apologists have said following his
death, and many of the contemporary conversations on the moral argument would simply not
occur without his influence.
William Sorley (1855-1935)
William Sorley is one of the first moral apologists to connect morality with a personal
God, and to do so at length.10 In his Moral Values and the Idea of God, Sorley lays out the
argument that moral values, such as goodness, love, and justice, are objective realities and also
person-dependent. Moral values are universally and eternally valid, yet the moral ideal does not
fully reside in any finite person because there are no finite persons who fully actualize the ideal
or possess a wholly objective mind. Therefore, there must be a Mind that actualizes the moral

Actually, this is Hastings Rashdall’s helpful summary of Kant’s categorical imperative. Hastings
Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), chapter 5.
8

9

For example, see chapter 5 in Rashdall’s The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. 1.

10

It is important to note here that Clement C. J. Webb points out that he first finds the expression
“Personality of God” in the writings of William Paley and Friedrich Schleiermacher. He also notes that Kant speaks
of God as a “Person” and of God’s “Personality” in his Opus Postumum. Clement C. J. Webb, Kant’s Philosophy of
Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 181-182.
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ideal, and such a mind must also be personal and eternal—which led Sorley postulate an eternal
Person that is God himself.11 Sorley’s tethering of moral values to a personal God will become
clearer in chapter 4 when moral values are discussed.
Hastings Rashdall (1858-1935)
Hastings Rashdall is another early moral apologist to ground morality in a personal God.
Although others speak on what it means for God to be personal, Rashdall provides a helpful
definition—a definition that largely shapes how “personal God” is defined in this dissertation—
when he states,
Is God a Person? . . . If we are justified in thinking of God after the analogy of a human
soul—if we are justified in thinking of Him as a self-conscious Being who thinks, feels,
and wills, and who is, moreover in relation with, capable of loving and being loved by
other such beings—then it seems most natural to speak of God’s existence as personal.
For to be a self-conscious being—conscious of itself and other beings, thinking, willing,
feeling, loving—is what we mean by being a person. 12
According to Rashdall, key attributes of a “personal God” include self-consciousness; the ability
to think, feel, will; and One who is capable of loving and being loved by other persons. There are
many areas where Rashdall draws the connection between morality and a personal God,
including moral motivation, moral obligation, and moral transformation. There is more that
needs to be said regarding Rashdall’s influence on the development of this particular moral
argument for a personal God, but there is too much to say here. As a result, Rashdall’s thoughts
will appear throughout this dissertation.
Clement C. J. Webb (1865-1954)
Clement C. J. Webb, like Rashdall, is a key figure when it comes to arguing from
morality to a personal God. His writings are literally filled with references to the personality of

11

William Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1930).

12

Hastings Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), 55.
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God. In fact, this is evident from the mere titles of two of his books: Divine Personality and
Human Life and God and Personality.13 In God and Personality, Webb attempts to examine what
is involved in the demand for a personal God, while also identifying what is involved in denying
that demand—with the ultimate goal of establishing rights and wrongs of those who ascribe
Personality to God and those who refuse to do so.14 Moreover, Webb maintains that “Personality
and Morality go together,” and that Christianity is “the only religion which has expressly
affirm[ed] Personality to be in God . . . in connexion [sic] with the doctrine of the Trinity.” 15 To
be fair, there are other religions that view God or the gods as personal, as Webb himself knows.
However, what Webb claims is that a Trinitarian view of God powerfully accounts for the
personhood or personal nature of God, likely better than the other “personal God” religions.
Webb’s thought on this connection—morality with a Trinitarian God—will surface more in
chapter 7 when personal metaphysical belief systems are discussed, and then, more specifically,
when the Trinitarian nature of the Christian God is considered. As with Rashdall, there are
numerous places where Webb’s ideas are important, especially considering the version of the
moral argument that follows, which is why he is referenced at numerous junctures throughout the
present work.
H. H. Farmer (1892-1981)
H. H. Farmer’s two books, The World and God and Towards Belief in God,16 are packed
with references to God’s personal nature, which makes sense considering his claim: “[T]o

13

Clement C. J. Webb, Divine Personality and Human Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920).
Clement C. J. Webb, God and Personality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1919).
14

Webb, God and Personality, 19.

15

Webb, God and Personality, 10-11.

16

H. H Farmer, The World and God: A Study of Prayer, Providence and Miracle in Christian Experience
(London: Nisbet & Co., 1933). H. H. Farmer, Towards Belief in God (London: SCM, 1942).
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expound the thought of God as personal, and to help to restore it to a more living and central
place in the experience of Christian men and women, is one of the major tasks of the theologian
today.”17 Whereas thinkers like Sorley, Rashdall, and Webb, along with H. P. Owen, go to great
lengths to link morality with God, Farmer is particularly helpful on understanding the
fundamental importance of God’s personhood for religious belief in general, and, more
specifically, how Christian revelation provides a robust account of the intrinsically personal,
Trinitarian nature of God. As a result, he is a thinker that cannot be overlooked.
C. S. Lewis (1898-1963)
C. S. Lewis’s version of the moral argument, located mainly in Book 1 of Mere
Christianity,18 did more to generate interest in the moral argument than any other writing ever
produced.19 Lewis’s version of the argument essentially rests upon two key premises: (1) There
is an objective moral law; and (2) Humans have fallen short of the objective moral law.
Therefore, Lewis proposes that there must be something like a Mind behind the moral law (to
explain the first premise), and that only if this Mind forgives can human beings be alleviated of
their guilty status (to deal with premise two). Lewis’s claims that the moral law is basically a “set
of instructions” for living, and his talk of divine forgiveness eventually lead him to conceptualize
a personal God, One who makes possible personal actions such as instruction-giving and
forgiving.20 Although Lewis’s main argument is found within the first part of Mere Christianity,

17

Farmer, The World and God, 15.

18

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2001).

19

On a personal note, it was originally the thought of C. S. Lewis that triggered my interest in the moral
argument. My copy of Mere Christianity is filled with notes in the margins that eventually developed into what
became this dissertation.
20

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 160-165 (Book 4, Chapter 2).
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there many other places where he addresses the moral argument, like in his The Abolition of
Man, Miracles, The Problem of Pain, and God in the Dock.21
H. P. Owen (1926-1996)
H. P. Owen’s The Moral Argument for Christian Theism aims to show that morality
provides firm grounds for believing not just in “a transcendent, personal and holy God,” 22 but in
God of Christianity more specifically, which makes his version of the argument more than an
inference to generic theism. There are several ways Owen’s argument points to the personal God
of Christian theism, including his thoughts on the personal nature of various moral categories,
including moral order, obligation, guilt, and the apparent pull or attractiveness of the moral law,
to name a few. As with Rashdall, Webb, and Farmer, Owen has much to say about morality and
the personal nature of God. Consequently, his voice will be heard again in the conversations that
follow.
Other Historical Thinkers
There are other historical figures in the field of moral apologetics who are worth
mentioning here, including John Henry Newman (1801-1890) and A. E. Taylor (1869-1945),
who both speak on the personal nature of guilt, among other things. Henry Sidgwick (18381900) also provides helpful insight on the personal concept of moral motivation, and W. G. De
Burgh (1866-1943) provides helpful discussions on moral values, moral duties, and reverence for
the moral law. There are certainly other important figures playing significant roles in the
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C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2001). C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New
York, NY: HarperCollins, 2001). C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2001). C. S.
Lewis, God in the Dock, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2014).
22

H. P. Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), 7.
Emphasis is added here to “personal.”
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development of the argument, many of which will be mentioned at some point in this
dissertation.
Contemporary Thinkers
In addition to the historical moral apologists, there are several contemporary thinkers
who deserve special attention as well. William Lane Craig (1949-present), one of the foremost
Christian apologists of the present day, claims that the moral argument, although not his favorite
of the classical theistic arguments, is the most persuasive theistic argument in his opinion.23
Craig is one of the contemporary thinkers who connects morality with a personal God by
insisting, for instance, that moral values, such as justice, exist as properties of persons and cannot
be reduced to mere abstractions. 24 Jerry L. Walls (1955-present) and David Baggett (1965present) deserve special attention here, as they have co-authored three books on the moral
argument, with a fourth in the works. Although they have written a trilogy of books on the moral
argument thus far, it is in The Moral Argument: A History where Walls and Baggett provide
numerous connections between morality and a personal God.25 Moreover, Baggett has also coauthored a book with his wife, Marybeth Baggett (1972-present), entitled The Morals of the
Story, where the personal nature of God is a focal point.26 Another contemporary philosopher,

Craig admits, “In my experience, the moral argument is the most effective of all the arguments for the
existence of God. I say this grudgingly because my favorite is the cosmological argument. But cosmological and
teleological arguments don’t touch people where they live. The moral argument cannot be so easily brushed aside.
For every day you get up you answer the question of whether there are objective moral values and duties by how
you live. It’s unavoidable.” William Lane Craig, On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision
(Colorado Springs, CO: David C Cook, 2010), 144.
23

24

William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 179.

25
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2016). David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011). Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument: A History.
26

David Baggett and Marybeth Baggett, The Morals of the Story: Good News About a Good God (Downers
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2018).
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Mark D. Linville (1957-present), notes how theism is well situated and equipped to account for
human persons, moral agency, and personal dignity. 27 Finally, Paul Copan (1962-present) ties
morality and personhood together, and, more specifically, maintains that moral categories, such
as moral values, are only actualized if a personal God exists. 28 Copan also argues that human
guilt felt before an abstract, impersonal (or non-personal) moral code seems odd and even
misguided.29 As with the historical thinkers, there are surely other modern thinkers who provide
helpful thoughts on morality and the personhood of God,30 some of whom will be mentioned in
the pages to come.
Again, without the writings of these individuals, the moral argument would not possess
the sort of widespread appeal and philosophical force that it enjoys today. It is because of these
named individuals, and others, that the moral argument has been given a seat at the philosophical
table of discussion where the big questions of life, such as God’s existence, are debated. Over the
past few decades, in particular, the resurgence of interest in the moral argument has been
exciting to see.

27

Linville has written a helpful encyclopedia article on the history of the moral argument. Mark D.
Linville, “Moral Argument” in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, eds., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of
Religion (Blackwell). Another substantive piece is Linville’s “God is Necessary for Morality” in Michael Peterson
and Ray VanArragon, eds., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019).
28

Paul Copan, Is God a Moral Monster? Making Sense of the Old Testament God (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 2011), 211. Copan has also authored a very helpful book on the topic with Matthew Flannagan. See Paul
Copan and Matthew Flannagan, Did God Really Command Genocide? Coming to Terms with the Justice of God
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2014).
29
Paul Copan, True For You, But Not For Me (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1998), 62. Copan also
wrote a widely anthologized piece on the moral argument with Mark D. Linville. See Paul Copan and Mark D.
Linville, The Moral Argument (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
30

Robert M. Adams, C. Stephen Evans, and Mark Murphy deserve special mention here. Each of these
individuals have offered significant contributions to moral philosophy.
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The Moral Argument and God’s Character
According to Farmer, “[T]he important question is, what is the character of God, what is
the character of this ultimate, underived, unifying reality which we seem compelled to think of as
the ground of the existence of the multitudinous ‘bits and pieces’ of reality which make up our
everyday world?” 31 One “bit” or “piece” of reality that Farmer refers to is morality, and morality,
or more specifically, the moral argument, greatly aids in the quest to determine the character of
its ground or source. Not only is God non-contingent first cause, maximally great, and
intelligent—as the cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments demonstrate—the
moral argument points to God as essentially good and loving, as well as transcendent yet deeply
personal.32 Moral evidence, perhaps unlike or better than evidence from nature, reveals and
points to a God who is worthy of worship since a God who is worthy of worship must be morally
perfect and seek what is best for humans (i.e., their redemption). 33 In all monotheistic traditions,
God is presented as a Being who is worthy of worship; to posit a God or god who is not worthy
of worship is to lower the bar, and one should not lower the bar or standard when it comes to the
divine. The God that results from the cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments
might be the first cause, maximally great, or intelligent, but it at least seems possible that this
God might also be morally imperfect, altogether averse to humans, or worse, a vindictive ruler or

31

Farmer, Towards Belief in God, 16.

32

One might object by pointing out an alleged contradiction between divine transcendence and divine
immanence. However, it is important to note that Christian theism, for example, maintains the transcendence as well
as the immanence (personal nature) of God (e.g., Jer. 23:23-24). As Clement Webb states, “Theism is not the
doctrine of a merely ‘transcendent’ God (it is presumably to indicate that the word ‘Deism’ is often used in
distinction from ‘Theism’ to express such a doctrine); the recognition of divine immanence is as indispensable to a
genuine Theism as that of divine transcendence.” Clement C. J. Webb, Religion and Theism (London: George Allen
& Unwin Ltd., 1934), 142.
33

It is important to note that if there is a God who seeks what is best for humans—chiefly, their
redemption—he is One who is personal in nature. This will be discussed more in chapter 6 when the category of
moral transformation is examined.
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cosmic bully. This is not to say that these arguments are not helpful. The point is that it is the
moral argument that reveals or points to a God who is morally perfect, essentially loving,
transcendent, and personal—and therefore, worthy of worship and devotion.34
Generally speaking, classical arguments for God’s existence do not get one to the God of
any particular religion, but it appears that the moral argument may be able to move one closer to
than the other arguments to a particular conception of God due to its ability to reveal more of
who God is (e.g., good, loving, personal, etc.). As Lewis says, there are basically two bits of
evidence for God in the universe: (1) the universe God has made; and (2) the moral law. And
according to Lewis, the moral law “is a better bit of evidence than the other, because it is inside
information. You find out more about God from the Moral Law than from the universe in general
just as you find out more about a man by listening to his conversation than by looking at a house
he has built.” 35 Similarly, Baggett and Walls suggest, “The moral argument is practically unique
among the arguments from natural theology, in furnishing us warrant to infer not just that God
exists, but that a God of a particular character exists.” 36 This is significant because who God is is
just as important as that God is, and if the moral argument is able to reveal more of God’s
particular character, it possesses a distinct advantage over the other arguments in this area.37

34

Credit for some of these ideas goes to Paul K. Moser, who shares these concepts in this YouTube video:
https://youtu.be/qiClbtO_qLI. Kant also speaks on this advantage of the moral argument in his Critique of Practical
Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 148-150.
35

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 29.

36

Baggett and Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, 49-50.

The most powerful approach is cumulative in nature, utilizing all of the arguments for God’s existence in
an effort to demonstrate his existence and better understand what he is like. The goal here is not to suggest that the
arguments are in competition with one another; rather, it is to point out a distinctive advantage of the moral
argument.
37
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The Debate Over God as Person and God as Personal
The concept that God is personal is an important part of religious belief. If God were not
personal, it would be odd to think of him as moral or loving. It would also seem counterintuitive
to speak of him as One with whom humans can have a personal relationship, One who can be
trusted, cares for the people he created, listens to their prayers, acts on their behalf, has their best
interests at heart, and so on. In short, to talk of such matters in a sensible manner and to
experience them in everyday life seemingly requires that God is personal.
Numerous religious belief systems describe God as a person or claim that he is personal
in some sense. For example, in Hinduism, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva are represented in personlike form. In Islam, Allah possesses a face and two hands (Surah 38:75), has the ability to see
and sits on a throne (Surah 57:4), is compassionate and merciful (Surah 1:3), and responds to the
prayers of his people (Surah 11:61). In the Hebrew Bible (or Old Testament), God is One who
decides to create (Gen. 1:1), walks in the Garden of Eden (Gen. 3:8), expresses emotions (Ex.
33:19; Is. 61:8), disciplines (Deut. 8:5), converses with human beings (Job 38-41), and reasons
(Is. 1:18). The New Testament describes God’s desire to be in relationship with those he has
created (Jn. 15:13-15; Jas. 4:8; 1 Pet. 3:18; 1 Jn. 3:1), displays compassion (Mt. 9:36), judges
(Jas. 4:12), loves (1 Jn. 4:10), and responds to prayers (Mt. 7:7-8; Mk. 11:24).38
Of course, there are those who argue that God cannot be “a person.” For instance, Brian
Davies argues that in order for one to be classified as a person, he or she must have a body, and
since God is a disembodied spirit or force, God cannot be a person. 39 Others, such as Keith

38
Elizabeth Burns, “Must Theists Believe in a Personal God?” The Royal Institute of Philosophy, Think 23,
vol. 8 (Autumn 2009): 77-86.
39

Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (London, Continuum, 2006), 61. One might
respond to this objection by simply stating that God is a person without a body, as Richard Swinburne has do ne in
The Coherence of Theism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 101. Arguing from a Christian view of
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Ward, argue that God lacks certain attributes that persons usually possess, such as the inability to
think abstractly since divine knowledge is “complete and intuitive.”40 Davies also argues that
God cannot experience emotions because to experience emotions is to be changed by something
other than oneself.41 Moreover, Ward contends that there are other attributes that God possesses
that persons do not normally feature, such as the notion that he is a supremely perfect being and
creator of everything not himself. 42 For Davies, the latter is problematic because persons are
parts of creation, and God is the creator, so he cannot be a person (because he is not part of
creation; persons are created beings in Davies’ estimation). 43 Another problem that Ward
assumes is that the person model implies that God and human persons are distinct things of the
same kind, which seemingly fails to do justice to the idea that God is within human beings, or
that human beings are one with God. 44
In an attempt to clarify the debate over God as person/personal, in the literature there are
three main ways God is classified on this score: (1) God is a person and so personal; (2) God is
non-personal, and so is not a person; or (3) God is a personal non-person.45 The first two views
are probably more familiar positions, as the first is the position held by most contemporary
God, one could even say that God, more specifically, the Second Person of the Trinity (i.e., Jesus Christ, God’s
Son), does possess a body.
Keith Ward, “Is God a Person?” in Gijsbert van den Brink, Luco J. van den Bron, and Marcel Sarot, eds.,
Christian Faith and Philosophical Theology: Essays in Honour of Vincent Brummer (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992),
261.
41
Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, 209.
40

42

Ward, “Is God a Person?”, 262.

43

Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, 62-68.

44

Ward, “Is God a Person?” 264.

45

For an overview of these three views, and for a defense of the first (that God is a person and so personal),
see Ben Page, “Wherein Lies the Debate? Concerning Whether God is a Person,” International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion, 85 (June 2019): 297-317. The first view is the view that the present moral argument for a
personal God assumes. It also needs to be noted that a fourth option actually exists, especially for Christian
philosophers, as they believe God is three Persons and thus personal.
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monotheist philosophers46 and the second by those who are pantheists. The third view, which is
likely less familiar to many, states that if God is not “a person,” it is at least possible to refer to
God as “personal.” 47 This approach would accept that God has some person-like characteristics,
and that he has them to a greater extent than human persons do. But, this begs the question
regarding how many, or what specific attributes God needs in order to be described as personal.
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood, and where does God stand on
that score? Also, one must explain exactly what is meant by the term “personal.”
The sticking point for many who apparently hold the third view, such as Ward and
Davies, is over what it means to be a “person.” However, Ward and Davies conflate personhood
with humanity and then project this view onto God, which then makes it impossible, or at least
very difficult, to call God a “person.” An alternate view might maintain that if God is the Creator
of human persons, one should begin with God in their attempt to understand and define
personhood, and then project that understanding onto human persons. This view would make it
possible to refer to God as a divine Person and human beings as human persons, since humans
are created by God and therefore bear some resemblance to him. Instead of a bottom-up
approach (like the approaches utilized by Ward and Davies), this is a top-down approach, and is
closely related to Anselm’s understanding of God as the perfect being possessing all of the
“omni” qualities.

46

For example, see T. J. Mawson, Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14; Brian Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?” Nous, 24 (1990), 590;
Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 104; J. E. Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” in Thomas P. Flint and Michael
C. Rea, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009),
106; and Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), vii.
Those who hold this view prefer referring to God as a “principle,” “ground,” or in some other similar
way. Graham Oppy, Describing Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 10.
47
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In this entire debate, it is important to note that claiming God is a person is not the exact
same as claiming that human beings are persons. It is to say that God, like human persons,
necessarily possesses the attributes found within human persons, albeit in the fullest sense
possible.48 As T. J. Mawson writes, God is “more of a person than any of us could ever hope to
be.”49 Similarly, Brian Leftow claims, “If God is a person of an extraordinary sort, He is still a
person.”50 If this view is adopted, it is at least possible to speak of God as a person,51 although
the goal of this section is not to solve the matter entirely; rather, it is to simply introduce the
issue, which will be dealt with more appropriately later.52

Stephen T. Davis, “God’s Actions,” in R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, In Defense of
Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 164.
Utilizing a top-down approach, this would mean that if God possess personhood and a personal nature in the fullest
sense possible, then humans possess personhood and a personal nature in virtue of being created by God, although in
a much less sense than God himself, who is the supreme Person and personal to the highest degree attainable. See
Brian Leftow, “Anselm’s Perfect-Being Theology,” in Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, eds., Cambridge Companion
to Anselm (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 134; and Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia Dei, q.9,
a.3, co. Also see Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).
Morris argues that God has the attributes of humanity, but not of mere humanity.
48
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Mawson, Belief in God, 20; T. J. Mawson, The Divine Attributes (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2019), 18.
Brian Leftow, “Naturalistic Pantheism,” in Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa, eds., Alternative
Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 73.
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Some would say that by viewing God as the perfect or ultimate “person,” such as what is being suggested
here, God’s transcendence is denigrated and he becomes too anthropomorphic. See Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas
on God and Evil (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 120; Oppy, Describing Gods, 311; and J. L.
Schellenberg, “God for All Time: From Theism to Ultimism,” in Buckareff and Nagasawa, Alternative Concepts of
God, 173-174.
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This issue will be discussed more in chapter 7, when metaphysical systems that posit a personal God are
examined. One interesting conversation surrounding the debate over God as a Person involves the Christian
understanding that God is actually three Persons. This is one of the challenges that will be discussed later.
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The Definition of Key Terms
Person
In order to clarify and to set the stage for the argument that follows, a few key terms need
defining, such as “person,” “personal,” “personhood,” and “personality.” As a side note, there
are some things that seem to resist definition, or are at least difficult to “pin down” or define
precisely. For instance, how should one define terms like “beauty,” “music,” or “green?”
Obviously, one might provide examples of these things such as roses, a guitar being played, or
grass in the spring—but this is not defining the terms except ostensively. In some ways, the task
of defining “person,” “personhood,” “personal,” and other corresponding terms is similar in this
regard.53 This is one reason why the task of defining personhood has been taken up by
philosophers for thousands of years.54 In order to better understand the meaning of the English
word “person,” which is of Greek and Latin origins, one must examine the Greek and Latin

The difficulty involved with defining what it means to be a “person,” although tricky, is a task that must
not be ignored or overlooked. It is of extreme importance to define this term because how it is defined will play a
crucial role in how persons are viewed and treated—both the unborn (or preborn) and born. History is replete with
examples of personhood or humanity being denied or reduced in order to justify atrocious treatment—slavery, the
Holocaust, abortion, etc. On a different note, Socrates was notorious for pushing his interlocutors to define certain
realities almost impossibly difficult to explain with precision, which likely detracted from his popularity.
53

54
A few words from Stephen T. Davis are helpful here. Davis says, “Person is one of those words that
probably cannot be defined rigorously. Nevertheless, let us loosely define the term as ‘a conscious purposive agent.’
Conscious means that persons are things that engage in ‘mental’ or ‘conscious’ acts like thinking, feeling, desiring,
willing, believing and knowing. Purposive means that persons are things that have certain desires, intentions or
aims, and set out to achieve them. Agent means that persons are things that have the ability to act, to do or to achieve
things in the world. Obviously, there are limitations on what human agents can achieve. No matter how badly I
might want to leap over a tall building, I could not do it. But if I wanted to walk to the library or telephone my wife,
I almost certainly could do those things. There are perhaps other notions that are constitutive of our concept of
persons. For example, a person can be harmed or benefited; a person is able to make moral judgments; a person is a
member of a linguistic community; and a person is able to formulate second-order desires or wants (that is, wants
about wants, like the desire to cease desiring cigarettes). Accordingly, let us say that a person is a conscious,
purposive agent that possesses a significant number of the properties just mentioned.” Stephen T. Davis, “God’s
Actions,” in Geivett and Habermas, In Defense of Miracles, 164.
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terms. The chart below contains definitions of two terms: the Greek “πρόσωπον” and the Latin
“persona.”55
Greek
πρόσωπον: person; a less technical term than
ὑπόστασις or subsistentia used to refer to the
three persons of the Trinity. 56 The original
meaning of πρόσωπον was “face” or
“expression,” but by the time the Greek
fathers appropriated the word for its use in
Trinitarian theology, πρόσωπον had taken on
the connotation of “role,” as in a play, and of
the individual person indicated by the role.

Latin
persona: person; a person is, according to
Boethius’ definition, an individual substance
of a rational nature. Like πρόσωπον, persona
carries the connotation of a dramatic role in a
play or a mask worn by an actor while playing
a role.57

The goal of this section is less to argue what is meant by “person” on a human level, but
rather what the term implies when directed toward God.58 If God exists, he is the One who
establishes personhood. He is “the premier person, the first and chief exemplar of personhood . .
. and the properties most important for an understanding of our personhood are properties we
share with him.” 59 If God is the very standard of personhood, humans are arguably persons only
insofar as they imitate or at least possess the ability to imitate him. Therefore, yet again, when

55

Definitions for each term taken from Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological
Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017).
The purpose of this chart is to serve as a reference point for the ensuing discussion.
56

Interestingly, the notion of personhood most clearly first arose in the context of figuring out what the
doctrine of the Trinity meant. Clement Webb argues that “it is beyond question that historically it was in connexion
[sic] with the doctrine of the Trinity that the words ‘person’ and ‘personality’ came to be used of the Divine Being.”
Webb, God and Personality, 61. Webb provides a helpful discussion of the history of the notion of personhood
(which he says first arises in discussions pertaining to the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity) in God and
Personality, 35-60.
57

The historical development of this term, particularly from the fourth century on, contains lots of twists
and turns. For a detailed discussion of this, see “persona” in Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological
Terms.
58

Though these questions may be intimately related, the goal is not necessarily to provide a solution here.

Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers, vol. 1, issue 3 (1984): 253-271.
59
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defining “person” in relation to God, one must avoid importing the idea of “person” as one
thinks of it in terms of a human being. Rather, the point is that when seeking to define “person,”
one ought to use a top-down approach by starting with God rather than man. In sum, although
there are various ways of defining “person,” there is a general consensus that a person is a selfconscious being who thinks, feels, and wills, and who is capable of loving and being loved by
other persons. As a result, this is how “person” will be understood here.
Personal60
There are important characteristics of a God who is personal, including his ability to
think, feel, will, and perhaps most importantly, his ability to enter into personal relationship with
others (i.e., human persons) outside himself. 61 When speaking of God as “personal,” one has in
mind what is always possible of personal relations—worship, trust, and love—between oneself
and God.62 Even the idea of humans directing emotion toward the Supreme Reality, which
regularly occurs, is not easily describable apart from reference to a personal God. 63 Thus, on the
whole, although other characteristics are required of a personal God, one ought not speak of a
personal God unless it is supposed that he or she can stand in personal relation to him.64
Throughout this dissertation, terms such as “personhood” and “personality” are largely used
synonymously with the term “personal.” On the other hand, “non-personal” and “impersonal” are used as antonyms
of “personal” and other similar terms.
60

Hastings Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), 55.
Similarly, Webb notes that God (the “personal Absolute”) is “a Being with whom persons can stand in personal
relations.” Webb, God and Personality, 123, 126.
61
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Webb, God and Personality, 70.
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Clement C. J. Webb, Divine Personality and Human Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920), 17-

18.
64
What constitutes a personal relationship? According to Farmer, “The answer would seem to be that he is
recognized as one with a right and claim to speak and to be spoken to, and not merely to be spoken about, to be
consulted, a right and a claim which must be met so soon as the physical situation permits it. Everything is focused
in this idea of speech to a person and not merely about him. Thus ‘speech to’ presupposes that the person addressed
has rational intelligence, does not lack what is sometimes called, in a very significant sense, discourse of reason; that
he is a self-directing and responsible will who can engage, in the light of his own rational judgment, in an answering
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Other characteristics are usually associated with the term “personal,” such as selfconsciousness, along with the capacity to reason, experience emotions, make decisions, and act.
According to Nancy Pearcey, a personal being is “a conscious agent with the capacity to think,
feel, choose, and act—in contrast to an unconscious principle or substance that operates by blind,
automatic forces (such as the forces of nature).” 65 If it is justifiable to think of God as a selfconscious Being who thinks, feels, wills, and who is capable of loving and being loved by other
persons, then it seems natural to think and speak of God’s existence as personal. For to exist as
“a self-conscious being—conscious of itself and other beings, thinking, willing, feeling, loving—
is what we mean by being a person.”66

activity of speech, indeed in any activity relevant and significant to the situation; that he is in a measure not
dependent on merely external forces playing upon him and manipulating him by impact, as a leaf is blown by the
wind, but can recognize and respond to what I mean. All this, implicit in our awareness of the other to whom we
speak, is implicit also in our awareness of ourselves as speaking; for if there were no possibility of being spoken to
in return, though it be only by a nod or a shake of the head, we would not speak at all. The shortest way to sum the
whole matter up is the one which has come much to the fore in recent thought, namely to say that in a specifically
personal relationship a living being is a ‘thou’ to us, and we are a ‘thou’ to him. It is an ‘I-thou’ relationship, or a
‘thou-thou’ relationship. An impersonal relationship is an ‘I-it’ or an ‘it-it’ relationship. Or in more technical
language, the difference between a personal and an impersonal relationship is the difference between a subjectsubject relationship and a subject-object relationship. Where the other being is fully grasped and treated as a subject
and not as an object, there is apprehension of him as personal. But the best way undoubtedly is to use the idea of
‘thou,’ the second person, as over against ‘he, she or it,’ the third person. The collocation ‘he, she or it’ is
significant. ‘He’ or ‘she’ we say are personal pronouns, ‘it’ is impersonal; yet in conjugating the verb we put them
together. Why? Precisely because ‘he’ and ‘she’ refer to persons, i.e. are about persons, they are just for that reason
pro tanto impersonal in the relation they indicate, and are indistinguishable from ‘it.’ That is why sensitive people
have an instinctive recoil from saying things behind other people’s backs which they would not be prepared to say to
their face. They sense the impersonality of it. They feel that the only protection against this impersonality is always
to test ‘speech about’ in the light of ‘speech to.’” H. H. Farmer, Towards Belief in God (London: Student Christian
Movement Press, 1942), 34-35. The “face-to-face” dynamic is key. The face is key to understanding personhood, it
would seem (at least etymologically, but likely in a stronger sense). It is interesting that on the Judeo-Christian view
one cannot see God’s face and live. Face-to-face interactions serve to constrain humanity’s rudeness—this is why
internet interactions are so often hideous; there is something awful within humans that is usually only latent and held
in check by the strictures of personal encounters; remove the constraints and the ugliness so often ensues.
65

Nancy Pearcey, Finding Truth: 5 Principles for Unmasking Atheism, Secularism, and Other God
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The Flow of Things
The universe and everything contained within it is either the result of a personal God (or
gods) or a non-personal essence, force, or set of natural processes. Ultimate reality is either
personal or non-personal, and everything within the universe flows from one or the other. This
leads to the question: What best explains the observable data in the universe, such as
cosmological constants, DNA, human personality, and morality?67 Are these things the result of
a personal God or a non-personal essence, force, or set of natural processes?
When gathering evidence for God, it is important to note that an effect cannot have a
quality the cause did not have to give (principle of causality). For instance, a horse cannot
produce a 2021 Ford Bronco, simply because a horse does not possess the inherent qualities
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Although the present argument focuses on morality, there are indicators from design that a personal God
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necessary for producing a car of any type, let alone a 2021 Ford Bronco. As Lewis says,
“Descent, downward movement, is the key word. The march of all things is from higher to
lower. The rude and imperfect always springs from something perfect and developed.” 68 In short,
a stream cannot rise higher than its source. 69 This means that if something such as morality is
personal, it must come from something that is personal. Certainly, something that is non-personal
or impersonal can come from something that is personal (e.g., a painting from an artist), but
something that is personal cannot come from something that is non-personal or impersonal (e.g.,
an artist from a painting).70 Simply put, “. . . impersonal cannot account for personal being . . .”71
What this means for the argument at hand is that if moral facts exist, and if they are personal in
nature, they strongly point in the direction of a personal God.

Approach
Although there are several ways for one to go about arguing from morality to the
existence of God,72 something resembling an abductive methodology is utilized throughout this
work. A method of this sort gathers the available data or evidence, analyzes it, and then makes an
inference to the best explanation. This is not a knockdown approach or a form of arguing that

68

Lewis, God in the Dock, 227.

69

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 48.

70

The former is an example of a stream not rising above its source, whereas the latter is an instance where a
stream does rise above its source.
71

Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, 71.

One common approach involves arguing deductively, as William Lane Craig oftentimes does. Craig’s
argument is deductive in nature, which means, if valid, that the conclusion follows with airtight certainty from the
premises. Craig’s moral argument looks like this: (P1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties
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72

23

produces certainty, but rather one that results in plausibility or probability.73 Applying this
method to the current project, several categories of moral phenomena/evidence will be examined,
such as moral knowledge, moral values, moral obligations, and moral transformation. Data will
be identified, and then the data or evidence will be explained by several possible explanation
candidates in an effort to determine which hypothesis possesses the most explanatory power,
widest explanatory scope, is the most plausible, and so on.74 In discursive format, an abductive
moral argument looks something like this:
P1) There are objective moral values and duties.
P2) The best explanation of objective moral values and duties is God.
C) Therefore, (plausibly or probably) God exists.
There are several reasons for adopting this sort of approach for the task at hand. First, it is
a modest, humble approach. It recognizes that there are other possible explanations, that there is
more work to be done, and that knowledge of ultimate reality, especially apart from special
revelation, is virtually impossible to attain. Second, it is likely more charitable and respectful,

Edward John Carnell defines probability in this way: “Probability is that state of coherence in which
more evidence can be corralled for a given hypothesis than can be amassed against it. The more the evidences
increase, the more the strength of probability increases.” Edward John Carnell, An Introduction to Christian
Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 113.
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gentle and kind. It recognizes that there are real people behind the arguments, and that the goal is
not necessarily to win an argument or crush an opponent, but to listen and learn, and strive
ultimately to win a person. As the apostle Peter says in 1 Peter 3:15, one ought to “always [be]
prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet
do it with gentleness and respect” (emphasis added). Elsewhere, in Colossians 4:6, the apostle
Paul says something similar when he states, “Let your speech always be gracious, seasoned with
salt, so that you may know how you ought to answer each person” (emphasis added). Third, this
kind of approach recognizes that there is common ground among people of various belief
systems. In fact, arguing in this manner likely makes points of convergence, overlap, and
resonance with competing theories more likely—which then, in turn, provides opportunities for
more meaningful conversation. For these reasons, and others, something akin to an abductive
approach is preferred. 75

Format, Goals, and Key Questions of this Moral Argument
Format
The approach being taken here, as noted above, is more abductive in nature, where
several of the features of morality are examined and then an attempt is made to locate the likely
best source of the moral law. Arguments of this variety are oftentimes not provided in discursive
format; however, out of a desire to clearly lay out the ensuing argument, the argument is
provided below in the clearest form possible:
P1) There are objective moral facts.

75

To be honest and clear, a full abductive case cannot be taken on in one dissertation on a topic of this
magnitude. There are simply too many alternatives to consider. Therefore, the desire in this project is to simply
contribute to what is a much larger project. There are many more parts to the larger project that have to be
undertaken in order to make a more complete abductive case.
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P2) Objective moral facts possess many features that are personal in nature.
P3) The best explanation of objective moral facts, which possess a personal nature, is a
personal source (i.e., a personal God).
P4) Naturalism, which is non-personal, is likely unable to account for the personal nature
of morality. Platonism, which is also non-personal, faces a challenge when attempting to
account for the personal nature of morality.
P5) Although there are several metaphysical systems that describe God as personal,
Christianity is unique in its Trinitarian description of God as an intrinsically personal
Being from all eternity.
C) Therefore, Christianity is a plausible and even robust explanation of the personal
nature of objective moral facts.
Goals
There are essentially three overarching goals of this particular moral argument: (1)
provide reasons for taking objective morality seriously; (2) examine the nature of morality by
considering four moral categories—moral knowledge, moral values, moral obligations, and
moral transformation; and (3) locate the likely best source of morality given its personal or nonpersonal nature.
Key Questions
Every dissertation involves attempting to answer key questions. There are essentially
three key questions that this dissertation seeks to answer:
(1) Are there objective moral facts?
(2) What is the nature of objective moral facts, particularly the various categories of
morality in general: non-personal or personal?
(3) Given the personal or non-personal nature of objective moral categories, what is their
likely best source?

26

A Few Brief Clarifications
Before proceeding further, stressing the following point is of great importance: The goal
of this version of the moral argument is not to say that God’s personhood is the key to the moral
argument, but that God’s personhood renders him the likely best explanation of various moral
phenomena, including moral knowledge, values, duties, and transformation. There are various
reasons for avoiding language that hints at saying the personal nature of God is the key to the
moral argument. First, God’s personhood is largely built into the operative conception of
theology on several belief systems. For example, when the Jewish, Islamic, or Christian
conception of God is in view, the personality of God is typically presupposed in every reference
to God that one makes. 76 Second, the personhood of God alone does not distinguish between
rival conceptions of the divine. What is needed is the God of the “omni” qualities (per Anselm),
which indicates that “personality” is among other attributes that one needs in his or her right
theology. While the moral argument may reveal that God is essentially personal, as well as
essentially loving, holy, just and sovereign, along with lots of other things, other classical
arguments may be able to more effectively show that God is, say, omnipotent and omnipresent. 77
This is why the moral argument, while powerful on its own, is most effective when part of a
cumulative case.78 Third, the personhood of God is one among other features of God that render
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him the likely best explanation of moral facts. Accordingly, rather than viewing a project on the
personality of God as a stand-alone project, it ought to be viewed as a small part of a much larger
community effort. God’s personal nature may very well provide substantial insight into various
moral categories, and may even be necessary for other attributes of God to retain sensibility, but
his personality alone does not entail that he is essentially loving, holy and sovereign, among
other things. Fourth, maintaining that the personhood of God is the key to the moral argument
lacks epistemic humility and ignores the fact that there is always more work to accomplish when
it comes to comprehending the ineffable character of God. Again, for these reasons, the aim of
this project is not to say that God’s personality is the key or the bridge that allows one to move
from the moral argument to the God of a particular religion (e.g., Christian theism), although it
will be shown that it is certainly relevant to that further step. 79

Overview of Chapters
Following the introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 seeks to provide fifteen reasons for
believing in objective morality, and then considers a few matters that frame the remainder of the
dissertation, including the nature and origin of moral facts. Chapter 3 focuses on the first of four
moral categories to be examined in the present work, moral knowledge. Since there are skeptics
who contend moral knowledge is not possible, a few responses are provided in an effort to at
least allow for the possibility of moral knowledge. A few reasons for believing in the possibility

prey to partisanship, one ought to admit—regardless of his or her favorite argument—that the arguments actually
work together in order form an even stronger team.
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in something akin to philosophical theology (especially in chapters 6 and 7) as I ultimately desire to demonstrate
that Christianity provides a robust account of the nature of morality.
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of moral knowledge are provided, and then the nature of moral knowledge is considered, with
emphasis on whether moral knowledge is personal or non-personal, and therefore pointings in
the direction of a personal or non-personal source. In chapter 4, the category of moral values is
examined in an effort to determine the nature of moral values, and thus, their source. Chapter 5
deals with moral obligations or duties, considers the possibility of them being commands from
God, and then seeks to determine if they point more in the direction of a personal or nonpersonal source. In chapter 6, the fourth moral category, moral transformation, is analyzed, with
the goal of determining whether it points more in the direction of a personal or non-personal
source. In the conclusion (chapter 7), the evidence gathered throughout the dissertation is
summarized, and then weighed against several belief systems, with the ultimate goal being to
demonstrate that Christian theism is the most plausible candidate for grounding the personal
nature of morality, particularly given Christianity’s conception of God as an intrinsically
personal Being from all eternity.
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CHAPTER TWO: OBJECTIVE MORALITY AND ITS SOURCE
Introduction
The cornerstone of the moral argument is the existence of objective moral facts. If there
really are moral facts that hold true regardless of human opinions and emotions, the moral
argument has the ability to convince. However, apart from the existence of objective moral facts,
moral arguments for God’s existence quickly lose their persuasive power. If morality is merely
an illusion, or social construction, a relativistic matter, an emotional projection, or worse yet—an
enormous mistake—then there is no real fodder for constructing the argument.
The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche claims, “There are altogether no moral
facts.”80 Elsewhere, he maintains that morality “has truth only if God is the truth—it stands or
falls with faith in God.” 81 Various versions of the moral argument for God’s existence basically
utilize Nietzsche’s claims as its two premises. 82 For example, consider this general abductive
version of the moral argument:
P1) There are objective moral facts.
P2) The likely best explanation of objective moral facts is God.
C) Therefore, (plausibly) God exists.
Contra Nietzsche, Premise 1 states that there are objective moral facts (i.e., values and duties, to
start with). If Nietzsche is right—that there are no moral facts—then the argument above
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collapses. On the other hand, if Nietzsche is wrong—if there are moral facts, indeed—then the
moral argument is able to get off the ground. For this reason, before considering how morality
points to a particular source (e.g., God), one must first establish reasons for believing in
objective morality. Therefore, in an effort to address these matters (at least briefly) and to
provide a bit of fuel to get the moral argument moving, this chapter’s chief focus is on providing
reasons for believing in objective moral facts, or at least, for taking the notion of objective
morality seriously.83 At the end of this chapter, a few words will be mentioned regarding the
source of the moral law. These words will serve the purpose of setting up or framing the chapters
that follow.

Objective Moral Facts and Moral Realism
Prior to delving into the various reasons for believing in objective moral facts, it is
important to first understand what they are. There are several important features of moral facts
worth noting. First, moral facts are not dependent on humans; they are discovered by humans.
This means that morality is similar to scientific laws, notes in music, or mathematical formulas—
all of which enjoy objectivity and are thus discovered rather than invented by humans. Second,
moral facts are objective in the sense that they are true regardless of what any human being
anywhere thinks, feels, or believes about them. In other words, even if human beings disagree
with moral facts, the facts hold true. 84 Third, believing there are objective moral facts does not
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necessarily imply moral absolutism. For example, just because one is a moral realist does not
mean that one always thinks it is wrong to perform certain actions, such as killing. Of course, it
is objectively wrong to kill someone for pleasure. However, there are times when taking the life
of another person may well be the right thing to do. For instance, it is arguably objectively right
to take the life of a person who is holding a gun to an innocent child, in order to save the life of
the child. Fourth, moral realism is at least prima facie agnostic on the nature and origin of moral
facts. So, for example, being a moral realist does not necessarily mean that one is also a theist. 85
In order to determine the most likely source of moral facts, one has to examine the various moral
properties. Fifth, there are many different versions of moral realism, and no single description
can adequately account for all of the theories that have taken the label. Despite the differences, it
is possible to define moral realism in a general sense.
When one is speaking of objective moral facts, he is speaking as a moral realist. What is
moral realism? According to Russ Shafer-Landau, “Moral realism is the theory that moral
judgments enjoy a special sort of objectivity: such as judgments, where true, are so
independently of what any human being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of
them.”86 Andrew Fisher explains, “Realism holds that moral judgments can be true or false, that
sometimes they are true and that what makes them true is independent from people’s (or groups
of people’s) beliefs, judgments, or desires.” 87 Generally speaking, despite the various labels the
theory of moral realism receives, moral realism is the view that, among other things perhaps,
there really is an objective standard of right and wrong that holds true regardless of human
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opinions, emotions, beliefs, or judgments. For example, one might think it is permissible to join a
racially motivated group whose mission involves killing people of a different race; however, this
does not change the fact that this person’s decision is morally wrong. Likewise, even if some
people understand rape to be morally acceptable in certain situations, this does not undermine the
wrongness of rape in virtually all situations.
The two examples above bring up an interesting parallel between the study of science and
moral realism. With science, it is assumed there are actual facts about the universe that are
discoverable. These facts are not the product of human invention; rather, they are objective
features of the universe that prompt further study and promote human learning. If there are no
objective features of the universe, there is no basis for scientific inquiry. The same is true with
morality. As moral realism assumes, there are moral facts within the universe that are
discoverable. Such facts are not invented; instead, they are objective features of the universe that
provide a set of moral guidelines or instructions that define and prescribe how humans ought to
live their lives. With science, there may be disagreement over which theory best explains a set of
evidence; however, this does not suggest there is no true theory. It only means that human
persons have not yet mastered the particular area of scientific inquiry. The same is true with
morality. Disagreements that result over moral issues among cultures does not reveal that moral
realism is false; it probably only reveals that humankind has not yet mastered or lived up to the
moral law in the fullest sense. Now that the argument has been introduced and the theory of
moral realism has been briefly explained, it is time to determine whether there are good reasons
for believing in objective moral facts.
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Reasons for Taking Objective Morality Seriously88
When considering reasons for believing in something, it is wise to gather and weigh
evidence before coming to a firm conclusion. To illustrate, consider what is involved when
serving on a jury in a murder case. A task such as this involves listening to testimonies and
examining various evidences presented, determining the facts that flow from the evidence, and
drawing inferences from the facts—all of which forms the basis for one’s decision. So it is with
the case for objective morality: one first considers the reasons (or evidences) for believing in
objective morality and then draws inferences from the data. This leads to the question: Is there
evidence for objective moral facts? When examining the moral landscape, at least fifteen reasons
surface for taking objective morality seriously.89
Reason 1: Obviousness
Some would say that an argument for objective morality is unnecessary because certain
moral facts are just plain obvious. One likely does not need an argument in order to be convinced
of the wrongness of, say, torturing a child for fun; such an act is obviously deplorable. In fact, it
is just as obvious that something like child torture is morally wrong as it is that 2 + 2 = 4,
especially if one understands the nature of children, torture, and fun. These three things simply
do not go together; they are an awful fit. On this score, Michael Ruse, a naturalistic philosopher,
states, “The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken
as the man who says, 2 + 2 = 5.”90 Moral intuition reveals that one could insert any number of

An earlier version of this discussion appears here: Stephen S. Jordan, “C. S. Lewis and 8 Reasons for
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morally unacceptable acts in the place of “rape little children” and the statement would still hold
true. Similarly, atheist philosopher Kai Nielsen, acknowledges:
It is more reasonable to believe such elemental things [wife-beating, child abuse] to be
evil than to believe any skeptical theory that tells us we cannot know or reasonably
believe any of these things to be evil. . . . I firmly believe that this is bedrock and right
and that anyone who does not believe it cannot have probed deeply enough into the
grounds of his moral beliefs.91
Many moral facts are deeply intuitive, which suggests that they are oftentimes self-evident.92 As
Ruse and Nielson indicate above, the wrongness of certain acts is as obvious and easy to figure
out as basic math. In addition to the overwhelming obviousness that certain acts are wrong, there
are many other acts and values that are obviously right, such as helping an elderly neighbor who
cannot afford groceries or viewing all human persons as possessing intrinsic worth.
Ultimately, due to the intuitive nature of moral facts, the burden of proof rests upon the
skeptic to show that moral intuitions are misguided or altogether fallacious. If humanity’s moral
starting point is wrong, the skeptic must demonstrate how. As David Brink says,
Our moral thinking and discourse might be systematically mistaken. But this would be a
revisionary conclusion, to be accepted only as the result of extended and compelling
argument that the commitments of ethical objectivity are unsustainable. In the meantime,
we should treat the objectivity of ethics as a kind of default assumption or working
hypothesis.93
What Brink is saying is that unless there is evidence against ethical objectivity, one is justified in
holding the moral realist position by default. Unless there are compelling defeaters of moral
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realism, moral realism ought to at least be assumed as true. In everyday life, one does not assume
skepticism about her experience in the physical world, that is, unless she is given reason to do so.
If this is the case, why should one accept a skeptical attack on moral intuition if there is no
evidence to support it? One should not doubt one’s moral intuitions unless one has good reasons
for doing so. For example, unless someone can provide a persuasive reason for the moral
permissibility of something along the lines of murdering deformed infants, one is justified in
believing that it is objectively wrong to do so. Simply put, humanity’s general moral intuitions
are usually right, which means they should be viewed and treated as “innocent until proven
guilty.”
Is morality as obvious as is being suggested here? What about psychopaths or sociopaths,
who do not possess the requisite moral capacity for recognizing the wrongness of acts that the
majority of people deem morally abhorrent? When considering this objection, one should
consider the story of David Wood, a diagnosed psychopath who once tried to murder his own
father with a hammer. Wood, though lacking the moral capacity to feel that certain things are
either right or wrong, is able to recognize through reasoning the rightness or wrongness of
certain deeds.94 Though some may raise arguments against objective morality, such as the
psychopath objection, there are adequate responses available. As atheist philosopher Peter Cave
maintains, “[W]hatever skeptical arguments may be brought against our belief that killing the
innocent is morally wrong, we are more certain that the killing is morally wrong than that the
argument is sound. . . . Torturing an innocent child for the sheer fun of it is morally wrong.” 95
Yet again, some moral facts are just plain obvious.

For David Wood’s story and a response to the psychopath objection, see David Baggett, “On
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The argument could basically pause here, waiting for a good response from a skeptic who
holds to a moral anti-realist view. However, out of a desire to provide a more substantive case
for moral realism, additional reasons for believing in objective morality will be provided.96
Reason 2: General Consensus
If an objective moral standard is as obvious as suggested above, there ought to be a
general consensus on what is right and wrong. This is not to say that truth is determined by what
the majority says is true or right, as there are countless examples throughout history where the
majority got it wrong (e.g., the majority of Americans once thought slavery was morally
acceptable). Nevertheless, if one is suggesting that morality is obvious, then it makes sense to
ask if morality is this obvious to virtually everyone. Is there some sort of general consensus on
what is right and wrong? If not, the first reason for believing in objective morality (i.e., it is
obvious) likely fails. 97
Does mankind generally agree, as C. S. Lewis suggests, that a “human idea of decent
behavior [is] obvious to everyone?” 98 Are there things that nearly everyone agrees are either
right or wrong? Although there are various ways to answer this question, Lewis poses an
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interesting solution in his appendix to The Abolition of Man, where he lists numerous examples
of various groups of people throughout the world and human history labeling actions such as
murder, lying, slandering, stealing, abusing women, and adultery as morally wrong and actions
like compassion, care for parents and the elderly in general, care for orphans and the weak,
honesty, self-sacrifice, and love as morally upright. 99 Elsewhere, R. Scott Smith, in his In Search
of Moral Knowledge, lists several moral principles and virtues that are widely, if not universally,
accepted. These moral principles and virtues include: (1) Murder is wrong; (2) Rape is wrong;
(3) Torturing babies for fun is wrong; (4) Love is a virtue; and (5) Justice is a virtue. 100
According to Lewis and Smith, there certainly appear to be moral values and duties that are
widely regarded as good or evil, right or wrong, virtue or vice.
To be fair, the claim that there is a general consensus on morality is not without its
critics.101 A common argument against this notion, and moral realism in general, is that different
people groups (whether religions or cultures) disagree on what morality actually is. For example,
certain sects of Islam agree that it is morally acceptable to enslave women, and specific African
tribes believe that it is appropriate to murder deformed infants. According to moral skeptics,
examples such as these indicate that morality is defined by religious groups or cultures, and that
there is no overarching agreement or general consensus that transcends various religious groups
and cultures. Actually, this is a non sequitur; it does not follow that because there are differing
views on morality at times among religious groups and cultures, there is no such thing as truth on
moral matters. Disagreement over what is right does not indicate that there is no right thing at all;
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it only reveals that humanity has yet to master or fully live up to the standard of the moral law. In
reality, once factual errors underlying moral beliefs—such as the enslavement of women or
murder of deformed infants—are corrected, one is able to see that there is wide agreement on
basic moral facts. In short, there is more convergence on moral issues than some might initially
realize. Fisher presents an intriguing scenario that may illustrate this very point:
Imagine we put fifty people from around the world in individual rooms and ask them to
think up the ten most important moral rules. I suspect there will be a large amount of
convergence. For example, they all might write that it is wrong to steal, or wrong to kill
children, or wrong to enslave people. Although the lists would not be identical there
would certainly be much overlap. . . . A good reason would be that there really are certain
moral properties and that they have been recognized by the people in the rooms. 102
Fisher’s scenario is an interesting one, especially considering the claim that skeptics raise about
the alleged problem of moral convergence. If Fisher’s scenario is accurate, it suggests that moral
convergence, or a general consensus on morality, is probable—and if this is the case, it provides
some evidence for the actual existence of an objective moral law. Of course, since there are rival
explanations, more evidence for moral objectivity is called for.
Reason 3: Moral Reasoning
There are several reasons for tying moral reasoning to a moral realist view. First, not only
do humans live as if moral realism is true, they also converse as if it is true. On a daily basis,
humans reason over moral issues, debating the rightness or wrongness of moral issues—from
private conversations between two people to courts of law, where the outcomes of such
conversations have significant ramifications for large numbers of people. Interestingly, when
human persons reason over moral issues—regardless of the level (private conversation or court
of law)—an objective standard of right and wrong is assumed.103 If there is no objective
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standard, then reasoning over moral issues is on the same level as one arguing with his friends
over the best flavor of ice cream at the local shop (e.g., “I prefer this,” “I don’t like that”).
Imagine a world where discussions on moral issues like adultery, sexuality, abortion,
immigration, drugs, bullying, stealing, and so on become a matter of preference or nothing more
than an emotional projection (e.g., “I prefer not to bully,” or “Boo! Stealing!”). 104 Furthermore, if
there is no objective standard of morality, all views become equally valid and immoral acts such
as stealing for personal pleasure cannot be deemed wrong. If all moral views are equal—which is
only possible if there is no objective moral law—the possibility of moral reasoning on any
meaningful level likely goes out the window. Something seems amiss when talking of moral
issues in this manner. The watering down of moral issues to the point where they no longer
possess significant meaning does not fit with what is known about these issues in reality. In this
way, moral discourse itself provides a measure of evidence for what seems to be most congenial
with moral objectivism, something that Mackie freely conceded.
Second, heated discussions oftentimes ensue over moral issues, which becomes odd, if
not altogether nonsensical, if morality is a matter of preference or an emotional projection.
Again, when two or more individuals reason, or even argue, over moral issues, the existence of
an objective standard of right and wrong is presupposed—a standard that each person is aware of
and one has allegedly broken. Arguing, by definition, involves attempting to show another
person that he or she is in the wrong, and, after all, one cannot be objectively wrong unless some
sort of objective standard exists that defines what is wrong. Moral objectivity in this way
safeguards the possibility of genuine moral disagreements, an important moral datum in need of
adequate explaining, rather than explaining away. As Lewis points out, there is no point in
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calling someone “wrong” unless there is some sort of agreement as to what right and wrong
actually are—just like there is no point in saying a football player has committed a foul if there is
no agreement about the rules of football. 105 Therefore, in order for discussions and even
arguments over moral issues to matter on any level, an objective standard of right and wrong
must be assumed.
Third, in an effort to further illustrate, consider the following scenario. Imagine one
claims that genocide of a certain people group infected by a virus is morally right while another
maintains that it is wrong. Common sense suggests that both of these individuals cannot be right,
and that one of these individuals must be mistaken. If moral realism is false and genocide does
not have the property of being right or wrong, then it is difficult to understand why both of the
individuals in the scenario cannot both be right. Perhaps moral realism is the best explanation for
why it is appropriate to contend that an act such as genocide cannot both be right and non-right,
both good and not-good.106 How would moral reasoning be possible if everyone’s views on
moral issues were thought to be equally valid?
Fourth, consider how the process of reasoning allows human beings to come to realize
that some views or acts are morally detestable. For example, slavery was widely accepted for
years—not only in America, but also throughout the world— but through the process of moral
reasoning, a great swath of people the world over came to realize the detestable nature of slavery
and have since vigorously condemned it. However, if there is no objective moral standard, the
ability to reason morally breaks down, and thus humans cannot come to realize anything
morally, at least not in any meaningful sense.
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Reason 4: Moral Order
Turning on the television, scrolling through social media, or visiting any news outlet
reveals that the world is a place filled with violence, anger, and mistreatment. However, a deeper
look at the world reveals a world where moral order prevails. Even though there are moral
atrocities committed on a daily basis, this does not discredit or undermine the reality of a world
that possesses a sense of moral order. Were it not for a standard of moral order existing, the
world would plausibly be a much worse place for humans to dwell than it currently is. Unlike a
world where moral anti-realism prevails, a world where moral realism exists provides a suitable
home for human beings, particularly regarding how they relate to themselves and treat one
another. In short, the existence of an objective moral law is what makes a world with moral order
possible.
Although an argument for God or any sort of moral lawgiver is not the purpose of this
chapter, it is important to note that moral order implies the existence of a ruler who enforces
certain laws whereas disorder implies the absence of such a ruler. An example of this on a human
level can be seen in movies, such as older Westerns where the phrase “the sheriff is back in
town,” or something similar, emphasizes two key points: (1) the presence of a ruler makes moral
order possible; and (2) the absence of a ruler leads to moral disorder. “The sheriff is back in
town” is a phrase that conveys that a particular town was in a state of moral disorder in the
absence of the sheriff but has now regained its sense of moral order because the sheriff is back to
enforce the laws and set things right. One could also use the example of a king ruling over his
kingdom. When the king is present within his kingdom, there is usually moral order—but when
the king is away from his kingdom, moral disorder ensues. Similarly, a universe that displays
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moral order and harmony seemingly points to a moral lawgiver, perhaps God, the governor of it
all.107
Reason 5: Unlivable World
A major issue with denying objective morality is that it presumably leads to an unlivable
world. One of the quickest ways to establish the importance of an objective moral law involves
contemplating what the world might be like if such a law did not exist. 108 This type of
consideration thus constitutes something of a counterfactual argument. When this approach is
applied to moral anti-realism—again, the view that there is no objective moral law—a number of
issue surface. First, if there is no such thing as objective morality, then virtually everything falls
to the realm of subjective preference. No longer are there things such as justice, fairness,
accountability, good or evil, right or wrong, praise or blame, tolerance, meaningful moral
conversations, moral improvement, and so on. Second, if there is no objective moral law, then
the world in which humans reside is amoral; nothing can be objectively defined as “moral” or
“immoral.” This presents a dilemma, especially considering the apparent obviousness that certain
acts really are right or wrong, good or bad. For instance, could anyone persuasively argue that
moral values such as love and justice are mere preferences, or refer to an event like the
Holocaust as anything less than an atrocity? Third, if morality is not objective, there is no way to
describe how individuals should behave. In fact, the moment one makes such an attempt (to
describe how a person or group of persons should behave), they invoke the notion of objective
morality—which is the very thing that moral anti-realists deny. Certainly, there are other
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problems stemming from a world where there is no objective moral law. The important matter is
for those who reject the concept of objective morality to face the reality of a world that functions
similarly to the one just described.109 A world where there is no objective morality is likely a
world full of chaos and is therefore totally unlivable. To be fair, some might wish to suggest this
carries no evidential force, just prudential reasons to act as if objective morality obtains; but if a
view entails such impracticality, requiring for practical purposes that we treat it as false, this
seems to suggest that there is something evidential at play after all.
What is particularly interesting on this score is that people really live as if moral realism
is true. If moral realism were false, people probably would not live as if moral facts really
exist—but people do live as if moral facts exist—which suggests that moral realism is likely true.
An individual might disagree at this point, claiming that there are indeed practical reasons for
assuming realism, but that this alone does not entail that moral realism is true. Therefore,
arguably the better explanation that people act as though moral realism is true is that it is actually
true, rather than that they merely for pragmatic and practical reasons alone act as if it were true.
Moral realism, for example, conceivably better accounts for the depth of moral convictions, their
ineliminability in certain circumstances, and the level of their ingression, than merely pretending
would explain. Clearly, one may deny realism with his words, but his actions probably reveal
what he really believes about morality. 110 As the old saying goes, actions speak louder than
words—and in this case, the actions of human beings are telling.
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Here is another way to put it: there are basically three tests for truth, which posed in
question form look like this: (1) Does it make sense? In other words, are there any logical
contradictions? (2) Is there evidence for it? If so, where does the evidence lead? (3) Does it work
in real life? In other words, is it livable? The third test for truth is the one being emphasized here.
A world with no objective moral law is a world that is unlivable. The point is that the widespread
convictions about moral realism are more likely on the assumption of moral realism than on its
denial. Of course, this is not a hard proof for moral realism, but one piece of a large puzzle based
on widespread moral experience.
Reason 6: Measuring Value Systems
Oftentimes individuals evaluate or measure value systems, concluding that some value
systems are better or worse than others. For the present discussion, it is important to note that
when an individual states that one value system is better than another, or attempts to replace a
particular value system with a better one, that person assumes an objective standard of judgment.
This objective standard of judgment, which is different from either value system, helps a person
conclude that one value system conforms more closely to the moral standard than another.
Without an objective measuring stick for value systems, there is no way to conclude that
civilized morality, where humans treat one another with dignity and respect, is better than
something akin to savage morality, where humans brutally murder one another, even within their
own tribes at times, for various reasons. 111
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Virtually everyone recognizes that some value systems are better than others. For
instance, the value systems of Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) are
commonly viewed as categorically repugnant, whereas the value system of someone like Mother
Teresa (1910-1997) is celebrated and held in high regard. As David Beck notes, denying the
existence of an objective moral standard of judgment is problematic when it comes time to
measure value systems. According to Beck, “That Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were not really
morally wrong, that we cannot judge a society to be truly guilty if it practices genocide or if it
causes needless environmental damage are such repugnant proposals that we find it impossible to
believe that they could be true.” 112 In short, one must affirm the existence of an objective moral
standard in order to evaluate value systems.
Attempting to illustrate the practical importance of such a standard, Lewis shares a
relevant example:
The reason why your idea of New York can be truer or less true than mine is that New
York is a real place, existing quite apart from what either of us thinks. If when each of us
said ‘New York’ each means merely ‘The town I am imagining in my own head,’ how
could one of us have truer ideas than the other? There would be no question of truth or
falsehood at all.113
Likewise, if there is no objective moral standard, then there is no sense in saying that any one
value system has ever been morally good or morally bad, or morally superior or inferior to other
value systems. Without an objective reference point, there is no way for one value system to be
recognized as good, more closely resembling the moral law, while another value system is bad,
straying far from what the moral law requires.
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It appears that if moral realism is false, then people would not disagree with other value
systems (because all value systems would be equally valid on moral anti-realism—or equally
invalid on error theory, as all moral theories are false on this view). However, people do disagree
with other value systems. The logical conclusion here is that moral realism is true. This is not a
strict deductive proof, but rather a simple way of stating how the measuring of value systems
indicates the existence of an objective moral standard.
Reason 7: Societal Reform
Stemming from the previous reason above, unless there is an objective moral standard, it
is difficult to think there is an adequate basis for societal reform. There are numerous examples
of individuals throughout history, such as William Wilberforce who have sought to reform
corrupt societies or policies within those societies.114 Presumably, the reason why individuals
like Wilberforce are able to recognize that what a society deems moral can, in fact, be immoral is
because there is an objective moral standard that transcends the laws of a particular society.
Throughout history, societal reformers have frequently appealed to this higher standard when
attempting to make their case. 115 An example of this is Martin Luther King, Jr., who repeatedly
appealed to the higher standard as the basis for human rights and equality. If there is no higher
standard, whatever a society says is moral by definition within that particular society and no
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society can judge another society for their moral wrongdoings because all societies are
essentially their own judges. If societies decide what is right and wrong and there is no objective
moral law, one’s attempt to call things like slavery and segregation immoral faces challenges.
Based on this discussion, four important points are worth highlighting: (1) societies do not
ultimately decide what is right and wrong—legality is not an infallible guide to morality; (2) if
societies do not ultimately decide what is right and wrong, one needs to look elsewhere for an
objective or ultimate standard of right and wrong; (3) a plausible place to look is to a moral
standard or law that transcends societal laws; and (4) such a moral standard or law provides an
objective basis for societal reform.
Reason 8: Justice, Injustice, and Punishment
If there is no objective moral law, there is arguably no such thing as ultimate justice. This
was understood all too well by the state torturers in Soviet prisons during World War II. Richard
Wurmbrand, a Romanian minister of Jewish descent who was captured by the secret police in the
late 1940s, reports,
The cruelty of atheism is hard to believe when man has no faith in the reward of good or
the punishment of evil. There is no reason to be human. There is no restraint from the
depths of evil which is in man. The Communist torturers often said, “There is no God, no
hereafter, no punishment for evil. We can do what we wish.” I have heard one torturer
even say, “I thank God, in whom I don’t believe, that I have lived to this hour when I can
express all the evil in my heart.” He expressed it in unbelievable brutality and torture
inflected on prisoners. 116
Although Wurmbrand advances the argument a bit further than this chapter intends to take it, it is
important to note the extreme ramifications of denying objective morality (and God’s existence
as the moral lawgiver, as Wurmbrand suggests), especially in light of how people typically live
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their lives when they assume there is no moral law to define how they should live and no God to
judge or punish them in the afterlife.
On the other hand, if anti-realism is true, there is arguably no reliable basis for speaking
out against injustice—at least not in any objective sense anyway.117 Humans regularly speak out
against others in the world for doing things that they should stop doing, regardless of what they
(the ones performing the immoral acts) believe about their own behavior. An example of this is
the terrorist group known as ISIS. People around the world have spoken out against the actions of
this group for their corrupt ideology and immoral acts—even though the members of the group
itself do not seem to find fault with what they are themselves doing. Occurrences such as this
suggests that most humans typically believe there is some sort of moral reality that is: (1) not
defined by humans; and (2) must be abided by, regardless of what human persons think.
Yet another example of this is when skeptics level the charge against those who believe
in God, asserting that his alleged indifference in the face of injustice points to either his nonexistence or imperfect nature in some way (e.g., he is not all-powerful, not entirely good, etc.).118
Lewis’s insight is particularly helpful here, as he admits: “My argument against God was that the
universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does
not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this
universe with when I called it unjust?” 119 What Lewis’s admission shows is that moral anti-
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realists borrow from the moral realist view when they call something “just” or “unjust.” 120 Do
terms such as “justice” and “injustice” retain their meaning and significance on an anti-realist
view? According to Lewis, they do not. Unless one has an idea “of a straight line” (i.e., objective
standard of goodness), she cannot “call a line crooked.”
Reason 9: Standard of Behavior
Morality is a code of conduct describing, and even prescribing, how individuals ought to
behave toward themselves and others. It is concerned with the principles of right and wrong
behavior and the goodness or badness of the character of human persons. If there is no objective
standard of behavior, there is no sufficient way to argue for how humans should or should not
behave. Accordingly, Lewis notes that two of the most obvious facts about reality deal with the
concept of how humans ought to behave. As he says, “First . . . human beings, all over the earth,
have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way. . . . Secondly . . . they do not in
fact behave that way. . . . These two facts are the foundation of all clear thinking about ourselves
and the universe we live in” (emphasis added). 121 Elsewhere, he maintains, “The moralities
accepted among men may differ—though not, at bottom, so widely as is often claimed—but they
all agree in prescribing a behaviour which their adherents fail to practice.” 122 Lewis recognizes
the universal acceptance of two fundamental realities: (1) there is a moral law that prescribes
how humans ought to behave; and (2) humans fail to behave this way. Unless there is an
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objective standard of behavior, it would be challenging to explain how humans should behave
and difficult to recognize when humans fail to live up to the moral standard or ideal.
Reason 10: Praise and Blame
Praise and blame are common responses by human persons to both moral and immoral
behaviors. A person is praiseworthy when that person is morally responsible for behavior that is
right or good, whereas a person is blameworthy when that person is morally responsible for
something that is wrong or bad. For example, when someone courageously stands up to injustice
or willingly sacrifices themselves in order to save others, praise is the appropriate response. On
the other hand, when an individual physically abuses his wife or mistreats small children, blame
is the proper response. However, unless an objective moral standard exists, determining what is
praiseworthy and blameworthy becomes incredibly difficult.
One who lays out a case that praise and blame make more sense from the perspective of
moral realism is Daniel Robinson. In his book, Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its
Applications, Robinson carefully examines the nature of both praise and blame, closely
identifying these two forms of moral appraisal with other moral properties such as responsibility,
punishment, and forgiveness. He also considers various views attempting to account for these
two forms of moral appraisal, including what he calls “moral luck.” His main targets are
reductive naturalism and any sort of Humean theory of action that dissolves moral principles into
biological mechanisms. According to Robinson, none of the opposing views possesses the same
explanatory power as moral realism. 123
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Reason 11: Mistreatment
One may say that he does not believe in objective morality; however, the moment he is
mistreated he will often react as if such a standard does, in fact, exist. For instance, when one
who denies the existence of an objective standard of behavior is cut off in traffic or has unfound
rumors spread about him among his friends, he will quickly complain, “Hey, you cannot do that!
That is wrong! What are you thinking?” Sean McDowell relays another example of this when he
shares a story involving J. P. Moreland taking the stereo of a University of Vermont student who
denies the existence of objective morality in favor of moral relativism. As Moreland shares the
gospel with the university student, the student responds by saying that he (Moreland) could not
force his views on others because “everything is relative.” Following this claim, in an effort to
reveal what the student really believes about moral issues, Moreland picks up the student’s
stereo from his dorm room and begins walking down the hallway with it in hand, when the
student suddenly shouts, “Hey, what are you doing? You can’t do that!” 124 Again, one might
deny the existence of an objective standard of behavior through their words or actions, but that
person will always reveal what they really believe through their reactions when mistreated.125
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significant to point out that many, perhaps even most, people possess an innate disposition towards moral realism.
This potentially points to the axiomatic nature of moral realism.
125
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Reason 12: Moral Obligations
A common experience among human persons when dealing with moral matters is the
sense of obligation that arises. 126 There are situations that cause individuals to feel the
overwhelming duty to perform certain actions and other circumstances where individuals
recognize they should avoid doing something. The words “ought” and “ought not” imply the
existence of an objective moral law that mankind recognizes and feels obligated to follow. 127 For
example, practically all humans would agree that one ought to try to save the life of a drowning
child and that one ought not kill innocent people for sheer amusement. It does not seem
appropriate to lessen the force of obligations such as these. To illustrate, it does not seem
forceful enough to say, “I ‘prefer’ or ‘do not prefer’ to save a child from drowning” or “Boo!
Killing innocent people for fun!” It is not only duties that seem obligatory, there are also values
that possess the same sort of “oughtness” or “ought not-ness.” For instance, it is perfectly
intelligible to believe that humans are morally obligated to possess (or acquire) values or traits
such as compassion, mercifulness, generosity, and courage, while avoiding or removing negative
traits like pride, greed, lust, and dishonesty.128
Reason 13: Guilt
Guilt is not merely a felt emotion that is entirely subjective. In a very real sense, guilt is
oftentimes objective in nature. Of course, it is possible for one to feel guilty when he is not
actually guilty—this is called “false guilt.” Conversely, it is also possible for one to be
objectively guilty without experiencing any feelings of guilt whatsoever, but the lack of
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subjective guilt feelings has no bearing on whether one is truly guilty in an objective sense.
One’s feelings do not always accurately reveal if one is a moral lawbreaker. For example,
consider again the psychopath who does not feel guilty after committing an immoral act. If a
psychopath committed a murder, one could still say that this person is guilty of breaking the law,
despite the absence of guilt and regret in the psychopath’s thought process. This is one reason
why it is appropriate to talk of guilt in objective terms. Apart from the existence of an objective
standard of right and wrong, guilt is likely nothing more than an emotional projection.
A. E. Taylor, a key thinker in the history of the moral argument, identifies five
characteristics of guilt, including:
(1) Human guilt involves true condemnation and not merely discontentment with
surroundings or circumstances. 129
(2) Moral guilt is indelible; even punishment does not get rid of it. Guilt cannot be
“brushed aside.” Only one “with the ‘mentality’ of the animal can reconcile himself to
the comfortable view that what he has done amiss is ‘washed off’ by punishment, or
‘made good’ by subsequent better conduct.” 130
(3) Humans recognize that their guilt deserves punishment. One’s guilty status demands
retribution so that justice is served. 131
(4) Humans recognize that sin (and thus, moral guilt) makes them dirty and pollutes them
in a very real way. This means that one’s guilt must be dealt with somehow. 132
(5) Guilt does not seem to be the violation of an impersonal principle; rather, humans
sense that they have sinned against a person who transcends humanity.133
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Taylor’s five characteristics of guilt provide additional evidence for the reality of objective guilt
(and thus, an objective moral standard or law). First, to speak of things like “true condemnation”
and not merely the lack of contentment with one’s circumstances invokes the notion of objective
guilt. Second, that one’s transgression cannot merely be “washed off” or “brushed aside” speaks
to the real, objective nature of guilt. If guilt were merely a feeling (rather than an objective
reality), it seems as if it could be “washed off” or “brushed aside.” Third, humanity’s admission
that their guilty status demands punishment or retribution is seemingly acknowledgement that an
objective moral law has been broken.134 There are other reasons for believing in objective guilt,
but Taylor’s characteristics certainly provide a helpful starting point.
Reason 14: Making Excuses
Why does one who denies the existence of an objective standard of behavior become
anxious to make excuses for how he has behaved in a given circumstance? If there is no
objective moral standard, one ought to just go on with his life without defending himself. After
all, a person does not have to defend himself if there is no standard for him to fall short of or
completely break. Consider how criminals oftentimes respond by stringing together a list of
excuses when they are caught breaking the law. Although there are more serious examples, think
about a law that is broken every day by a large number of people: driving over the posted speed
limit on a particular road. After being pulled over by a police officer on duty for breaking the
speed limit, people frequently respond, “I did not know the posted speed limit for this road,” or
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“I am late for work and I am in a hurry.” Why does one feel the need to provide excuses such as
these if they have not broken a law?135 Perhaps, as Lewis says, “The truth is, we believe in
decency so much—we feel the Rule of Law pressing on us so—that we cannot bear to face the
fact that we are breaking it, and consequently we try to shift the responsibility.” 136
Reason 15: Moral Progress/Improvement
Throughout history there are examples of moral progress. For instance, there are now
rights for women, whereas women used to have virtually no rights. If things like this are
considered progress, then it makes sense to posit an objective moral standard that humanity as a
whole is slowly moving toward. According to Fisher, “[I]f there is progress this seems to imply
that we are somehow moving closer to the truth of how the world actually ought to be. But if
moral realism is false then it seems that there could be no standard or benchmark, and it is hard
to see why we would think moral progress was possible at all.” 137 Like science is advancing the
human race to deeper understanding of how the universe operates, moral progress is moving the
human race closer to how humans ought to live their lives.
On a personal level, countless individuals regularly determine to improve themselves
morally—usually after a major moral failure or around New Year’s Day—while others possess
an innate awareness that they ought to be better people than they presently are. Certainly, no sane
person wakes up each morning and declares, “My goal for today is to become more immoral!” 138
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Even if someone’s goal is to become more immoral, that person still needs an objective standard to
measure the level of his or her badness.
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If there is no objective standard of good that exists, then talk of moral improvement is
nonsensical and actual moral progress is impossible. If no ultimate standard of right and wrong
exists, then one might change his morality, but he can never improve it. As, Immanuel Kant
points out, “A man who has transgressed against the moral law, but still recognizes it in its
purity, can be improved because he still has a pure law before his eyes; but a man who has
invented for himself a favourable [sic] and false law has a principle in his wickedness, and in his
case we can hope for no improvement” (emphasis added). 139
Recognizing that there is hope of moral improvement, one should seek to identify where
the standard of moral improvement lies. The objective standard of good—the ruler that measures
moral progress and target for humans to aim their moral efforts at—exists above and outside the
process of improvement itself. Without an objective standard of behavior, then “[t]here is no
sense in talking of ‘becoming better’ if better means simply ‘what we are becoming’—it is like
congratulating yourself on reaching your destination and defining destination as ‘the place you
have reached.’” 140 The point is that if real moral progress is being made, or if moral
improvement is being encouraged, then moral realism is implied.
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Morality and Its Source
Different Types of Moral Realism141
Having been offered fifteen reasons for taking objective morality seriously, the focus
now shifts to the second part of the abductive moral argument sketched at the beginning of this
chapter.142 What (or who) is the best explanation for moral facts? What is their source? Someone
like Nietzsche, who was quoted at the outset of this chapter as saying that morality “has truth
only if God is the truth—it stands and falls with faith in God” readily links morality with God. 143
Others, like Mackie, are a bit less certain, stating, “[I]f there are objective values, they make the
existence of a god more probable than it would have been without them. Thus we have a
defensible argument from morality to the existence of a god” (emphasis added). 144 Then there are
those like Erik Wielenberg, while affirming the existence of objective moral facts, attempt to
explain them apart from reference to God. In Wielenberg’s case, Platonism is the answer. 145
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Finally, there are individuals who attempt to explain moral realism via ethical naturalism, such as
Kevin DeLapp.146 What these varying views on how to ground moral realism reveal is that even
though there may be good reasons for believing in objective moral facts, it does not necessarily
follow that God exists. There are many views that fall under the umbrella of moral realism,147
and in order to claim that God is the best explanation, each of these views must be analyzed and
shown to possess less explanatory power than the God hypothesis. 148
Locating the Source of Morality
As humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz points out, “The central question about moral and
ethical principles concerns this ontological foundation. If they are neither derived from God nor
anchored in some transcendent ground, are they purely ephemeral?” 149 When attempting to
identify and locate the ontological foundation of moral principles, there are a few things to keep
in mind.
First, it is important to stress again that moral realism is silent on the nature and origin of
moral categories. One moves too quickly when concluding that because there is an objective
moral law, a particular belief system, like Christianity, is true. A belief system such as
Christianity might be able to account for objective moral facts, but this alone does not mean it is
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the best explanation for morality as a whole. Moral realism simply shows that there are, indeed,
objective moral facts. In order to continue moving the argument, one then has to turn to the
various moral categories themselves—namely, moral knowledge, values, obligations, and
transformation—in order to gain an understanding of the nature of the moral data. Then, by
gaining a better understanding of the nature of the categories, one can, in turn, attempt to identify
their proper source.
Second, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the unique features of the moral
argument is that it is able, likely better than other arguments from natural theology, to furnish
warrant to infer not just that a source of morality exists, but that a source of a particular character
exists.150 If this is true, what sort of characteristics does the source of morality need to possess?
David Baggett and Jerry Walls suggest that the source must be “perfectly good” in order to
account for morality.151 Similarly, A. C. Ewing contends that a being in whom the whole moral
law resides cannot fail to be less than perfectly good. 152 Others, like Mackie, propose, “Moral
properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to
have arisen in the course of events without an all-powerful god to create them.” 153 In addition to
perfect goodness and infinite power, there are other characteristics that the source of morality
will likely need to have, such as transcendence. It seems that the source of morality needs to be
transcendent in order to adequately account for the objectivity of the moral law. Furthermore, if
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morality is “the sphere of personal relations,” 154 does the source also need to be personal? Does
morality make better sense deriving from a personal source?
Third, harkening back to the introduction, when attempting to identify the best
explanation for morality, it is important to realize that the source of morality, whatever it may be,
must at least possess the same features as morality because a stream cannot rise above its
source.155 In this case, the moral law cannot rise above its source in terms of the features it
possesses. Emphasizing that “[d]escent, downward movement is the key word . . . [t]he march of
all things is from higher to lower” is key here.156 For instance, suppose morality is understood in
terms of what is good and right. If this is true, it appears logical to postulate a “perfectly good”
being.157 Stated differently, a Being (e.g., theism) or even a group of beings (e.g., polytheism)
who are flawed would not be able to account for moral goodness or the rightness of certain
acts—since this would be an example of “a stream rising above its source” or “upward
movement.”

Non-Personal or Personal Source
It is easy for one to become overwhelmed by the vast number of religions and
philosophies being expounded in the marketplace of ideas today. However, the task becomes
easier when one realizes that all belief systems can be grouped into two fundamental categories:
those that begin with a non-personal force or essence and those that begin with a personal being
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or set of beings.158 Typically, the term “non-personal” is used to refer to secular belief systems
like naturalism, but this category also includes non-personal religious conceptions of God. On
the other hand, the term “personal” is used to refer to belief systems that understand God as a
personal Being, like Christianity, for example.
Presumably, something that is personal cannot come from something that is nonpersonal—which means that something like morality, if personal, likely makes better sense
deriving from a personal source. 159 Therefore, one approach in the quest to locate the source of
morality, involves asking the question: Does morality point more in the direction of a nonpersonal or personal source? Humanity and the world in which human persons dwell is either the
result of non-personal or personal; ultimate reality is either non-personal or personal—there are
no other options. Which view best explains the moral data? Over the next four chapters (chapters
3-6), the question of whether morality points in the direction of a non-personal or personal
source will be taken up, with the ultimate goal being to show that the latter is most likely. Then,
in chapter 7, a few worldviews will be examined in an effort to determine which view is most
plausible in light of the personal nature of morality.

Summary
This chapter began by laying out a general abductive moral argument for the existence of
God. The first premise of the argument states, “There are objective moral facts.” Although the
fifteen reasons provided above do not cover all of the reasons for believing in objective moral
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facts,160 they provide a starting point nonetheless. Of course, a whole book could be written on
moral realism alone, but for the present purposes the reasons provided here should suffice. If the
discussion presented in this chapter on reasons for believing in an objective moral standard or
law is valid,161 then the moral argument for God’s existence has the ability to at least get off the
ground.
Because the argument in this chapter focuses only on providing valid reasons for
believing in objective moral facts (i.e., moral realism), and since an argument of this sort is silent
on the nature and origin of moral facts, one must turn to examining the moral categories
themselves in order to discover their nature and draw a conclusion as to their most likely source.
Although there are a countless number of religions and philosophies that exist today, the task of
locating and identifying the source of morality becomes more manageable when one realizes that
the various belief systems can be grouped into two fundamental categories: (1) those that begin
with a non-personal force or essence; and (2) those that begin with a personal being or set of
beings. This leads to two questions: (1) What is the nature of morality: non-personal or personal?
(2) Given the nature of morality, what is its most likely source?

An example of another argument for objective moral facts is Terence Cuneo’s “if epistemic facts exist,
then moral facts exist.” If one is a moral non-realist and has ever claimed someone has done something objectively
wrong by misrepresenting an argument, then the non-realist has assumed epistemic virtues or duties while arguing
such duties are either subjective or not real. How is this? By identifying intellectual honesty as an epistemic virtue,
one is also admitting the reality of a moral virtue (i.e., moral honesty). Although there are other examples available
to illustrate what is being stated here, the bottom line is this: Epistemic facts and moral facts cannot be separated;
therefore, the existence of the former points to the existence of the latter. Cuneo, The Normative Web.
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CHAPTER THREE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
Fifteen reasons for believing in objective morality were provided in the previous chapter.
Again, if moral realism is true, the moral argument is able to get off the ground. As Angus
Ritchie maintains, “The [moral] argument . . . only has force if the ‘pull of objectivism’ needs to
be respected.” 162 In order to continue moving the argument forward, one has to turn to several
moral phenomena or categories, examining them to gain a better understanding of the nature of
morality. Then, one is better positioned to locate and identify their most likely source.
The first moral category under examination is moral knowledge. The previous chapter
implicitly gestured toward moral knowledge. But this chapter will discuss moral knowledge
more thoroughly and explicitly, while extending the conversation on moral realism.163 Moral
experience arguably suggests that virtually all humans have knowledge of right and wrong, at
least on a basic level. For example, imagine turning on the television and watching a
documentary on Ted Bundy, an American serial killer who kidnapped, raped, and murdered over
thirty women throughout the 1970s across at least seven different states. What seems evident to
many if not most throughout the documentary is that Bundy’s actions are morally abhorrent on
every level. Even one who has failed to see the documentary is likely to agree that kidnapping,
raping, and murdering innocent women is utterly reprehensible and unjustifiable on any level.
This moral knowledge seems immediate and involuntary. Phenomenologically, it seems less like
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an inference than an inviolable intuition. That a serial killer like Bundy is morally wrong appears
knowable for practically all human beings. Conversely, that famine relief is morally right seems
just as knowable. If these examples are accurate, if such seemingly reliable deliverances of moral
experience are indeed veridical, then moral knowledge is possible.
However, moral skeptics argue there are good reasons for thinking that moral knowledge
is not possible. They argue that one cannot know Bundy’s actions are morally abhorrent or that
famine relief is morally upright. Additionally, some skeptics, like J. L. Mackie, indicate that if
one could be aware of objective moral values and duties that “it would have to be by some
special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of
knowing everything else.” 164 Therefore, the aim of this chapter is threefold: (1) considering
objections to moral knowledge; (2) analyzing some potential ways in which moral knowledge is
acquired; and (3) considering the nature of moral knowledge and whether it points more in the
direction of a personal or non-personal source.

Objections to Moral Knowledge
Atheist philosopher Louise Antony notes, “Any argument for moral skepticism will be
based upon premises which are less obvious than the existence of objective moral values
themselves.” 165 This is certainly an insightful admission from an atheist such as Antony.
However, to be fair, one could respond by saying that because something is less obvious, that
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does not mean it is false. For instance, it may have been less obvious thousands of years ago that
the world is actually a sphere, but that does not change the fact that it is, and has always been, a
sphere.
The task of the first part of this chapter involves examining and responding to several
objections moral skeptics raise against the possibility of moral knowledge. This is in no way an
exhaustive treatment on the matter; rather, it is more of a survey or an attempt to deal with
several common objections before moving on to other discussions related to moral knowledge. 166
Objection 1: Ethical Non-Cognitivism
There are various types of knowledge, but the relevant sort of knowledge that morality is
most customarily concerned with is propositional knowledge. 167 Propositional knowledge is, as it
sounds, knowledge of propositions, which involves claims that are either true or false. An
example of a propositional moral claim would be something like this: It is true that feeding or
housing someone who is homeless is a good or right thing to do.
At this point, a non-cognitivist would likely retort by claiming that morality does not
possess truth-apt status. In other words, morality is not about truth; moral claims are neither true
nor false. Ethical non-cognitivists, in opposition to ethical cognitivists, claim that moral
discourse does not assert genuine propositions that can be evaluated as true or false in any
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stance-independent way.168 Therefore, for non-cognitivists, moral claims are not factual claims.
They are neither true nor false in any sense; they are basically desires or emotional projections—
and thus, not propositional in nature. 169
Various forms of non-cognitivism have surfaced throughout the twentieth century,
including: emotivism,170 expressivism,171 prescriptivism,172 and a bit more loosely, quasirealism.173 In a nutshell, emotivists, expressivists, prescriptivists, quasi-realists, and other noncognitivist positions deny the possibility of moral knowledge. Some philosophers even view
expressivism as a penumbral term under which fall the various non-cognitivist accounts. 174
Again, each of the non-cognitivist views contend that, in some way, moral judgments or claims
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are not truth apt; they are not true or false. Rather, they are expressions of desires, emotions, or
other non-belief-like states.175
Response to Objection 1: Ethical Non-Cognitivism
Due to space constraints, each of the non-cognitivist views cannot be addressed here.
Consequently, a few general responses to non-cognitivism as a whole will be offered. 176 First,
non-cognitivism is, as most would agree, deeply counterintuitive. This was one among the fifteen
reasons earlier adduced for believing in objective morality. The first reason dealt with the
“obviousness” of objective morality; in other words, the intuitive nature of morality. According
to Kevin DeLapp,
Suffice to say that as a descriptive thesis, noncognitivism appears exceptionally
counterintuitive. Most speakers of most languages presumably do not mean by ‘killing
innocents is wrong’ merely that they do not approve of it, or even that they are simply
endorsing a norm, no matter how universal in form. Rather most speakers think that they
mean what they say, namely that killing innocents is literally wrong. 177
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Labels like “emotivism,” “expressivism,” “prescriptivism,” and “quasi-realism” have been used in a
variety of ways historically. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the label “non-cognitivism” will be used as a
“catch-all” for the varying views of Ayer, Stevenson, Gibbard, Hare, and Blackburn. For a useful introduction to
several non-cognitivist views, see McPherson and Plunkett, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 58-134,
626-642.
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response to Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, see Nicholas Unwin, “Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach
Problem,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 49, issue 196 (July 1999): 337-352; G. F. Schueler, “Modus Ponens
and Moral Realism,” Ethics, vol. 98, no. 3 (April 1988): 492-500; and M. H. Brighouse, “Blackburn’s Projectivism:
An Objection,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 59 (1990): 225-233. For a response to Allan Gibbard’s expressivism, see
Nicholas Unwin, “Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s Logic,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 51,
issue 202 (January 2001): 60-75; also see Terence Cuneo, “Saying What We Mean: An Argument Against
Expressivism,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), 35-71. For a response to emotivism, see John Lemos, “The Problems with Emotivism,” Journal of
Philosophical Research, vol. 25 (January 2000): 285-309; also see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in
Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). For a response to prescriptivism, see
Macintyre’s After Virtue; also see Ralph McInerny, “The Poverty of Prescriptivism,” Am. J. Juris, vol. 17, (1972). It
is also important to note that the Frege-Geach problem is a problem for prescriptivists, emotivists, expressivists, and
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177

DeLapp, Moral Realism, 26.

68

DeLapp captures the sort of thought process involved with the intuitiveness of morality by using
the example of “killing innocents.” It seems intuitive, or obvious, that killing an innocent person
is “literally wrong.” To say that killing an innocent person is morally wrong, even downright
abhorrent, seems more appropriate than saying something equivalent to “I don’t like killing
innocents and I don’t want you to like it either” or “Boo! Murdering innocent people!”
Admittedly, this is no knock-down argument; non-cognitivists will not readily concede
the point, likely replying that this is a specific instance of a dichotomy between appearance and
reality. Moreover, so-called second and third-wave expressivists and non-cognitivists have
devoted considerable efforts to address this point and make better sense of why human beings
are so inclined to interpret moral discourse assertorically. Still, though, in their very efforts to do
so, they are acknowledging that there is a substantive prima facie challenge their theories
encounter and need to surmount. 178
Now, this might raise a question in the reader’s mind: If non-cognitivism is so ineffective
at making sense of why human beings are inclined to interpret moral discourse as propositional,
what motivation is there to even entertain such a view as a possibility? Most concede that the
best reason to take non-cognitivism seriously is that it makes clear why there is such a tight
connection between our moral discourse and what motivates us. If such discourse in one way or
another is closely connected to a person’s attitudes, inclinations, and emotions, these are just the
dynamics that tend to motivate one to act. This is, for many, the salient and unique strength of a
non-cognitivist construal of ethics. However, Shafer-Landau raises a concern on this score when
he notes that “. . . any judgement that fails to motivate, according to non-cognitivism, cannot
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possibly be a moral judgement.” 179 One problem with this non-cognitivist claim is that it is
possible to issue a moral judgment and not be motivated. For instance, imagine someone who
has been mentally beaten down by a bad experience or set of experiences; this person may have
become completely empathetic to the moral judgments that they believe are true. This seemingly
indicates that it is possible to divorce moral judgments from motivation or an outward
expression.180
Second, a factor demonstrating the intuitive truth-apt nature of cognitivism is that
virtually all moral psychology points toward cognitivism. A cognitivist approach is more
effective in terms of character building and moral progress. In fact, this is the default position
that parents typically hold when raising their children. Parents allow their children to experiment
with trial and error, communicate to them consequences of actions, and ultimately help them
understand what is right and wrong—all of which presupposes the truth-aptness of the moral
enterprise.
Third, the history of moral theory seems to tell against non-cognitivism. With the
exception of non-cognitivism itself, moral codes and expressions across cultures have
historically shared an understanding of morality as something external to a particular person’s
feelings and attitudes. To be clear, this is not to say that necessarily these conceptions are true,
but rather that non-cognitivism has been taken to be prima facie false for the overwhelming
majority of ethical theories throughout history.181 Again, this is not a knock-down argument,
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though collectively the arguments within this chapter arguably provide good evidence in favor of
moral realism and perhaps moral knowledge as well.
Lastly, there are several additional challenges facing non-cognitivism, including the
Frege-Geach problem,182 Terence Cuneo’s illocutionary act-intention argument,183 the problem
of identifying outward expressions of things solely as emotions,184 and the problem of moral
motivation.185 Without elaborating further, these problems are acknowledged here so that readers
are aware of them, and so that non-cognitivists understand there are additional challenges for
non-cognitivism to overcome.
Objection 2: Problems with Intuitionism
Non-cognitivists frequently issue the charge (like the cognitivist and error theorist
Mackie did) that moral objectivism requires a commitment to intuitionism, which is then said to
face several challenges. 186 First, according to moral skeptics, intuitionism is nothing more than

For a helpful overview of the Frege-Geach problem, see Mark Schroeder, “What is the Frege-Geach
Problem?” Philosophy Compass, vol.3, issue 4 (July 2008): 703-720. For the classic formulation of the objection,
see P. T. Geach, “Ascriptivism,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 69, no. 2 (April 1960): 221-225; and P. T. Geach,
“Assertion,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 74, no. 4 (October 1965): 449-465.
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objection to non-cognitivism, see Terence Cuneo, “Saying what we Mean,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford
Studies in Metaethics, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 35-71.
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If non-cognitivism is true, any moral claim is just an emotion or expression of a non -representational
attitude towards the state of affairs of something. If one were to say an action is virtuous, mean, desirable, terrible,
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attitudes don’t seem nearly as diverse or fine-grained as the predicates we standardly reply in moral assessments.
Cognitivists straightforwardly account for these differences by referring to different meanings, content, or properties
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sheer arrogance or mere stubbornness. It is arrogant for one to say that he or she has access to
something as significant as a moral law that supposedly guides the behaviors of all people, and to
condemn others who have opposing views (such as those who deny the existence of an objective
moral standard). Additionally, when one challenges a person holding to intuitionism, and the
intuitionist responds by saying something like, “Well, I just know that _______ is wrong,” he or
she is being stubborn. Second, moral skeptics often level the charge that intuitionism is a license
to claim moral knowledge about anything. For example, if morality is recognized intuitively, a
person might claim that something like cutting his or her neighbors up and feeding them to
sharks is morally acceptable. Third, moral skeptics state that intuitionism seemingly requires
some sort of special faculty that allows for one to acquire non-inferentially justified beliefs. This
is one reason why Mackie thinks intuitionism should be rejected.187 Fourth, intuitionism is an
excuse one makes for not thinking for himself or herself. 188 Basically, as mentioned above, it is a
stubborn refusal to think individually. As Singer and others maintain, it is easy to say, “I just
know” or “It feels wrong” without actually knowing why or how something is known, but it is far
more difficult to actually do the research for oneself and then arrive at an evidence-based
conclusion.
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As mentioned in chapter 2, it is helpful to note that one can be a moral realist without putting all of his
or her eggs in the intuitionist basket. That being said, the intuitionist challenge is something that a moral realist
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some level.
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Response to Objection 2: Problems with Intuitionism
In response to the charges leveled against intuitionism, a few things are worth
considering. First, if there is nothing that is known intuitively, nothing can be proven. As Lewis
clearly states, “If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved.” 189 It certainly appears that
some things are objectively self-evident or properly basic,190 such as rules in mathematics or
laws of logic, which are valid irrespective of anyone’s opinions or feelings.191 As mentioned in
the previous chapter, in his In Search of Moral Knowledge R. Scott Smith shares a few examples
of moral principles that seemingly qualify as self-evident, including: (1) murder is wrong; (2)
rape is wrong; (3) torturing babies for fun is wrong; (4) love is a virtue; and (5) justice is a
virtue.192 There seems to be widespread agreement about these moral facts. Another example is
the famous quotation found within the United States Declaration of Independence: “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness” (emphasis added). 193 On a slightly less famous note, Shafer-Landau explains, “It
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seems to me self-evident that, other things being equal, it is wrong to take pleasure in another’s
pain, to taunt and threaten the vulnerable, to prosecute and punish those known to be innocent,
and to sell another’s secrets for personal gain.” 194 In sum, there appear to be some moral
principles that are rock-bottom beliefs that need no further justification.
Second, stemming from the first, without a legitimate starting point, one is caught in an
infinite regress. If every belief is required to be based on a prior belief, then each belief must be
justified by an infinite number of beliefs. This goes for moral knowledge as well. 195 If there are
certain rock-bottom, fundamental truths, it appears “that at least some such axiomatic moral
propositions hold.” 196 A good candidate for an axiomatic moral proposition or non-inferentially
justified belief would be the commonly used statement: “Torturing innocent children for fun is
morally wrong.” Morally speaking, if anything is obviously wrong, this fits the bill. There are
other examples, such as, “Blowing up the pizza delivery guy for bringing you the incorrect pizza
is morally wrong.” It is not only what is radically morally wrong that is obvious, some things are
clearly morally right. For instance, it is morally right to help a young girl who is drowning in the
community swimming pool, and it is better to love others than murder them.
Third, to be clear, to say that morality is intuitive is not to say that everything pertaining
to how humans should behave is intuitively clear. There are some things that are more obvious

bad conditioning; still, the minority status of such convictions historically poses at least a prima facie case that needs
to be addressed for those who insist such views are clear deliverances of intuitions. (3) David Bentley Hart argues in
his Atheist Delusions that such views are less a function of general revelation than special revelation; that it was the
influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition that over time inculcated such convictions. This is remarkably interesting.
If Newman is right about special revelation performing an ampliative function, perhaps it is in general revelation at
least inchoately, but special revelation gives the finer grained and more explicit analysis.
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than others, and some things that are not obvious at all without moral training. Undoubtedly,
some things must be taught and learned, and moral training aids in the process of coming to
realize what is right and wrong, and thus, how one ought to live his or her life accordingly.
Fourth, defending moral intuitionism is not a license to claim moral knowledge about
anything. As Robert Audi notes in his work, there are a number of misconceptions about selfevidence or, more specifically, a priori intuitionism. Audi explains three key points: (1) that selfevidence does not entail infallibility; (2) one can change his or her mind about what is selfevident; and (3) that self-evidence does not rule out inferential justification. 197 Regarding Audi’s
first point, intuitionism is not a license to claim moral knowledge about just anything—one can
actually be wrong about what he or she thinks is a self-evident moral belief. This leads to Audi’s
second point, which suggests that one can (and even should) change his or her mind about what
is self-evident if it is found that this belief is, in fact, misguided in some way. Pertaining to
Audi’s third point, it is important to note that it is possible for an individual to provide reasons
for coming to believe or recognize that a particular moral belief is true. In fact, if a self-evident
belief is true, the evidence should eventually come to support it—and it would be unwise for one
to ignore evidence that would only serve to strengthen his or her self-evident belief.198

Robert Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” Ethical Theory and
Practice, vol. 1, no. 1 (1998): 15-44. Audi’s aim in this article is to improve upon the intuitionism of W. D. Ross as
spelled out in The Right and the Good, which contains a statement of intuitionism frequently referred to by writers
in ethics.
197

198

Another relevant response concerns how Mackie points out that intuitionists need some sort of special
faculty in order to acquire non-inferentially justified beliefs (i.e., self-evident beliefs). Although Mackie makes this
claim, he does not seem to elaborate on it or develop it in any significant way, besides saying that the “queerness” of
morality seemingly requires a special faculty unlike other faculties that help individuals come to acquire knowledge
of other things in daily living. A full response to Mackie will not be attempted here, but it is important to point out
the objection he raises, especially considering that his is a prominent voice in ethical discussions pertaining to
objectivity, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and so on. For a response (drawing upon natural law theory) on why
Mackie’s argument fails due to a deficient epistemological approach, see Michael Bissex, “The Objectivity of
Ethics: A Response to J. L. Mackie’s Error Theory,” The Catholic Social Science Review, vol. 24 (2019): 75-89. For
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Objection 3: Moral Disagreement Among Cultures
This objection is based on the claim by realists that at least some moral principles are
self-evident. As moral skeptics commonly ask: If moral principles are self-evident, why is there
so much disagreement about them? Mackie calls this the argument from relativity and explains
that the basic premise of the argument involves “the well-known variation in moral codes from
one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs
between different groups and classes within a complex community.” 199
Response to Objection 3: Moral Disagreement Among Cultures
Since this objection was actually addressed in chapter 2, it will not be addressed at length
again here. A couple of brief reminders are in order, however. Harkening back to Reason 2 for
believing in objective morality, there are actually numerous examples of various groups of
people classifying similar actions as right or wrong. This would suggest moral agreement (not
disagreement) among cultures and people groups.200 Additionally, as the Fisher scenario
involving putting fifty people in a room and asking them to write down the ten most important
moral rules suggests, there may be more convergence on moral issues than some might initially
realize.201
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Reasons for Moral Knowledge
In the previous section, three general objections to moral knowledge were presented, and
a response was provided to each objection.202 If there are valid reasons to support the realist
position,203 then one ought to at least consider the possibility or plausibility of moral
knowledge.204 This leads one to consider the epistemic source of the moral law.

Key Features of the Moral Law
If moral knowledge is possible, what is its source? Where does moral knowledge come
from, and how do humans acquire it? There are several potential answers to this question,
including: (1) intuition or conscience; (2) moral experience; (3) moral training; (4) different
cultures or societies; (5) a transcendent mind; and/or (6) divine revelation. One might even
understand the source of moral knowledge and humanity’s ability to acquire it to be the result of
one or more, or even all of the above, options.
However, before attempting to move in the direction of the likely source of moral
knowledge, it is helpful first to consider a few key features of morality itself. What is it like?
What are some of its key features? Learning more about objective morality better positions one
to consider its possible source. For purposes of this discussion, the topic under consideration will
be referred to as the “moral law,” while recognizing that such language is not without
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controversy. What this dissertation has argued so far is that there are several reasons to take
moral objectivity seriously. Taken collectively, this set of reasons seemingly points to a moral
standard that is authoritative, binding, and objective.
There are arguably key features of the moral law itself that are worth noting, especially if
the ultimate goal is to get all the way to the source of moral knowledge. This is an important step
because the source of moral knowledge must be able to account for and explain the features of
the moral law in a most robust manner. Attentiveness to the moral phenomena in question is a
crucial piece of the puzzle; inattentiveness, domestication, or too casual a look at the moral
evidence in question risks missing its potential for evidential import. Therefore, such key
features will be considered in turn.
First, the moral law is basically information—information on how humans ought to live
and what humans ought to become. Actually, the moral law is “inside information” that only
humans can acquire. 205 In everyday experience, information is shared and transmitted in a
number of different ways (e.g., through the medium of technology), but it is always the product
of a conscious, intelligent mind (i.e., a human person). For instance, if one were walking on the
beach and saw the words “marry me” spelled out in the sand,206 it would be natural to assume
that this instance of specified complexity and information was not the result of a natural
mechanism like waves that washed on the beach and somehow arranged the letters in sequence.
Rather, one would understand this phrase to be the result of a human person, of someone
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possessing intelligence. Similarly, the great works of literature originated in the minds of human
persons—Homer, Hemingway, and Twain, among others. There are a number of other examples
to use here, but this much is clear: information always derives from personal intelligence. As
Stephen Meyer notes, “Our experience of the world shows that what we recognize as information
invariably reflects the prior activity of conscious and intelligent persons.” 207 What, then, should
be made of the presence of information in the moral law? How did this information get there?
What does the presence of information in the moral law imply about its origin? Who or what is
the author of the moral law? 208
Second, the moral law indicates that its source cares deeply about how humans behave
toward themselves and others. Like caring parents establish clear guidelines for their children
regarding right and wrong—details regarding what their children can and cannot do—the moral
law provides similar guidelines for how human beings, in general, ought to live their lives. A
parent who did not care deeply for their children would ignore the importance of establishing a
basis of right and wrong and instead allow their children to do whatever they wanted to do.
Likewise, if there is no God, no personal source of the moral law, it might be expected that there
is no such thing as an objective moral law. But there is evidence of an objective moral law.
Therefore, there is a measure of evidence not only that God exists, but that he cares about how
humans live, and caring is a personal characteristic requiring at least two persons: the one doing
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the caring and an “other” receiving the care. It would be odd to say that matter, energy, or
particles care; it makes considerably better sense to say that a personal being cares. 209 Caring
also reveals that the caring-one is conscious and affectionate, has purposes and preferences, as
well as a desire to see the one being cared for improved or provided for in some manner. If the
source of the moral law cares, as is implied by the personal instructions contained within the
moral law, and if the source is conscious and affectionate, has purposes and preferences, as well
as a desire to see others improved or provided for, it is reasonable to assume that the source of
the moral law is personal.
Third, the moral law implies purpose. There are a few things that purpose suggests. First,
purpose suggests that a goal exists, and in the case of the moral law, the goal is to help human
beings reach their maximum moral potential, to become like God, or something along those
lines. If there were no goal or ultimate aim of the moral law, what would be the point of the
moral law to begin with? 210 Second, in addition to purpose suggesting an ultimate goal, anytime
there is purpose, there is intent, and intent reveals a personal will. Third, purpose also reveals
wisdom, and wisdom comes from a personal intelligence. The point here is that if there is
purpose, there must be a “purposer” since purpose does not arise out of thin air. Therefore,
purpose, which stands behind the moral law, presumably points in the direction of a divine
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“Purposer,” at the least, or perhaps more specifically, an all-wise personal God who has a high
moral goal in mind when it comes to human beings.211
These three features of the moral law—its information-like nature, its ability to point to a
source that cares, and the implied purpose behind it—shed light on the possible source of moral
knowledge, revealing that the source, among other things, is plausibly thought to be personal.

The Source of Moral Knowledge
Where does moral knowledge come from? Certainly, there are a number of factors
involved with an individual’s understanding of morality, including parental training, the sort of
education received, media influences, a person’s friends, and so on. However, the question that is
being asked here regarding moral knowledge is not about how an individual acquires moral
knowledge, per se, but where morality and the possibility of moral knowledge come from in
general. If there are objective moral facts of the sorts described, and if moral knowledge is
possible, one explanatory candidate is a transcendent mind of sorts. 212 The source is presumably
transcendent because it is difficult to account for true objectivity213 apart from such a source, and
the source seemingly possesses a mind because the moral law is arguably a set of instructions on
how to live. Moral knowledge, too, is arguably well explained in terms of a mind and, due to the
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objectivity of morality, most appropriately “a mind from which all reality is derived.”214 As
Lewis says, “the Something which is directing the universe…is more like a mind than it is like
anything else we know—because after all the only other thing we know is matter and you can
hardly imagine a bit of matter giving instructions.” 215
As evidenced by the discussion above on key features of the moral law, it is at least
plausible to assume that the source of moral knowledge is a transcendent personal mind.216 If this
is the case—that moral knowledge is ultimately housed in a transcendent personal mind—how
do humans come to acquire moral knowledge? If the source of moral knowledge is transcendent,
then neither cultures nor societies, nor even individuals, can account for the transmission of
moral knowledge.217 If the source is personal and possesses a mind, it is difficult to imagine
something like Platonic free-floating forms as the source. 218 Although there are other
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John Rist talks about how weird such things would be. According to Rist, “Plato’s account of the
‘Forms’ (including the Good) as moral exemplars leaves them in metaphysical limbo. They would exist as
essentially intelligible ideas even if there were no mind, human or divine, to recognize them: as objects of thought,
not mere constructs or concepts. But, as Augustine learned, and as the Greek Neoplatonists had asserted, the notion
of an eternal object of thought (and thus for Plato a cause of thought) witho ut a ceaseless thinking subject is
unintelligible. Intelligible Forms, never proposed as mere concepts, cannot be proposed as Plato originally proposed
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possibilities to consider, one possibility that should not be ignored is a personal God, One who is
transcendent in nature and One who also possess a mind.

Divine Revelation
If moral instructions are ultimately contained within a transcendent personal mind—
perhaps even within the mind of a transcendent yet personal God—a likely way for humans to
acquire moral knowledge is divine revelation.219 In light of the potential charge that talk of
revelation is moving too quickly in the direction of a particular religion, it needs to be pointed
out that revelation, in one form or another, is characteristic of all religion.220 Because humans are
finite and God is infinite, if humans are to know God, then God must take the initiative to make
himself known.221 As Peter Kreeft suggests, “It takes divine revelation to give us knowledge of
God.”222 Thus, it is probably safe to infer that it also takes divine revelation to give individuals
knowledge of morality—if God is its ultimate source.
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There are two basic types of revelation: general revelation and special revelation. General
revelation is God’s disclosure of himself to all persons through nature, the human conscience,
and perhaps other means as well.223 The term “general” indicates that adherents of various
religious traditions, and even atheists and agnostics, can receive this type of revelation. 224 Special
revelation involves God’s particular communication and manifestation of himself to specific
people groups and persons, as recorded within the pages of religious texts, like the Bible.225 As
such, “special revelation is an important source of moral knowledge.” 226 It deepens the insight
that general revelation itself affords; it provides more specific, direct insight into the nature of
moral epistemology as a whole.227
Divine Revelation and God’s Personal Nature
Interestingly, God’s revelation of moral knowledge is further evidence of his personal
nature in at least four ways. First, if moral knowledge is ultimately contained within the mind of
God, and if God has chosen to reveal such knowledge to humans, then the act of revelation itself
provides warrant to infer that God is personal. Divine revelation is essentially God’s
communication of himself to human persons, and communication is a personal task that is
typically carried out by persons. Actually, revelation implies at least two persons: the revealer
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and the one receiving the revelation (the “revealee,” for lack of a better term). Thus, revelation is
personal in nature.
Second, if objective morality is ultimately a reflection of God’s character228 and God has
chosen to reveal this information to humans, it follows that: (1) morality is extremely important
to God (it is who he is at his core; he is holy, good, loving, etc.)229; (2) God expects humans to be
moral beings (he has revealed this knowledge to humans, not animals or nature)230; and (3) God
cares deeply about human beings (living according to God’s standard of morality is what makes
it possible for humans to truly flourish). 231 In the words of Clement Webb, “In recognizing the
Law we find ourselves in God’s presence; and the language of personal intercourse is no longer
forbidden us as involving an inadmissible severance of God from his Law; for the Law itself is
the revelation of his Personality” (emphasis added). 232 Again, this is an important reason why the
moral argument is able to reveal more of God’s character than other classical theistic arguments:
it is not just an argument for God’s existence, but an argument for his character. 233

The view that morality is a reflection of God’s character is a core component of divine command theory
(DCT). For detailed explanations and defenses of divine command theory, see Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods;
John E. Hare, God’s Command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Baggett and Walls, Good God: The
Theistic Foundations of Morality, 103-123. Divine command theory will also be discussed more in chapter 5.
228

229

When one reveals who they are at the core of their being to another person, it is a deeply personal and
even intimate act. Newman on conscience is deeply personalist. The human conscience on his view is the very voice
of God, enabling real, not merely notional, knowledge of God.
230

As far as we know, God has not revealed himself to animals or nature, but exclusively to human persons.
Therefore, he expects persons to live according to his divine (and therefore, objective) standard of morality.
231

Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy, 334.

232

Clement C. J. Webb, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 192.

233

An objection that some raise is the Ockhamist challenge—if morality is whatever God says it is, then
morality becomes a relative matter and nothing is learned about God’s character. And if one wants to say God’s
character is good, then the challenge he faces from some is this: Is this not appealing to a standard external to God
by which to characterize him as good? For more on this, see chapter 4 on moral values and perhaps even chapter 5
on moral obligations.

85

Third, by means of general revelation, God has disclosed a basic understanding of
morality (moral knowledge) to all people, primarily by giving each person a conscience, which
helps them judge whether something is right or wrong. This means that the data of morality are
readily available to virtually everyone possessing a conscience, which typically requires for its
proper functioning that a person be adequately socialized, although there may be examples where
one realizes something via his conscience that he has not been taught or learned in a social
setting (e.g., when one realizes the need to love his enemies). Therefore, since morality has been
generally disclosed to virtually all human persons via their conscience, everyone is familiar, at
least to some extent and at some level, with the issues posed by good and evil, right and wrong.
Usually, conscience is spoken of in a negative sense, particularly as a person’s conscience causes
one to feel guilt when that person has done something wrong, but there are also occasions where
one’s conscience can push or motivate one to do what is right.
As referenced previously, another possible connection between moral knowledge, the
human conscience, and a personal God is found in Lewis’s Mere Christianity. Lewis indicates
that there are two bits of evidence for God: the universe God has made and the moral law that
God has put into the minds of human persons. He goes on to say that the latter is better evidence
for God because it is “inside information.” This “inside information” demonstrates that the One
behind the universe is “intensely interested in right conduct—in fair play, unselfishness, courage,
good faith, honesty and truthfulness.” This reveals that God is good, yes, but it also suggests that
he is personal. Therefore, the human conscience, serving as a sort of channel through which God
has communicated the moral law (at least on a basic level), is further evidence that God is
personal.234
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Fourth, one might speculate on the reasons why God chooses to dispense moral
knowledge to human persons, but one possibility flows out of his desire to be in relationship with
those whom he has created. 235 According to Paul Moser, “God’s dispensing of vital knowledge
of God is truly gracious, a genuine gift calling for grateful reception. How we may know God
depends on what God lovingly wants for us and from us. Primarily God wants us to become, in
relationship with God, humbly loving as God is.” 236 If the primary purpose God has for revealing
moral knowledge to mankind is for the sake of being “in relationship with God” as Moser states,
then certainly this reveals the personal nature of such knowledge.
Actually, one might even be able to argue that knowledge in general is a relationship. As
Bruce Reichenbach says, “Knowing is a relationship between the knower and the known, such
that each contributes to the task; it is a balancing act between the contributions of the valuing
knower and the valued known.”237 With moral knowledge, if God is the ultimate source, then his
dispensing of moral knowledge is essentially a relational or personal act—establishing the
possibility of a relationship between the knower (a human person) and the known (God himself).
As a side note, it can be argued, especially on a Judeo-Christian view, that God’s
revelation of his moral expectations (e.g., the Torah) was (and is) more than a statutory
enactment or even a purely ethical imperative; it was (and is) the teaching given by God to his
people, essentially outlining his “way” in which they were (and are) to live their lives.238
Furthermore, as Webb maintains, it “would be absurd to deny that a religion has a personal God
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which has ever taken as its ideal the great Lawgiver to whom his God ‘spake face to face as a
man speaketh unto his friend.’” 239 Not only is the Torah God’s personal moral guidelines that he
expects his people to follow, the Old Testament law is primarily a covenant that God established
between himself and his people,240 and covenants are radically personal agreements that occur
between two or more persons. The Divine Lawgiver, rather than forcefully demanding obedience
from his people,241 developed a covenant with his people, whereby he gave them laws to follow
in an effort to lead them along the right path and ultimately back to himself and his moral
standard of holiness. 242 The bottom line is that if God revealed his law to the people of Israel,
and charged them to obey the law, not just for duty’s sake, as Kant later claimed, but rather to
make possible a relationship between God and man, this is evidence of a personal God allowing
human persons the opportunity to demonstrate and cultivate personal loyalty to God himself. 243
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Summary
This chapter has dealt with an important category in ethics: moral knowledge. This
chapter began by canvassing three objections to moral knowledge, continuing with a discussion
of where knowledge of morality comes from. Finally, it considered the nature of moral
knowledge, with the goal of determining if moral knowledge points more in the direction of a
personal or non-personal source.
Seven key pieces of evidence were presented in this chapter. First, the moral law itself is
basically information—perhaps even “inside information”—and information is typically the
product of a conscious, intelligent mind (i.e., a person). If the information that makes up the
moral law cannot be accounted for on a purely human level, one may postulate the existence of a
personal God in order to explain it. Second, the moral law indicates that its source cares deeply
about how humans live their lives, assuming there is a source and a moral law. Like a caring
parent who establishes clear guidelines for his or her children, perhaps it can be said that the
source of the moral law has established guidelines within the moral law for a similar reason.
Caring is a personal trait requiring at least two persons: the one doing the caring and an “other”
receiving the care. It would be odd to say that matter, energy, or particles care; it makes more
sense to say that a personal being cares. Third, the moral law itself implies purpose, and purpose
involves intent, and intent reveals a personal will. Additionally, purpose likely reveals wisdom,
and wisdom comes from a personal intelligence. Fourth, if moral knowledge is ultimately
contained within the mind of God, and if God has chosen to reveal such knowledge to human
persons, then the act of revelation itself provides warrant to infer that God is personal. Fifth, if
morality is ultimately a reflection of God’s character and if God has chosen to reveal this
information to humans, it follows: (1) that morality is extremely important to God (it is who he is
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at the core of his Being); (2) that God expects humans to be moral beings; and (3) that God cares
deeply about human beings. Sixth, the human conscience, if it serves as a channel through which
God has communicated the moral law, is evidence that God is personal. Seventh, perhaps one
reason why God chose to dispense moral knowledge to human persons flows from his desire to
be in relationship with them. One might even argue that knowledge in general is a relationship
(i.e., a relationship between the knower and the known). In sum, the seven pieces of evidence
from chapter 3 point in the direction of a personal God.
If this is the case—that the category of moral knowledge makes more sense housed in
and flowing from a transcendent personal mind, or a personal God—then ethical naturalism is in
a tough spot, facing a difficult challenge that warrants further response from naturalists. This is
not to say that this chapter has successfully defeated ethical naturalism or anything like that, but
rather to say that if what this chapter has presented is true, then ethical naturalism will likely
have a difficult time accounting for the personal nature of moral knowledge, and more
specifically, a transcendent personal mind of sorts. This chapter, although containing references
to God, and in some cases, comments pertaining to specific belief systems,244 is not an argument
for any specific conception of the divine—but rather an attempt to better understand the nature of
moral knowledge, which is particularly helpful when striving to determine the nature of its
source. In sum, if moral knowledge is personal for the reasons mentioned in this chapter, or for
any reasons at all, then the source of moral knowledge is most likely personal as well—perhaps
even the result of a personal God.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MORAL VALUES
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the possibility of moral knowledge was raised, a few objections
were considered, and several ways in which moral knowledge points in the direction of a
personal God were provided. Now, in this chapter, the second category—namely, moral values—
will be discussed in an effort to further examine whether morality points in the direction of a
personal God. Moral values are usually taken for granted by human beings, as their existence and
objectivity allow for human well-being and flourishing. It is values like goodness, justice, love,
and gratitude, among others, that make human well-being and flourishing possible in the fullest
sense.
This chapter begins by defining and describing a few key features of moral values, moves
toward responding to one general objection to moral values, looks at the nature of values, and
concludes by seeking to determine whether the source or ground of moral values is most likely
personal or non-personal. First, what are moral values? Second, are values the result of social
convention, personal preference, evolution, God, or perhaps something else? In other words, do
certain objections to grounding moral values in God render God unnecessary in talks pertaining
to such values? Is it convincing to explain moral values solely on the human level, or does talk of
moral values (particularly their basis) introduce the possibility of the transcendent or divine?
Third, what is the nature of moral values? Are they objective or subjective? What about personal
or non-personal? Fourth, in light of the discussions in this chapter, is the most plausible source of
moral values personal or non-personal?
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Defining and Describing Moral Values
Before moving further, it is important to define moral values and describe a few key
features of them, as well as draw a few distinctions between values and duties, among other
things. First, moral values are what people care about and even hold dear, what motivates their
behavior, what grounds their judgments regarding what is morally good or bad. In any given
moment, by attempting to determine what (or even who at times) is good or bad, better or worse,
honorable or dishonorable, worthy or unworthy, one makes a judgment that involves values in
one way or another. Additionally, moral values play a role in shaping the character and
personality of individuals, and oftentimes with children, these values are usually modeled in
stories where children are introduced to the important concepts of good and evil.
Second, agreeing there are things that are either good or bad, morally better or worse,
honorable or dishonorable, worthy or unworthy assumes the objectivity of moral values. To say
that there are objective moral values is to say that there are things that are good or bad regardless
of what people think, believe, or feel. 245 So, for example, claiming that stealing from a homeless
person for fun is bad is to say that an act such as this is bad or evil despite what anyone thinks,
believes, or how one feels about it. One may concede this point but then suggest that if there is
such a thing as objective moral values, then people would live them out. However, even if moral
values are not recognized or if they are ignored, and even if they are not fully lived out in the life
of any particular person, they are not abrogated in any sense. Furthermore, moral values are more
than personal preferences; they are the objective guiding forces that drive a person’s behavior
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towards himself and others. Properly construed, values are intimately connected with the facts
about reality and not divorced from them as some might assume. 246 What confronts human
beings in life is neither facts without value nor values apart from the facts themselves. If values
are merely preferences, they are unable to provide a window of insight into the nature of ultimate
reality. On the other hand, if values are tethered to the facts, they retain their meaning and
potentially serve as a helpful tool for tapping into the nature of reality itself. This is something
that A. E. Taylor recognized, which is why he went to such great lengths in order to salvage an
intimate connection between facts and values.
Third, there is a key distinction between values and duties. Values relate to whether
something is good or bad, whereas duties have to do with whether something is right or wrong.
Robert M. Adams states that “good” actually provides the proper foundation or framework for
thinking about “right,” and not the other way around. In other words, the good possesses a
conceptual priority over its opposite that the right does not have. Badness should be understood
in relation to the good whereas rightness is usually understood in relation to wrong. However,
attempting to understand the word “right” in relation to the “wrong” is difficult. In fact, the word
“right” sometimes comes across as ambiguous in relation to the “wrong.” Therefore, it is
probably more appropriate to think of what is right in terms of how it relates to the good.247
Not only does the good provide the proper foundation for thinking about the right, there
are other reasons for drawing a distinction between the terms. For example, aspiring to become a
nurse is a good thing, but one is not morally obligated to become a nurse. Likewise, striving to
get a college degree in order to become an engineer or a math teacher or a medical doctor is good
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as well, but again, it is not necessarily one’s duty to pursue one of these careers despite the fact
that each is a good career. 248
Drawing a distinction between values and duties, what is good and what is right, is also
particularly helpful when defending divine command theory (DCT) and responding to the
Euthyphro dilemma. If one applies the previous discussion regarding the foundational role of the
good to God by understanding God as the good, one can determine what is right by looking to
the unchanging standard of the good: God himself. When the two are separated—God from the
good—saying that God is independent of the good in some way, one runs into all sorts of
problems, particularly the ones involving the Euthyphro dilemma. 249 Since the next chapter
(chapter 5) focuses on moral obligations, more will be said there about DCT and the Euthyphro
dilemma. For now, it is helpful to simply introduce the idea that if God is the exemplar of the
good, and his character serves as the foundation for the right, one positions himself to better
understand the distinction between moral values and duties, and how values, properly construed,
serve as a foundation or framework for duties.
In sum, moral values are what people care about and hold dear, what motivates their
behavior, what grounds their judgments regarding what is good or bad. Again, if one assumes
that there are things that are either good or bad, morally speaking, one assumes the objectivity of
moral values (because one needs an objective reference point for classifying something as good
or bad). Finally, the good serves as the foundation or framework for thinking about the right, and
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if God is the exemplar of the good, and his character serves as the foundation for the right, then
one is likely more equipped to defend DCT and respond to the Euthyphro dilemma.

Objection to Moral Values
Objection 1: The Social Objection
Before considering the nature of moral values, at least one brief objection needs
addressing; it is the social objection, which asks: Do values derive from society, culture, parents,
school and friends? Of course, it is true that people commonly learn and come to hold moral
values as a result of their parents and teachers. No one ought to deny this. However, it does not
follow that because of this, moral values are solely the product of human convention.
As Lewis indicates, something like the multiplication table is learned at school or home,
and a child who grew up on a deserted island would likely not know it. “But,” according to
Lewis, “it does not follow that the multiplication table is simply a human convention, something
human beings have made up for themselves and might have made different if they had liked.” 250
Admittedly, there are some things that are learned that could have been different, such as the side
of the road on which one is to drive. The question, as Lewis asks, is to which class moral values
belong. Are moral values more like the multiplication table (which could not have been
different) or the side of the road on which a car drives (which could have been different)?
Response to Objection 1: The Social Objection
According to Lewis, there are two reasons for saying morality belongs to the same class
as mathematics. The first is that though there are differences between the moral values of one
society and another, the differences are not as great as most people claim and one can recognize
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“the same law running through them all,” whereas mere conventions, such as the rule of the road
or the kinds of clothing people wear, may differ to great extents. 251 In short, there is probably
more convergence among societies when it comes to moral values than skeptics often realize or
admit. Lewis’s second reason for saying that moral values belong to the same objective class as
mathematics, and are therefore not the upshot of human convention, is that throughout history
people have recognized the moralities of some people groups as morally better or worse than the
moralities of others. Recognitions of this kind have made moral progress possible, and moral
progress is not merely changing, but changing for the morally better. As Lewis says, “If no set of
moral ideas were truer or better than any other, there would be no sense in [morally] preferring
civilised morality to savage morality, or Christian morality to Nazi morality.” 252 Because it is
possible to say that some moral ideas are truer or better than others, Lewis posits a standard by
which two or more moralities are measured—a standard that is different from either. This
seemingly invokes at least the possibility of a transcendent realm or source (e.g., Platonism or
God) in order to explain or ground such an objective standard of measurement for moral values.
Another problem the social objection faces is that the equality of all human persons
makes it impossible for any single finite person to determine value for other persons. No human
person possesses the requisite authority to make moral decisions about right and wrong. As
David Beck suggests,
This . . . leads to a dilemma. Only persons can be the source of values, yet no finite and
socially conditioned person is in a position to determine authoritatively the values
appropriate for other persons. So, if there really are objective values, there must be some
“ultimate” person who has the moral authority to set the standards of right and wrong.
[Therefore], [t]here must be a universal personal authority that is the source of morality.
What is crucial about this argument is its implication that the source of this feature of the
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universe is a personality, at least in the sense required by the capacity to understand value
and make free moral judgments. There is, of course, more to the concept of “person,” but
this is enough to show that there is a transcendent agent capable of moral concerns,
decisions and actions. . . . 253
If Beck’s analysis is correct, that values only derive from persons, and if no finite person is
capable of determining authoritatively the values appropriate for other persons, this is potentially
evidence that a universal personal authority exists as the source of objective moral values.
Therefore, what began as an objection to objective moral values has turned into a potential
indicator not only of the reality of objective moral values, but of the existence of a transcendent
personal source.254

The Nature of Moral Values
In the discussion that follows, several moral values will be examined in an effort to
determine whether they are largely personal or non-personal. If it is found that values are indeed
personal, and if they cannot be accounted for on a purely human level, they are likely evidences
of a personal God.
Goodness
At the beginning of this discussion on the nature of moral values, it is important to first
address goodness, considering its foundational role for other values. Human persons ascribe
goodness to a number of things or at least consider them good in their everyday thoughts and
conversations. For example, one likely considers his favorite chair to be a good chair or his
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preferred drink to be a good drink.255 This leads to an interesting question: Does the value of
goodness (or badness) belong to the mere thing, that is, to things which are not persons like
chairs and drinks? What about something more controversial, such as a firearm? At first, the
answer of common sense seems to suggest that the answer is “yes,” that goodness (or badness)
belongs to the mere thing. However, a deeper look at this answer reveals that “the ‘goods’ of the
world are appraised in relation to persons—by ministering to their desires, furthering their ideals,
or offering scope for their activities.” 256 A chair or drink or firearm is neither morally good nor
bad in and of itself; rather, they take on the property of goodness (or badness) depending on how
they help or hurt, aid or limit personal beings. As William R. Sorley explains,
The fruits of the earth are called good if they nourish man or satisfy any human wants;
the forces of nature, the arrangement and order of the world, are valued for their effects
on the lives of persons for the personal and social qualities and conditions which they
encourage and foster. Man makes the world his instrument, and seeks in it the means for
promoting a human good. These values, therefore, are strictly instrumental values; and
instrumental values—real and necessary as they are—are not in themselves values but
only instruments of value or means for its attainment. They are the conditions by which
intrinsic values are realized; and these latter, it would appear, are found only in personal
life.257
Likewise, the evils of the world are also calculated in relation to persons. Again, material
things are not morally good or evil in and of themselves, but rather in their relation to persons;
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therefore, goodness and badness “[do] not belong to material things, but to persons only.” 258 This
is an especially important point nowadays as all kinds of people attempt to reduce talk of
goodness, including moral goodness, in terms of things non-morally good, like health and
happiness, for example. 259
What about immaterial things, such as love and justice? It seems natural to say that
values like love and justice are good things, but what is meant by this? It seems odd to assign
goodness to some other quality without considering that this quality belongs to some concrete
whole. It appears to make more sense, for instance, to say that “love is good” or “justice is
good,” recognizing that “love as realised in a personal life is good, that justice as manifested in a
man’s character or in a social order is good.” 260 Sorley actually claims that qualities or values
such as love and justice are not good when conceived abstractly and without any connection to
personal life.261 It is important to note that by saying these qualities are “not good” when
understood abstractly, Sorley is not claiming what some may assume—that these qualities are the
opposite of good (i.e., bad). Rather, he is simply saying that these qualities lose the property of
goodness when not connected with or understood in terms of a larger concrete whole,
specifically, personal life.
What about ultimate goodness? Is it possible to understand ultimate goodness apart from
reference to a personal source? If ultimate goodness exists, and if perfect moral goodness “does
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not exist in the volitional, or even in the intellectual, consciousness of [human] persons [and if]
they have not achieved agreement with it in their lives, and [if] their understanding of it is
incomplete,” then one can reasonably postulate the existence of a source of ultimate goodness. 262
Sorley attempts to explain this jump to the divine in the following way:
And yet the system of moral values has been acknowledged to be an aspect of the real
universe to which existing things belong. How are we to conceive its relation to them? A
particular instance of goodness can exist only in the character of an individual person or
group of persons; an idea of goodness such as we have is found only in minds such as
ours. But the ideal of goodness does not exist in finite minds or in their material
environment. What then is its status in the system of reality? The question is answered if
we regard the moral order as the order of a Supreme Mind and the ideal of goodness as
belonging to this Mind.263
Here, Sorley claims that moral values belong to the fabric of the universe, and that something
like goodness is best explained in terms of a person (or group of persons) possessing a mind. The
issue is that the ideal or standard of goodness does not perfectly exist or is not wholly found
within the mind of any particular finite being. Therefore, Sorley introduces a Supreme Mind in
which the ideal of goodness exists.
It certainly seems reasonable to conclude that goodness on a human level is personal.
What about ultimate goodness, if there is such a thing?264 Is it personal or non-personal? There
are several reasons for arguing that ultimate goodness is personal. First, as H. P. Owen notes, if
on the finite level moral values inhere in persons (and not merely things), then “it is natural to
infer that they are personal in their absolute existence.” 265 As previously mentioned, the march of
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all things is from higher to lower, so if something is understood as personal on a finite level, the
logical assumption is that it is also personal in its absolute existence. Second, it is challenging to
conceive how humans can participate in ultimate goodness if it is non-personal. The concept of
ultimate goodness is attractive to human persons, prompting them to pursue goodness in their
own lives, giving them moral reasons to act, demonstrating what is permissible, and perhaps
even exerting obligations on occasion. It is understandable how Platonic Forms could attract, but
how is it that abstract Forms give one reasons to pursue goodness or make morally good choices,
demonstrate what is permissible, and possibly even exert obligations or at least serve as the
foundation for moral duties?266
According to David Bentley Hart, “Among the mind’s transcendental aspirations, it is the
longing for moral goodness that is probably the most difficult to contain within the confines of a
naturalist metaphysics.” 267 Perhaps in longing for moral goodness, one is longing for something
greater than nature itself, such as God. Actually, this is one “proof” of God that is discussed in
the Catechism of the Catholic Church: “The human person: with his openness to truth and

As Owen puts it, “The second question is whether absolute goodness is personal or impersonal. Are we
to equate it with Plato’s Idea of the Good or with the personal God of Christianity? The second alternative is
preferable on at least two grounds. In the first place, if on the finite scale moral qualities inhere in persons (and not
things) it is natural to infer that they are personal in their absolute existence. The inference is not only natural: it is
also necessary. Plato said that the world of becoming ‘participates’ in the world of being. But how could we, as
persons, participate in a goodness that is impersonal? An even stronger proof is afforded by the fact that values exert
an obligation. Their obligatoriness is inexplicable unless they are personal. Platonic Forms could, perhaps, attract.
But how could they impose an obligation? How could we be indebted to them? Why should the failure to enact them
engender guilt? I can betray a person and I know that I deserve the guilt I feel. But I cannot see how I could betray
values if they are impersonal. Personal theism gives the only explanation by affirming that value-claims inhere in
the character and will of God.” Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, 79-80. Note: Owen’s statement is
helpful here for a number of reasons, but his emphasis on values exerting obligations may be taken a bit too far. It is
true that values may produce obligations in some circumstances, but certainly not in all circumstances. It may be
more helpful, and perhaps more accurate, however, to say that values produce permissibility, maybe obligations on
occasion, maybe on other occasions reasons that, if acted on, would go beyond our obligations but still be good
(supererogatory).
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beauty, his sense of moral goodness, his freedom and the voice of his conscience, with his
longings for the infinite and for happiness, man questions himself about God's existence. In all
this he discerns signs of his spiritual soul. The soul, the ‘seed of eternity we bear in ourselves,
irreducible to the merely material,’ can have its origin only in God.” 268 Whether longing for
moral goodness is actually longing for God is a debatable claim, no doubt, but it is an intriguing
thought nonetheless. The aim here is not to present a deductive case, but rather to present
thoughts to take into consideration when attempting to determine the likely best source of moral
values. In sum, moral goodness is personal on a human level and also points toward the personal
nature of goodness on an ultimate (or divine) level as well.
Justice
Justice is a word that is commonly discussed on the contemporary scene, especially as
talks of “social justice” occur. What is justice? Among other things, justice is a personal
response to the wrongdoing of morally free human persons. 269 It is said that justice has been
served when a guilty party has been punished for his or her wrongdoing. Justice, rather than
merely existing as an abstraction of the universe, appears to be a property of persons. When a
judgment is made upon a particular person or group of persons (or a situation in general),
whether it be one of approval or disapproval, a mind and a will are assumed, and generally
speaking, one who possesses a mind and a will and the possibility of grasping the role of justice
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is a person. Is it plausible for justice to simply exist apart from connection to a person or
persons? William Lane Craig responds to this question in the following manner:
It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. What does it mean to say, for
example, that Justice just exists? It’s hard to know what to make of this. It is clear what is
meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the
absence of any people, Justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of
persons, not as mere abstractions—or at any rate it’s hard to know what it is for a moral
value to exist as a mere abstraction. 270
On a human level, it is easy to understand that justice exists and that its instances are present in
persons. In many cases, one might argue that justice is the result of governments (whether
federal or local), which are personal entities that enact justice when wrongdoing occurs by a
specific party. What about ultimate justice, if such a thing exists?
It is difficult to understand how one can separate the two—justice and persons—which
presents an interesting dilemma when considering that justice (at least in an ultimate sense) is
challenging to account for on a purely human level. If justice is personal, is it possible to ground
the notion of ultimate justice apart from reference to a personal source that transcends humanity?
When a human person chooses to carry out a criminal act, he is deserving of punishment, and
only when he receives the punishment he deserves, has justice been served. This raises a difficult
question: What about the times when justice does not seemingly prevail, at least in this life?
There are countless examples of this throughout history, including Joseph Stalin and his
participation in the killing of between twenty and sixty million people, Adolf Hitler and his role
in the murder of six million Jews, and Pol Pot and his slaying of nearly one-third of the
Cambodian population (between one and three million Cambodians). Other examples include the
numerous persons who get away with atrocities such as rape, sex trafficking, child abuse, and
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murder. When human justice is not enacted in this life, should one hope that there is a personal
God to enact justice in the next? According to Richard Creel,
As long as it is logically possible that evil be defeated, that innocent suffering is not
meaningless and final, it seems to me that we have a moral obligation to hope that that
possibility is actual. Therefore we have a moral obligation to hope that there is a God
because, if there is a God, then innocent suffering is not meaningless or final. . . . To be
sure, the Holocaust was enormously tragic—but without God it is even more tragic.
Indeed, a far greater evil than the evils of history would be that the evils of history will
not be defeated because there is no God. 271
If there is no God or the divine is altogether impersonal, legitimate hope for ultimate justice
appears unattainable. 272 Conversely, if there is a holy and personal God who exists, then
“innocent suffering is not meaningless or final” because ultimate justice will be handed down. 273
Therefore, by considering the concept of ultimate justice, one is able to postulate not only the
existence of a personal deity who is capable of enacting justice, but also an afterlife in which
ultimate justice is handed down. Even if justice just exists, as a Platonist might assume, it is
difficult to understand how an abstract realm could account for ultimate justice and enact justice.
Suppose that an abstract realm does exist for a moment. Admittedly, in theory it is easier to
understand how ultimate justice could exist, but it is much more difficult to grasp how a nonpersonal realm (with no ultimate person in view) could enact justice because enacting seemingly
requires the existence of a person who does the enacting.
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There are those who accept the need for justice on a human level but dismiss the need for ultimate
justice. However, on this view, it appears that there are many who get away with injustice unscathed. For this
reason, among others, it at least seems logical to hope there is such a thing as ultimate justice and that it will be
enacted.
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Love
In order for genuine love to exist there must be both a subject and an object, a giver and
receiver of love. True love is more than self-love, which easily slips into narcissism. It is a selfgiving love, where the fullness of love is shared in reciprocal fashion among two or more human
persons. As Richard of St. Victor claims, “One never says that someone properly possesses love
if he only loves himself; for it to be true love, it must go out towards another. Consequently,
where a plurality of persons is lacking, it is impossible for there to be love.” 274 No one considers
a human person loving if he ignores the needs of others, instead looking out for his own
interests.275 Again, while it is important for a human person to love himself (in the sense of
desiring to take care of himself, maximize his potential, etc.), the concept of self-love is a
slippery slope that leads to pride and selfishness if pushed too far. Proper love is outward rather
than inward focused.
Where does the moral value of love come from? Without religion the coherence of an
ethic of love and compassion276 are difficult to establish. The principles of love and respect for
persons and the principle of the survival of the fittest are mutually exclusive. 277 Thus, an
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evolutionary view faces a challenge in accounting for the existence of love on a metaphysical
level. Additionally, to say that love just exists in a transcendent realm of values (i.e., Platonism)
seemingly misses the point that love exists within the context of personal relationships. 278 What
about God? Within various belief systems throughout the world, God is described as loving. 279 If
God is loving, then he is personal—because genuine love does not exist in isolation, but rather in
community with other persons. At this point, the question becomes: Which religions of the world
claim that God is personal and which one(s) provide(s) the best explanation of his essentially
loving nature? Although raised here for the purpose of causing one to begin thinking ahead, this
important question is one that is addressed in chapter 7.
Gratitude
Gratitude is not a self-enclosed or self-sufficient emotion but a human person’s inner
response to another person or persons, whether human or divine, for benefits, gifts, or favors
received from them—such as the gratitude one experiences as a result of caring parents, loving
friends, and dedicated teachers or mentors. The call of gratitude is to honor a person for a benefit
he has provided. On a human level, when gratitude is felt due to a country, school, or some other
collective, it is owed to them not as impersonal institutions, but as communities of human
persons. Once again, consider receiving a special gift from a friend or family member and, as a

277
R.Z. Friedman, “Does the ‘Death of God’ Really Matter?” International Philosophical Quarterly 23
(1983): 322.
278

Actually, Erik Wielenberg, a modern Platonist, claims that not all values are properties of persons; he
also denies that all values have external foundations. See Erik J. Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and
Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 46.
This seems to be required of God’s character. If he is the greatest conceivable being, then it appears that
he must be essentially loving. How could he be the greatest conceivable being if he was unloving? Of course, some
might suggest that love is not a great-making property, arguing instead that the greatest conceivable being is not
essentially loving, but still loving in some sense. If love is the supreme ethic, as many conclude, it is difficult to
understand how God could be anything less than essentially loving. If a Being such as God was loving at some times
and unloving at other times, would one be able to refer to him as essentially good? It seems that goodness and love
bear an intimate connection when it comes to the nature of God.
279

106

result, experiencing an overflowing sense of gratitude that spills over in the form of thankfulness.
Similarly, consider the “thank you” notes and cards that individuals send throughout their
lifetimes—each of which assumes a personal object. In every expression of thanks, the verb
“thank” is used in conjunction with an object: “you.” Without an object of thanks, there can be
no thankfulness. Every time one utters the words “thank you,” it is directed toward someone.
On a deeper level, when one enjoys the richness of life which culminates in deep
gratitude and a profound sense of reverential wonder, to whom is this gratitude, this reverence, to
be felt? Assuredly, these are emotions that plausibly demand a transcendent personal object. 280
Furthermore, when one considers the overwhelming immensity of a galaxy or the dynamic
intricacy of a single living cell and is overcome by an intense feeling of thankfulness, chalking
this up to “abstract gratitude” seems inadequate. It is easy to understand how atheists and
agnostics feel gratitude toward human persons who have made positive differences in their lives,
but what about the blessings that cannot be ascribed to human agency? Perhaps understanding
this appreciation of the good gifts of life as praise of a personal Creator and transcendent Giver
of all good gifts, even when one knows little about whom they are praising, provides a more
satisfying account.
Of course, there are other values that many people hold,281 but the values of goodness,
justice, love, and gratitude are thoroughly personal in nature and are indicators of a personal
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For example, consider anger, which is closely related to blame. Although one may not characterize
something like anger as a moral value per se, it is interesting to point out a few key features of anger here. Anger,
while sometimes directed inwardly due to a personal failure, is typically aimed at another person or persons.
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God. What about human value? Do humans possess intrinsic worth, and if so, what (or who) is it
that makes them valuable?

Human Value
Although time and space do not allow for a full treatment of human value, as that would
take an entire dissertation or more, it is helpful to mention a few things here in light of the aim of
this chapter and the overall thrust of this dissertation. When considering how to determine or
measure the value of human beings,282 there are, at least broadly speaking, two main camps that
exist. The property view measures the value of human beings by certain properties that they
acquire, such as self-consciousness or rationality, claiming that humans begin to exist at some
point but become valuable later when such properties are gained. The substance view283 holds

toward which anger is appropriately directed. On a divine level, believers and atheists alike sometimes express anger
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that humans are valuable based upon the kind of thing they are (i.e., they are human persons), not
by some capability they have or function they can perform. 284 Of course, it is true that humans
differ significantly in terms of their talents, abilities, accomplishments, and degrees of
development—a point that Nietzsche perpetually accentuated—but they are nonetheless equal
because they share a common human nature, at least arguably and intuitively. Simply put,
humans are intrinsically valuable because of their shared personhood. On this view, personhood
is ontologically prior to any and all contingent properties that may be acquired by human beings
over time. Again, they are not valuable because of what they do or possess the potentiality to do,
but rather because of what they are—they are human persons and therefore possess intrinsic (or
fundamental) worth.
The property view is problematic for several reasons, but perhaps the most significant
problem facing this view is that it cannot account for basic human equality. If humans have value
by virtue of the value-making properties they possess, such as self-consciousness or rationality,
then it follows that since these acquired properties come in varied degrees among human beings,
basic human rights also come in varying degrees. Does one really wish to say that those with
more self-consciousness or rationality are more human (and therefore more valuable) than those
with less? 285 If so, the claim that all human beings are equal loses its force. Philosophically
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things, such as have consciousness, reason, possess a self-concept, and engage in sophisticated discussion. See Mary
Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” in The Problem of Abortion, 2nd ed., ed. Joel Feinberg
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984). Michael Tooley and Peter Singer hold similar views to Warren’s. Actually,
Tooley and Singer both possess an understanding of personhood that leads them to support infanticide. See Michael
Tooley, “In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide,” in The Abortion Controversy 25 Years after Roe v. Wade, 2nd ed.,
eds. Louis Pojman and Francis J. Beckwith (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998); and Michael Tooley, Abortion and
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speaking, it arguably makes more sense to claim that human beings are of equal worth not
because of the sorts of properties they possess or acquire, but rather because of the sort of thing
they are—rational moral agents. Again, it is true that humans differ with regard to their talents,
abilities, and degrees of development, but they are nonetheless equal because they share in a
common human nature.
But is this talking in a circle, basically saying that humans are valuable because they are
human? Of course, one can avoid the potential for the circularity objection by grounding human
value in one or more human properties (rationality, self-consciousness, etc.), but again, the
property view fails to adequately account for human equality (since there are varying degrees of
rationality and self-consciousness among persons). Additionally, Mark Linville notes that secular
theories as a whole, and even many religious theories, likely fail to provide a robust account of
the intrinsic value of persons. As Linville maintains, “If such an account [a robust account] of
dignity is to be had at all, it must be rooted in the metaphysics of personhood.” 286
This poses a number of issues for various belief systems, including (but not limited to)
naturalism.287 For example, Linville notes that naturalism’s difficulty in accounting for the
intrinsic dignity of persons is at least threefold: “how to derive the personal from the impersonal,

Infanticide (New York, NY: Oxford, 1983). See Peter Singer, “Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?” Pediatrics 73
(July 1973); Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (New
York, NY: Oxford, 1985); and Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Traditional Ethics (New
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
Mark D. Linville, “The Moral Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, eds.
William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 441.
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Linville critiques a number of secular theories in his chapter on the moral argument, including (but not
limited to) Hobbesian egoism, utilitarianism, and ideal observer theory. Linville also analyzes Hinduism and
Buddhism as theories for grounding the intrinsic value of persons, and he finds that Hinduism fails because the
Advaita Vedanta appears to deny the real existence of persons whereas Theravada Buddhism fails because it views
persons as bundles of instantaneous constituents without anything substantial that may be identified as the self. On
Theravada Buddhism, there are only non-personal constituents. See Linville, “The Moral Argument,” 417-438.
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how to derive values from a previously valueless universe, and how to unite the personal and the
valuable with the result of a coherent and plausible notion of personal dignity.” 288 Interestingly,
if human value is ultimately rooted in the metaphysics of personhood, naturalism is in a difficult
position when it comes to accounting for personhood—because naturalism is impersonal (or nonpersonal). Suppose, as Linville does, that the personal and the valuable are not emergent features
of reality after all (as naturalists typically assume),289 but are basic instead. Furthermore, suppose
that personhood is one of (if not the) most basic feature(s) of reality, and that the impersonal
(along with the personal) ultimately derives from the personal. Finally, “[s]uppose that the one
thing that is both metaphysically and axiologically ultimate is a person [or personal God], so that
personhood and value are necessarily united in that Being.” 290 Of course, theists believe exactly
this and claim that this Being is God. 291
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Ibid., 443.

289

A Platonist would contend that there are necessary objective features of the universe that exist as brute
facts and do not need God as their ground or source. These features exist as eternal and unchanging ideas in a
transcendent, abstract realm. For example, Erik Wielenberg states that ethical truths are “part of the furn iture of the
universe,” constituting the “ethical background of every possible universe.” Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in
a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 52. William Lane Craig notes three issues with
Platonism. First, it seems unintelligible. What does it mean to say that moral values such as justice or love simply
exist? Values like justice and love appear to be properties of persons, and it is difficult to understand how they can
exist as abstractions. Second, it is difficult to understand how Platonism provides a basis for moral duties. How is it
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compassion, and the like? In the absence of a moral lawgiver, is it possible for one to be morally obligated to an
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personal to exist as a basic feature of reality, claiming that at the very heart of the universe there exists a personal
God who is then able to account for personhood?
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Linville ultimately posits the following conclusion: “God is personal and is the source of all value so
that the value of personhood is found in the fact that the metaphysically, axiologically, and explanatorily ultimate
Being is a person” (or three Persons, on the Christian view). Linville, “The Moral Argument,” 443.
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On the substance view, human beings enjoy an unconditional worth that is categorical in
nature, independent of any extrinsic considerations. Therefore, the only appropriate response to
each human being is categorical regard for their intrinsic worth. As Immanuel Kant’s Principle
of Humanity (i.e., one version of his Categorical Imperative) states: “Act in such a way that you
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as
a means, but always at the same time as an end.” 292 Kant claimed that there are two ways in
which something may be said to have value: either it has dignity or it has a price. If, as Kant
claimed, the value of human persons “is above all price,” unlike mere things (which have a
“price”), then they ought to be treated as an “end” in themselves because they are intrinsically
valuable.293
Persons are intrinsically valuable (i.e., substance view); they do not gain or lose value
based on properties they gain or lose (i.e., property view). Furthermore, if the intrinsic value of
human persons is ultimately rooted in personhood on an ontological level, then naturalism is
likely not in a position to ground the concept of personhood and one has reason to look in the
direction of a personal God for a robust account of personhood. 294 There is obviously more that
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Kant used this version of his categorical imperative primarily to show the immorality of suicide and
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happiness as well. See Baggett and Baggett, The Morals of the Story, 197-216.
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needs discussing on this topic, but at first glance, it appears that non-personal naturalism
struggles to provide an adequate basis for personal value. 295 Sure, naturalism is certainly in a
position to measure the value of human beings by price, but it is likely not in a position to
account for the value that humans intrinsically enjoy. Conversely, personal theism seems better
positioned to account for the unconditional and essential worth of human persons by grounding
the value of persons in the personhood of God. 296

295
If the substance view is one that is largely owing to the effects of the Judeo-Christian tradition, this
potentially raises a concern about circularity. If the notion of the substance view comes from, say, Christianity, the
arrow presumably points from Christianity to essential human dignity/equality, not vice versa, on pain of
problematic circularity. In response to this potential objection, perhaps it is helpful to consider this particular
thought from the outspoken atheist, Jürgen Habermas, who admits the profound debt that human rights discourse
owes to the Christian faith: “Christianity has functioned for the normative self-understanding of modernity as more
than just a precursor or a catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and a social
solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights,
and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy,
substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day,
there is no alternative to it. And in light of current challenges of a postnational constellation, we continue to draw on
the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.” Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions,
ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 150-151. According to Habermas, the
foundational role of the Judeo-Christian ethics of justice and love are undeniable as the proper basis for
contemporary discussions on human value and equality. What is more telling is that Habermas admits “there is no
alternative” to the Judeo-Christian view on this matter. Could it be that the Judeo-Christian view finds itself as the
basis for these discussions because it is actually true? Surely, there are numerous examples of how adherents of such
a view have been motivated to fight for the intrinsic value of human persons in the face of mistreatment. John Hare
makes an interesting observation on this score. According to Hare, “When we look at the great movements towards
the recognition of human value over the last sixty years, we will often find a religious motivation. I am thinking of
Martin Luther King and the civil-rights movement, and the Lutherans in East Germany and the fall of the totalitarian
state. Why is this? It is because of the nature of the God they worship.” John Hare, God’s Command (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 307-308. Others, such as Robert Putnam and David Campbell, have compared how
religious and non-religious Americans have behaved in terms of giving money and time to charities and social
organizations, finding that religious Americans typically give more money not just to religious organizations but to
the American Cancer Society. Furthermore, religious Americans volunteer more of their time not only in their
respective places of worship (churches, synagogues, mosques, etc.), but also in civic associations across the board.
As Putnam and Campbell conclude: “By many different measures religiously observant Americans are better
neighbors and better citizens than secular Americans—they are more generous with their time and money, especially
in helping the needy, and they are more active in community life.” The point here is not that religious adherents are
better people morally speaking, but that their greater involvement in these ways is not a coincidental in nature . D. E.
Campbell and R. D. Putnam, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 2010), 461.
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A question that surfaces here is: Are human persons valuable because God values them, or does God
value them because they are valuable? According to Linville, “God values human persons because they are
intrinsically valuable. Further, they have such value because God has created them after his own image as a Person
with a rational and moral nature.” Linville, “The Moral Argument,” 445.
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Values and Purpose
Another indicator that values are personal in nature concerns the role that values play in
helping one satisfy his or her purpose—because purpose is, after all, a key feature of personality.
According to Sorley, if moral values belong to the nature of reality, at least two things are
implied: (1) they are objective and ought to be each person’s guide; and (2) they help each
person satisfy his or her purpose in life. Regarding the second point, Sorley explains,
Reality, whatever other manifestations it may have, is manifested in persons; they are
part of the real universe, and they come to form ideas of moral value and to some extent
to frame their lives in accordance with them. Their lives are continuous efforts towards
fulfilment of a purpose or purposes; and in their attainment of moral values the nature of
persons receives an expression which grows in completeness as value is realised. That is
to say, the objective moral value is valid independently of me and my will, and yet is
something which satisfies my purpose and completes my nature. . . . Values characterise
personal life as completed or perfected; they are factors in the fulfilment of purpose, and
purpose is an essential trait of personality. 297
As Sorley points out here, moral values are objective features of reality and independent of
human will (or intellect, etc.), yet at the same time, values are manifested in persons.298 Values
serve as the framework for how humans should live their lives and are factors in the fulfillment
of their purpose in life—and “purpose is an essential trait of personality.” The link between
values and purpose is another indicator that the source of moral values is likely personal in
nature.
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Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 240-241.
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Unlike the laws of nature, mathematical relations, and general logical relations, moral values arguably
hold true for persons only. Values are ultimately realized in persons, not in mere things. As Sorley says: “Of moral
values it clearly holds that it is in persons that they are realised, not in mere things, and that they belong to persons
in as truly objective a sense as any other characteristics belong to them. But something more than this is true. It is
not merely the value actually realised in some one’s conscious life that must be held to belong to objective reality. In
bringing value into existence the individual person is conscious of a standard or ideal which has validity as a guide
for his personal endeavour, or of an obligation which rests upon him. The attainment of value is recognised as a
value only because of its conformity with this standard or law of value, or because of its approximation to this ideal
of value. It follows therefore that the value or goodness actually achieved in personal life implies as its ground or
condition a standard or ideal of goodness.” Ibid., 508-509.
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Summary
Chapter 4 looks at evidence from moral values in an effort to determine whether their
source is personal. Six pieces of evidence for a personal God are suggested in this chapter. First,
ultimate goodness, which is not fully contained within any finite mind, points in the direction of
a personal God. If goodness on a human level is personal, as this chapter suggests, it appears
logical to conclude that ultimate goodness is also personal (since the personal arguably cannot
come from the non-personal—this would be an example of a stream rising higher than its
source). Another reason to maintain that ultimate goodness is personal—if there is such a
thing—has to do with the difficulty in understanding how human persons could participate in
ultimate goodness if it were non-personal. Second, the value of justice, which is deeply personal,
signals that a personal God likely exists. If there is such a thing as ultimate justice, one may
postulate not only the existence of a personal God, but an afterlife in which ultimate justice is
handed down (this is significant because it appears that some human persons get away with
injustice in this life). Third, the ethic of love, which some suggest is the highest ethic, appears to
signify the existence of a personal God. Love, which requires a subject and an object, a giver and
a receiver of love, is difficult to establish on evolutionary naturalism since the principles of love
and respect for persons and the principle of the survival of the fittest are mutually exclusive.
Additionally, Platonism, which is a view that ultimate reality is non-personal, and that moral
values just exist, faces a challenge in accounting for something as personal as love. Therefore,
love likely points in the direction of a personal source. Fourth, gratitude suggests that a personal
God exists because there are occasions when gratitude is not appropriately directed to any human
person, such as when one feels grateful for the gift of life, or thankful for the beauty of a sunset
or the warmth of the sun itself. Fifth, personal theism appears better positioned to account for the
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concept of human value by holding that the unconditional and essential worth of human persons
is grounded in the personhood of God. Sixth, values themselves are personal in nature because
values play a role in helping one satisfy his or her purpose in life, and purpose is a key feature of
personality. If this is the case, one might suggest the existence of a personal God as the source of
moral values. In sum, the six pieces of evidence suggested in chapter 4 make postulating the
existence of a personal God appropriate.
This chapter has attempted to show that moral values belong to persons and that moral
values, plausibly thought to be objective and eternal, point to something (or someone) beyond
the minds of finite persons. It seems, as J. F. Bethune-Baker indicates, that “belief that the
ultimate reality is in some sense personal [is what] allows us to speak of values without talking
nonsense, for values and idealistic views of life are the creatures of persons.” 299

J. F. Bethune-Baker, “The Religious Value of the Idea of a Future Life,” in King’s College Lectures on
Immortality, 25. Sorley concludes something similar here: “For we have found that values—intrinsic values, that
is—belong to persons only. Persons are required for the realisation of the concept value; and it is only in connexion
with the lives of selves or persons that values belong to the structure of the universe as the sum-total of existence.”
Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 362.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MORAL OBLIGATIONS
Introduction
In chapter 4, which focused on moral values, several objections were considered, and
then several specific moral values were examined—namely, goodness, justice, love, and
gratitude—in an effort to demonstrate that the source of moral values is likely personal.
Additionally, a discussion on human value (or dignity) was provided, leading to the conclusion
that humans are intrinsically valuable because of their personhood, which was then understood as
plausibly deriving from a personal God. Finally, a brief word on the link between moral values
and purpose was offered, highlighting, yet again, the personal nature of moral values and
pointing out the apparent need for a transcendent personal source.
This chapter focuses on moral obligations. The discussion assumes the existence of an
objective standard of goodness and maintains that certain acts are either obligatory or forbidden
in some sort of overriding sense. A particular act is morally obligatory when it ought to be
carried out and forbidden when it ought not be done.300 For example, attempting to save the life
of a drowning child is something that someone ought to do. Likewise, it is perfectly intelligible
to believe that humans are morally obligated to possess (or acquire) traits such as compassion,
mercifulness, generosity, and courage. 301 On the other hand, one ought not drown children for

300

Of course, some moral acts are permissible without being obligatory. This is an ambiguity in the word
“right” that sometimes surfaces. Oftentimes, rightness is equated with obligatoriness, but “the right” more precisely
encompasses a “deontic” cluster of concepts that include permissibility and forbiddenness. There are also occasions
where certain choices are good (e.g., becoming a doctor), but they are not necessarily obligatory. Regarding the
doctor example, it is important to remember the distinction drawn in chapter 4 regarding “the good” and “the right.”
Even something morally good need not be dutiful; recall, again, supererogation. In this treatment it is “the good”
that serves as the proper foundation for “the right.”
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This suggests there is a connection between the deontic and the virtues. C. Stephen Evans, God and
Moral Obligation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 2-3.
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fun or murder a human person out of boredom. C. Stephen Evans notes four key features of
moral obligations:
(1) They are objective, in the sense that they are the kind of thing that people can be
mistaken about;
(2) They provide compelling reasons of a distinctive kind for actions;
(3) They help humans understand why they should (and do) care about their obligations
and why moral reasons should (and often do) move them to action; and
(4) An adequate account of moral obligation helps one understand the universality of
morality.302
The overall flow of this chapter is as follows. First, following a brief explanation of
divine command theory, there are responses to a few common objections, particularly those
concerning divine command theory and the Euthyphro dilemma. Next, the nature of moral
obligations is examined in order to determine whether obligations make better sense originating
from a personal or non-personal source.

Divine Command Theory
Before moving to several objections that are commonly raised when moral obligations
are discussed, it is helpful to briefly introduce and discuss divine command theory (DCT). 303
Admittedly, there are numerous ways in which to explain moral obligations, but DCT is the
preferred approach here for various reasons. 304 Obligations are more than feelings of obligation
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For a comparative approach to DCT that considers versions of DCT presented by Christian, Islamic, and
Jewish thinkers, and even considers how evolutionary psychology stacks up to the theory, see John Hare, God’s
Command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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For detailed defenses of divine command theory, see Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A
Framework for Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Evans, God and Moral Obligation.
Adams provides something like a Platonic theistic account whereas Evans presents more of a theistic natural law
account, but both defend divine command theory at length, albeit in different (but not disjointed) ways. Baggett and
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(e.g., I feel like I should do this).305 They are not mere suggestions or opinions, and they are not
even prescriptions for which there are excellent reasons to fulfill. 306 Duties are inescapable.307
Furthermore, they are imperatives and therefore require something beyond inescapability; they
require authoritativeness.308 Actually, authority is arguably the single most important feature of
moral obligations.309
How does one account for the authoritativeness of moral obligations? This question,
among others, is one of the main reasons why DCT is appealing. 310 By positing God’s existence,

Walls explain how the defenses of Adams and Evans are integrative in David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and
Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 287-289.
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Feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient for obligations. For instance, one might have a legitimate
obligation to do something, but he or she does not feel as if should be done. On the other hand, one might have a
feeling that something should be done but he or she is not actually obligated to do it. Admittedly, there are instances
where feelings do not accurately correspond to obligations, but in many instances, feelings of obligations at least
roughly correspond to actual obligations. On the whole, however, feelings alone are an inadequate basis for
explaining and accounting for moral obligations.
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A vital ingredient that morality requires is “authority,” as Richard Joyce suggests. This, as Joyce
maintains, provides a normative system that enjoys both features (inescapability and authority), and one that
possesses “practical clout.” Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 57.
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Although the nature of moral obligations has not been addressed up to this point in the chapter, one brief
comment needs to be made regarding the issue of authority. The authoritativeness of moral obligations needs
explaining, which is why many insert God into the equation and explain obligations as his divine commands. If God
exists, he certainly possesses the necessary authority for explaining obligations. W. R. Matthews adds a particularly
insightful thought regarding intrinsic authority. If God is to account for moral obligations, he seemingly must
possess intrinsic authority, and if he possesses intrinsic authority, his nature is most likely personal. As Matthews
explains, “But it is obvious that a law externally imposed can possess no inherent authority but only that compulsory
force which the Deity may exercise by an appeal to my hopes and fears. I may obey [God] because I hope for
heaven or dread hell, but it will not be a moral obedience nor will His commands possess any moral authority. It is
thus clear that the only moral judgment which can have intrinsic authority is one that springs from the nature of
personality” (emphasis added). W. R. Matthews, Studies in Christian Philosophy (London: MacMillan and Co.,
1921), 131.
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and by understanding moral obligations as commands from God, morality is given the sort of
clout that most intuitively think it possesses. 311 Divine command theory rests upon the
foundation of a theory of “the good” (as suggested in chapter 4) and attempts to explain and offer
an account of what is morally right. Of course, something can be morally good without being
obligatory; moral duties, in contrast, are not optional, but required. As mentioned above, moral
duties are authoritative and binding, signals of what one ought to do. This is why when one fails
to carry out his duty, he or she is morally blameworthy or guilty. It is true that there is
significantly more to DCT that deserves mentioning, but for now, it suffices to simply
understand these two things: (1) DCT accounts for the authoritativeness of morality by (2)
viewing moral obligations as commands from God.312 Regarding the second point, it is of crucial
importance to view moral obligations not only as commands from God but as commands that
flow from his moral nature. In other words, God basically expresses his moral nature (who he is)
to human beings through his commands. This key clarification will prove helpful as several
objections to DCT are raised below. It is also helpful to note that DCT, at least as it is conceived

At the end of their chapter entitled “Divine Command Theory,” Baggett and Walls provide several
reasons why authority is normally ascribed to someone, including: (1) power—someone who has the ability to
enforce his will has a certain kind of authority; (2) knowledge—authorities are persons who have sufficient mastery
of a field or discipline; and (3) moral integrity and character—the sort of authority that appeals to the conscience and
demands respect in a deeper sense than the authority that comes from power or knowledge. These three reasons
prove helpful in understanding why it is that God has the requisite authority to account for morality. As Baggett and
Walls explain: “God has the supreme power, knowledge, and goodness, and all of these underwrite his mora l
authority. He created us and this world and stamped us with his image, and has the power to hold us fully
accountable for our actions. Since he has perfect knowledge of us, he understands perfectly what is good for us and
our flourishing. Moreover, since he is perfectly good he desires our well-being and does everything short of
overriding our freedom to promote it. In view of his nature as a perfect being, there are no good grounds for
doubting his authority. There can be no blindsideness, no bias, no imperfect understanding, no possibility of misuse
of power, or having obtained it wrongly. If all rational withholdings are blocked, we ought to accept God as an
authority. And part of what is involved in that is accepting his commands, unless we have good reason to do
otherwise; but again, with a perfect being, there can’t possibly be good reasons to do otherwise. In short, we think
the issue of authority is a matter of power, knowledge, and character, all of which add up to moral authority.”
Baggett and Walls, Good God, 122-123.
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of in this chapter, is a theory of the nature of obligation only, and not of moral properties in
general. These clarifications are helpful in better understanding the foundation of DCT.
However, DCT is not without its critics. A few objections raised by critics are addressed below.

Objections to Moral Obligations
Objection 1: The Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro Dilemma is perhaps the most common objection to DCT.313 Oftentimes
skeptics raise the challenge directly, and there are many other occasions where the Dilemma
inspires other objections. In the Euthyphro, Socrates interrogates Euthyphro, who claims that
holiness (or “piety,” as many translations have it) is understood as “that which is pleasing to the
gods.”314 After a bit of philosophical sparring, Socrates raises this famous question: “Is what is
holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?” 315 This question
raises an interesting dilemma. If Euthyphro responds by saying that what is holy has the quality
on the basis of the gods’ approval, then the gods’ approval appears to be arbitrary. On the other
hand, if he maintains that the gods approve of it because it is holy, holiness is a quality
independent of the gods’ approval. 316 Although Euthyphro is about holiness or piety, many
philosophers have thought that a similar challenge can be raised about morality. 317 Adapted to a
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Especially moral theories that ground moral qualities in what God commands (or wills or approves of).
Of course, DCT is one of these theories, which is why proponents of DCT cannot ignore the Euthyphro Dilemma.
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monotheistic context and replacing notions of “approval” or “loving” with “commands,” it might
go like this: Does God command what is right because it is right, or is something right because
God commands it? If God commands something because it is right, then rightness is independent
of God’s commands. Conversely, if something is right because God commands it, it appears that
abhorrent things such as hatred and mistreatment would be right if God commanded them. 318
Either way, there is a challenge for a proponent of DCT to overcome.
Response to Objection 1: The Euthyphro Dilemma
Before addressing the Dilemma,319 there are two clarifications that need mentioning.
First, DCT as presented here (and in the work of Adams, Evans, Baggett, and Walls) is a theory
only regarding the source of moral obligations, not a theory of morality as a whole. This is in
contrast to William of Ockham, who is widely regarded as having developed a universal
voluntaristic ethical theory that attempts to ground all moral properties in God’s commands or
will.320 Second, since moral obligations deal with what is right, a theory of the good is necessary
in order to account for what is morally right. Taken together, one can then argue that if God is
the good, then what is right flows from his nature. This approach allows one to ground goodness
in who God is rather than independent of him, while also potentially avoiding the abhorrent
command charge by maintaining that God’s necessary goodness serves as the basis for his
commands (e.g., a necessarily good God could not possibly command evil things, though he may
well command certain things in some respects bad, but ultimately justified and reconcilable with

Evans mentions another problem on this score, namely, if God’s commands make something right, then
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our deepest moral intuitions). Of course, more needs to be said on the matter, which is why two
common Euthyphro-inspired objections are further addressed below, followed by an objection
that is more central to the overall thrust of this dissertation.
Objection 2: Abhorrent Commands
This objection to DCT, inspired by the Euthyphro Dilemma, states that if God’s
commands dictate moral goodness, then it is possible for God to command something that is
abhorrent, like torturing children for fun or mistreating people instead of attempting to love and
serve them. If God commanded something like this, then it would be good—at least according to
the skeptics.
Response to Objection 2: Abhorrent Commands
The problem with the abhorrent command objection is that it fails to recognize that God
wills something because he is good, and something is right because God wills it. (This is the
main reason it is helpful to properly understand the distinction between “the good” and “the
right.”) God’s very nature is the standard of goodness, and his commandments are an expression
of his loving nature. This means that, on the view under consideration, moral obligations and
duties are ultimately determined by and flow from a perfectly loving and just God instead of a
dictator who issues arbitrary commands. If God’s character is impeccable—if he is essentially
and entirely holy, compassionate, kind, and so on—when he issues commands, they are a
reflection of his perfect moral nature. Why are all of God’s commands right (instead of arbitrary,
immoral, etc.)? Because God is good. This means that to assume God could issue abhorrent
commands is to assume something that is logically impossible. God cannot cease to be other than
who he is; if he could, then he would fail to be the maximally great Being. 321 Similarly, God
321
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cannot fail to do something that runs contrary to who he is; again, if he could, then he would not
be God. This is at least one theory, model, account, or overall picture, which seemingly
possesses plausibility and power and coherence, which gives one reason to take it seriously.
This objection is not a decisive one against DCT because a story can be told according to
which there are principled reasons for believing that a good God simply never would or could
issue a command to do something irremediably reprehensible. Since DCT satisfies various
desiderata for what a good account of moral obligations should explain, and this objection and
the others are not decisive, this gives us reason to take theistic ethics seriously. (And ultimately,
since theistic ethics makes morality personal, these considerations point toward a personal
explanation.)
Objection 3: “No Reasons”
When skeptics raise this objection to DCT, they suggest that if God’s say-so is the reason
for the morality of an action, then there is no reason that something is wrong (e.g., slavery, rape,
etc.) except God’s command. In other words, God’s commands are a reflection of his own
capricious choice; there are no prior reasons for them. And, as skeptics maintain, if God has no
reasons for his commands, then we cannot anticipate what his commands will be, since they can
be whatever he decides and dictates.
Response to Objection 3: “No Reasons”
How should one respond to this objection? One must affirm that God does have reasons
for the commands he issues, and one must reject the notion that this leads to a divorce between
God and ethics. If “God is good” is true, a foundational reason for why God commands the sorts
of things he does is because the actions he commands are good. One must remember that the
goodness of an action—in this case, God’s commands—comes from its resemblance to God’s
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nature. As such, a command to love one’s neighbors, then, is good in virtue of the fact that it
resembles God’s own loving and relational character; it flows from who God is. Ultimately, this
is the reason why all of God’s commands are understood to be right: because he is good and all
of his commands flow from his loving nature.
There are other Euthyphro-inspired objections to DCT, but for the sake of time and space,
only the abhorrent command and “no reasons” objections are addressed in detail here. For other
Euthyphro-inspired objections—such as the normativity, vacuity, epistemic, and autonomy
objections—one will need to look elsewhere. 322 One additional objection follows: this objection
is more central to the heart of this particular dissertation, as it deals with God, personhood, and
morality, along with how the three are related.
Objection 4: Personhood
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to evaluate moral properties in an effort to
determine whether their source is most likely personal or non-personal. Thus far, there are many
indications that the source is personal in nature. An interesting challenge involving moral
obligations and personhood is presented by Brian Davies, and due to its relevance to the current
topic, a response is warranted. According to Davies,
You might say that there are moral laws of which any decent God needs to take
account—this making God a moral agent. After all, is it not commonly said that God is a
person? And are persons not subject to moral laws (or duties, or obligations)? And are not
such laws (or duties, or obligations) binding on all persons—even divine ones? And does
this not mean that God is a moral agent? 323
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Interestingly, Davies himself,324 among others,325 does not think that God is a moral agent
subject to moral obligations, and therefore God is not, or likely cannot be, a person. Davies
claims that if God is a person, then he is subject to moral obligations because obligations are
binding on all persons (or moral agents), both human and divine. However, since God does not
have moral obligations, he is not a moral agent and is therefore not a person. There are several
issues with Davies’ claim. First, Davies projects the idea of “person” (in a human sense) onto
God, failing to acknowledge that God is the premier person, the very standard of personhood. As
mentioned previously, if God exists, he is the One who establishes personhood. In essence,
Davies utilizes a bottom-up approach when it comes to defining personhood (which begins with
humans), instead of utilizing a top-down approach (which begins with God). Second, there are
theists who claim that God is a person (and a moral agent) while also maintaining that he has no
moral obligations. For example, William Lane Craig writes, “I’m inclined to think that God has
no moral obligations whatsoever to fulfill.” 326 Moral obligations arise when a competent
authority issues imperatives, and since God presumably does not issue imperatives (or
commands) to himself, it follows that God is under no moral obligations.
Response to Objection 4: Personhood
If this is the case—that God has no moral obligations—does it mean that God is not a
person, as Davies suggests? There are presumably two ways of responding here: (1) hold that
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God has no moral obligations, and that this has no bearing on his personhood since he is the One
who ultimately establishes personhood; or (2) hold that God issues commands to himself and is
therefore under moral obligations, which would satisfy Davies’ criteria for being a person. 327
Regarding the second option, there are theists who claim that if God has moral obligations, they
are only those which he gives himself. For instance, perhaps by making promises, God is
allegedly placing himself under an obligation to keep those promises. 328 Not all theists would
agree that the promises of God are congruent with obligations that are binding upon him, but if it
is true, it is potentially problematic for Davies’ view. If God is under an obligation to keep a
promise, or under any obligation whatsoever, then he is a moral agent and therefore a person on
Davies’ view. Although both options deal with Davies’ objection, one who holds to DCT, such
as the version presented in this chapter, should probably go with the first option and hold that
God has no obligations. Even if God has no moral obligations, it is a non sequitur to claim that
he is not a moral agent, and therefore not a person. It appears perfectly reasonable to say that
God has no obligations, is a moral agent, and is the ultimate exemplar of personhood.

The Nature of Moral Obligations
In what follows, a discussion on the nature of obligations (or duties) takes place, divine
commands are addressed, and the concept of reverence is considered—all in an attempt to
determine whether moral obligations are personal or non-personal, and then, as a result, whether
their source is most likely personal or non-personal.

This is not Davies’ only quality necessary for personhood, but it is the one that is most relevant to the
present discussion.
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Obligations/Duties
Although some claim that there can be morality without God,329 removing God from the
equation raises serious challenges for maintaining objective morality, including moral categories
like moral obligations. 330 Furthermore, attempting to claim that moral obligations derive from an
impersonal source is problematic since the idea of obligations involves the idea of a person or
persons to whom one is obligated; the word “obligation” itself “always impl[ies] a personal
constraint whenever [it] refer[s] to an object within the finite world.” 331 One might say he is
under an obligation to his friend or wife, but not to a tree or computer because “[i]t takes two to
establish an obligation. . . . The person that bears the obligation cannot also be the person whose
presence imposes it; it is impossible to be at once the upper and the nether millstone.” 332 As
Adams says, “If I have an obligation . . . I believe it can only be in a personal relationship or in a
social system of relationships. If an action is wrong, likewise, there must be a person or persons,
distinct from the agent, who may appropriately have an adverse reaction to it. For the meaning of
the obligation family of ethical terms is tied to such reactions to the wrong.”333 In short, the idea
of a “‘claim’ seems inevitably to suggest two persons, one of whom might make a claim on the
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other.”334 All of this seemingly makes sense if morality is, after all, “the sphere of personal
relations.”335
One might agree with the previous analysis, which mainly deals with obligations on a
human level, while insisting that obligations on a divine level either do not exist or do not require
a personal source. Fair enough, but what if there are moments when no human person is in sight
and one still feels morally obligated to perform an act or to avoid it altogether? To whom is one
obligated if not to God who is the source of such obligations? 336 The only other possibilities are
to oneself or to an abstract order of claims. Regarding the first option, it seems obvious that the
idea of obligation involves the notion of an “other” to whom one is obligated, whereas the
second seems unintelligible due to the oddness337 of an abstract order of claims providing a bit of
instruction regarding what ought or ought not be done in a given situation.338 If moral obligations
are essentially instructions, even commands or requirements on how to live, it appears that
reference to a personal God is more appropriate. 339
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A duty is something that is owed—“[b]ut,” as Taylor says, “something can be owed only
to some person or persons. There can be no such thing as duty in isolation.” 340 One might say
that it is his or her moral duty to protect innocent children from harm, but one would not
maintain that it is his moral responsibility to protect a tree in his yard from pesky insects (unless
it provides shade, food, or some other benefit to persons).
The idea of political and legal obligations, which are the products of human lawmakers,
are clear enough; the duty of individuals is to obey the statutes set forth by the society in which
they live. What best explains moral obligations, which are higher and more binding upon
humanity than political or legal obligations? Are they more adequately explained in terms of a
higher-than-human personal Lawgiver, or can one explain these moral claims and duties as selfexplanatory aspects of impersonal existence? It seems contradictory to say that humans are
morally responsible to obey the latter (i.e., self-explanatory aspects of impersonal existence)
since duties are owed to persons. 341 Conversely, it appears more logical to consider obeying a
higher-than-human personal Lawgiver (i.e., personal God).
If moral duty is explained in terms of an impersonal, abstract principle, or even an
impersonal God, the idea of an abstract principle or impersonal God holding someone personally
responsible for failing to carry out his or her moral duty becomes difficult to uphold. Moreover,
when one fails to carry out his or her duty in a given circumstance, guilt frequently arises, which
follows if moral obligations are the result of a personal God but not if they derive from abstract
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or impersonal principles. This provides further evidence that the concept of moral duty is best
explained in terms of a personal Source.
Obligations/Duties, Inanimate Objects, and Animals
If duties are best understood within the context of persons, what about duties felt toward
inanimate objects? For example, perhaps one feels obligated to care for a tree in his or her yard,
or a small stream down the road. How is one to account for these sorts of duties apart from
reference to a person? Or are these duties also best understood within the context of persons?
According to Kant,
These duties are also indirectly duties towards mankind. Destructiveness is immoral; we
ought not to destroy things which can be put to some use. No man ought to mar the
beauty of nature; for what he has no use for may still be of use to some one else. He need,
of course, pay no heed to the thing itself, but he ought to consider his neighbor. Thus we
see that all duties towards animals . . . and towards inanimate objects are aimed indirectly
at our duties towards mankind. 342
Interestingly, Kant explains duties felt toward inanimate objects as indirect duties toward human
persons, specifically because these sorts of things may be of use to others—whether it be for
enjoyment, shade, provision, or some other personal benefit. 343
In the quote above, Kant also mentions the personal component present when carrying
out duties toward animals. How is it that if one has a duty to an animal, that this is somehow a
duty, albeit indirectly, to human persons and is therefore personal in nature? Kant’s reason for
holding that duties toward animals are indirectly duties to human persons (and personal in
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nature) is as follows: “Animal nature has analogies to human nature, and by doing our duties to
animals in respect of manifestations which correspond to manifestations of human nature, we
indirectly do our duty towards humanity.” 344 Kant unpacks this statement by saying that by
carrying out duties toward animals, this prepares human persons to carry out their duties toward
other persons, where there are binding duties. Additionally, Kant claims that if acts toward
animals are analogous to human acts and conceivably spring from the same principles, duties
toward animals are personal because it is through them that one cultivates his or her
corresponding duties toward human persons. For instance, when a man has a dog and is cruel to
it, by depriving it of food and water, and perhaps even by beating it frequently, this man is more
likely to become hard also in his dealings with other men. 345 On the other hand, if a man treats
his dog well, regularly feeding and watering it and taking it for walks, showing the dog affection
and so on, this man is probably going to be kinder in his dealings with human persons. This is
why Kant says, “We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals.” 346 Shortly after
this statement, in a somewhat humorous manner, Kant quips, “Tender feelings towards dumb
animals develop human feelings towards mankind.” 347 In sum, duties toward animals, as with
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duties toward inanimate objects, are indirect duties toward human persons and are also personal
in nature.
Another approach to animals involves saying that human persons have an obligation to
God to treat his creation properly, which includes animals, and it is even more pressing that
human persons treat animals well because they are capable of feeling pain. Intentionally and
needlessly inflicting pain on animals is cruel disregard for God’s creation—and a sin against
God. One should also care about the experience of animals and want them not to suffer
needlessly, and not just for instrumental reasons. Either way, whether one is obligated to care for
animals because mistreatment of them leads to mistreatment of human persons or because God
commands that animals be cared for—or perhaps some combination of both—there is still
evidence that caring for animals is personal in nature, and if a personal God exists, caring for
animals is likely a duty one has to God.
Divine Commands
Moral obligations viewed as divine commands arguably make more sense of these
obligations than any alternative account. Owen notes that “[i]t is impossible to think of a
command without also thinking of a commander” and that “[e]ither we take moral claims to be
self-explanatory modes of impersonal existence or we explain them in terms of a personal
God.”348 It seems that the latter is the better explanation because divine commands are more than
ethical imperatives to follow or decrees to obey. They reveal that their divine source (i.e., God) is
intensely interested in how people live and that he cares deeply about the moral decisions they
make. Perhaps this is because “we are not merely obligated to a law or a moral principle, but to a
perfectly loving person.”349
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On a Judeo-Christian view, throughout Israel’s history, rather than forcefully demanding
obedience from his people, God developed covenants (which are radically personal) with his
people, whereby he gave them laws to follow in an effort to lead them along the right path and
ultimately back to himself and his moral standard of holiness. Therefore, as T. W. Manson states,
The last ground of moral obligation is the command of God; and the supreme ideal is the
imitation of a God who is at once king and father, who exhibits in the field of nature and
history, and above all in his dealings with Israel, the qualities of holiness and
righteousness, mercy and faithfulness, love and covenant-loyalty, which are to be the
pattern for the behavior of his subjects and children.350
God revealed his law to the people of Israel and charged them to obey it,351 not just for duty’s
sake, as Kant later claimed, but rather so they could cultivate and demonstrate personal loyalty to
a personal God.352 Following the revelation of God’s law to his people, the picture remained
incomplete until the eternal Person of Christ was clothed with human flesh and was sent to earth
to reveal the embodiment of the moral standard in human form.
The profound implication in this is that although God issues commands for individuals to
obey, individuals are not obligated to the commands themselves or to some sort of impersonal
moral code as a whole, but rather to a perfectly loving Person who desires to be in relationship
with his creatures (i.e., human persons). Having realized that a personal God, whose very nature
is love, is the One addressing humans via morality grounds the idea that this Being listens and
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cares, which then provides motivation353 for trusting him and living in confidence, knowing that
the well-being of every person is never at odds with doing God’s will and following his
commands.354
Reverence
It has been the impression of many, including Kant and others, that anything less than
complete reverence for the moral law is unfitting. What is interesting about this attitude is that
reverence inspired by the moral law likely cannot be equated with reverence for an abstract
principle, even of moral obligation, because “[r]everence is naturally reverence for a person,”
and in this case, as de Burgh insists, “reverence for the law leads to reverence for its author.” 355
Reverence, if understood as one’s most proper attitude toward the moral law, can only be felt
toward persons, which seems to suggest that the representation of moral laws as divine
commands, suggested in this chapter, may very well be something more than an imaginative
personification.356 From a practical point of view, it hardly needs to be pointed out “how much
easier it is to feel towards the moral law the reverence that we ought to feel when we believe that
that law is embodied in a personal Will.” 357
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If reverence includes the attitude of devotion, then “[o]ne cannot (morally) devote oneself
to an object that is less than personal.” 358 One may marvel at the sheer beauty of a snowy
landscape or possess a sense of awe when considering the magnificent colors bursting forth
behind a picturesque mountainside at sunset, but one cannot morally devote himself to such
impersonal objects in nature. If one recognizes a sense of reverence arising in his or her soul at
moments like this, then the best explanation is that this reverence is due to the personal Author of
nature, God himself. Webb adds, “Reverence refers always to persons only ‘as its object,’ never
to things. Things can arouse in us inclination, and if things are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, etc.)
also love, or again fear, as with the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey—but never reverence.” 359 The
same is true with the moral law. When one considers the overwhelming weight of what “ought”
or “ought not” be done in specific circumstances, the reverence for the moral law that sometimes
arises is naturally reverence for its personal Author. This sort of reverence for the moral law and
dedication to fulfilling moral obligations, which seems to be the appropriate response in light of
the overriding nature obligations possess, seemingly requires a personal divine source.

Summary
Chapter 5 considers moral obligations in the quest to determine whether obligations make
better sense in terms of a personal or non-personal source. This chapter lists at least five pieces of
evidence for the existence of a personal God. First, the idea of obligations or duties involves the
idea of a person or persons to whom one is obligated. There are times in life when no human
person is in view and one is still, ostensibly at any rate, morally obligated to do something—to
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whom is one obligated if not to a personal God who is the source of such obligations? Second,
moral duties explained in terms of non-personal, abstract principles, or even in terms of a nonpersonal God, appears strange because a non-personal entity likely cannot hold one personally
responsible for one failing to carry out his or her duty in a given situation. Third, duties toward
inanimate objects and animals are also personal in nature, albeit indirectly. Fourth, in an effort to
account for the authoritativeness of obligations, one possibility involves viewing obligations as
divine commands, and divine commands imply a personal divine Commander. Fifth, it has been
the impression of many, including Kant and others, that anything less than reverence for the
moral law is simply unfitting—and reverence is naturally reverence for a person. If reverence
includes the attitude of devotion, then one arguably cannot devote himself or herself to an object
that is less than personal. Therefore, a personal God at the foundation of ethics makes excellent
sense of the reverence due to the moral law. In sum, the five pieces of evidence presented in
chapter 5 on moral obligations make the existence of a personal God seem likely.
If moral obligations are personal, as suggested in this chapter, and rooted in God, then
God presumably must exemplify this quality by being personal himself, and personal to the
highest degree possible. Views such as naturalism and Platonism, which are non-personal in
nature, face a difficult challenge when it comes to accounting for the personal nature of moral
duties.360 Supposing that naturalism or Platonism were true, this “would mean that the
ontological status of moral duties in themselves would be entirely different from their

According to Christoph Ernst Luthardt, “In the sphere of nature there is no morality, and consequently
no immorality. For here, not freedom but necessity prevails, here it is not will or ought, but must.” This seems to
indicate that the very idea of moral obligation only applies to persons (obligation implies freedom to choose; just
because one is under obligation to do something does not mean that he or she is forced/coerced to do something).
Nature itself cannot account for will or ought, as Luthardt suggests, but only must. Christoph Ernst Luthardt,
Apologetic Lectures on the Moral Truths of Christianity, trans. Sophia Taylor (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1873), 34.
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ontological status when empirically embodied.” 361 God’s existence, however, provides a strong
explanation of obligations, particularly their authoritative and utterly personal nature. In sum, as
with moral knowledge and moral values, moral obligations provide further evidence for the
existence of a personal God.

Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument: A History, 188. Similarly, Owen says, “[God] must perfectly
exemplify all the qualities which we know to be binding on us in our human life. Otherwise he cannot be the source
of moral obligation.” Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, 38.
361
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CHAPTER SIX: MORAL TRANSFORMATION
Introduction
Chapter 5 offered an examination of the nature of moral obligations, ultimately
concluding that a personal God accounts for both the authoritativeness of obligations and their
personal nature. This chapter362 considers one of the most obvious facts about human persons:
they fail miserably when it comes to following the moral law. As C. S. Lewis explains, there are
two foundational facts that ground all clear thinking about human persons and the universe in
which they dwell: (1) Humans have the idea that they ought to behave a certain way; and (2) they
do not behave that way.363 Elsewhere, he admits that although moralities may differ among men
at times, although not as widely as is oftentimes claimed, “they all agree in prescribing a
behaviour which their adherents fail to practice” (emphasis added). 364
Not only does this chapter consider moral failure; it also focuses on the hope of moral
transformation. Is it really possible for human persons to become new persons or do their moral
failures define them, keeping them from ever experiencing radical transformation (or as Kant
would say, a revolution of the will)?365 There are several key concepts related to moral failure
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Spener, who originated the notion. See Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New
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and moral transformation that essentially bridge the gap between failure and transformation;
these concepts are guilt, punishment, grace, and forgiveness. Each of these concepts are
discussed in this chapter, among others. Yet again, the overarching aim of this chapter, as with
chapters 3-5, is to examine the nature of the moral features themselves in an effort to determine
whether they point in the direction of a personal or non-personal source.366

John Hare and The Moral Gap
John Hare, in his work The Moral Gap, presents a version of the moral argument that
focuses on moral transformation. Recognizing that there is a gap between humankind’s failure to
live up to the demands of the law, and also assuming that ought implies can, Hare deals with four
possible ways to close what he calls “the moral gap”: (1) Puffing up human capacities to close
the gap367; (2) lowering the moral demand368; (3) providing secular substitutes for God’s
assistance 369; or (4) God’s assistance.370 After evaluating the first three options, Hare ultimately
concludes that these options fail to close the gap as well as God’s assistance (the fourth option)
can. In the final comment in his book, he declares, “My own belief is that there is a God who
loves us enough both to demand a high standard from us and to help us meet it.” 371 Therefore,
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Chapters 3-5 begin by addressing several objections before looking at the nature of moral features. This
chapter, however, considers a few objections throughout instead of beginning with potential objections to moral
transformation.
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according to Hare’s view, one ought to keep the moral law, and one can keep the moral law, but
only with God’s assistance.
Hare’s version of the moral argument serves as a helpful starting point when thinking
about moral failure, and especially moral transformation. It also serves as a backdrop to the flow
of this particular chapter, which emphasizes the personal nature of concepts such as moral
failure, guilt, grace, forgiveness, and moral transformation.

Moral Failure
Humans everywhere—regardless of their age, gender, culture, socio-economic status,
level of education, and training—fail morally. There is no human person who perfectly lives out
the moral law; each person falls miserably short in his or her attempt to satisfy morality’s
pressing demands.372 Maybe this is because all humans are, as Clay Jones puts it, born
“Auschwitz-enabled.”

373

None are good; every human person is deeply broken. Even one who

denies there is such a thing as morality (i.e., a moral standard or law) is likely to admit his or her
own shortcomings in life. There are even those, mired by their perpetual failings and plagued
with discouragement, who cease trying to live a good life and choose instead an “easier” route by
accepting their own depravity and spiraling downward into the muck even further. It seems there
is more to life than simply trying and failing and trying again and failing more. Perhaps Lewis
was right when he claimed, “We are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and
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ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud
pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We
are far too easily pleased.” 374 Is there hope of something more, possibly even anticipation of
something like radical moral transformation—“a holiday at sea,” as Lewis puts it—or are
humans forever destined to make mud pies in the slums? If the former, then more needs to be
said; if the latter, then humans ought to ignore the issue altogether and go on with making more
mud pies. Since the prospect of making mud pies for several decades does not sound overly
appealing, more is said about the possibility of undergoing radical change in what follows, but
not without first dealing with the reality of moral failure a bit more. 375
Regarding the nature of moral failure, it is interesting to note that when one fails or is
irresponsible in some manner, he or she usually fails or is irresponsible to another person. On
this score, H. P. Owen suggests,
The concept of responsibility has clearer theistic implications. When we call someone
“irresponsible” we can often supply a reference to another human person….Yet we also
speak of responsibility when no human persons are in view. Thus a person who wasted
his talents could be called “irresponsible.” Admittedly we may mean that he is
irresponsible towards his wife who depends on his income or to his parents who are eager
for his success. Yet even if he has no wife or parents, and even if he discharges the duties
of his station to the satisfaction of society, we should still regard him as irresponsible if
he squandered his gifts. To whom then is he responsible if not to God who bestows all
gifts of trust? The only other possibilities are that I am responsible either to myself or to
an abstract order of claims. With regard to the first it seems to me plain that the idea of
responsibility involves the idea of an “other” to whom responsibility is due. Can then,
this “other” be a set of impersonal claims? Hardly. Each person must speak for himself.
374
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But I, for one, cannot make any sense of the view that such claims, however august and
magisterial they may be, can be the objects of responsibility. 376
Owen points out the personal nature of responsibility here, while also demonstrating the theistic
implications in play.
What about moments when one is all alone—is moral failure an individual thing then?
Even in moments when no one else is around, when one is all alone, individual failings have a
way of spilling over into the lives of others. For example, consider a man who looks at
pornography, thinking it to be a private, individual act that affects no one else but himself. What
the man fails to realize is that this moral failure has profound implications on the man’s marriage
(or his future marriage, if presently unmarried), his children, and how he interacts with others,
particularly in how he views and treats them. Again, when one sins (as Christians say), he sins
against another person or group of persons. On the Christian view, even if there is no other
possible human person in view, when one sins, he or she still sins against a Person. 377 Perhaps
this is one reason why guilt is so strong at times, even in the absence of human persons. Many
describe what they take to be their intense realization that they are not merely obligated to a
moral law or principle, but to a perfectly loving Person. 378 If such a picture is accurate, moral
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This is a simplification of the Christian doctrine of God (which involves three Persons). It is also
interesting that David once prayed “against you, you only, have I sinned” (Ps. 51:4). This does not mean that one
does not sin against fellow human beings, but that one’s sin against God is primary. In a similar way, one might
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writers were inspired to emphasize God’s ultimate sovereignty; if something evil happens, it is only because he
allows it; it might not be his perfect will, but it is at least within his permissive will.
378

Baggett and Baggett summarize a view of Clement Dore that is rather pertinent here. Dore insisted that a
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failure is not merely a blunder when it comes to carrying out one’s duty, it is essentially failing
to love the Person who deserves the deepest loyalty and devotion. This is arguably a piece of
general revelation amplified in special Christian revelation. 379
Regarding the cause of moral failure, it is also true that what is a criminal act, if brought
about by a person, is not blamed when due to a natural force or the activity of an animal. For
instance, it is nonsensical to assert that a tree is guilty of murder because it falls on someone and
claims that person’s life. Trees do not fail morally; trees simply fall. Similarly, one would not
charge a bear with murder because it mauls a person to death. The bear is simply acting like a
bear, and is therefore not guilty of any sort of moral lapse. It still might be killed, but not out of
any sense of retributive justice, on pain of quite a bit of confusion. Thus, the implication here is
that the cause of evil in the world (moral failure) should be regarded as personal in nature. Only
persons are blameworthy when it comes to moral failure, which makes sense of why only human
persons experience guilt.380

Guilt
Guilt381 is a human experience involving the fact or state of having violated a sense of
right and wrong. It serves as something like a trigger that alerts one to his or her personal failure
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An interesting phenomenon to which some point is that some cultures are more inclined to speak of
shame than guilt. Some try to raise this as a potential objection. However, shame itself tends to be a deeply personal
(and usually communally rooted) sort of visceral reaction. For instance, one typically feels shame when a moral
shortcoming has been exposed to an “other” or, in some cases, several others. Another potential objection is that
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shade” at psychologists as a whole, but rather to point out the conclusions that some have arrived upon when guilt is
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to do what ought or ought not have been done in a particular situation.382 For example, when one
fails to keep an important promise to a family member or friend, he likely experiences guilt on
some level. Someone who accidentally runs a red light while texting and driving, leading his car
to strike a pedestrian crossing the road experiences painful feelings of remorse and a sense of
responsibility over his carelessness. Human beings all over the earth have the idea that they
ought to behave in a certain way and fail to do so,383 which gives rise to guilt. 384 In fact, one of
the most natural things in the world is to recognize imperfection in humans and their inability to
adhere to moral ideals. 385 Even the atheist experiences guilt as she reflects upon her violation of

psychoanalyzed). This sort of approach to guilt casts it as a bad thing rather than a good thing, and as having no
referent beyond the subjective feelings involved. One way of responding to this objection involves highlighting the
differences between objective and subjective guilt. (The distinction between guilt feelings and an objective state of
guilt is further addressed below.)
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unreliable or non-existent, one can come to realize through reasoning that he or she is really guilty in an objective
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Again, Lewis says “[t]hese two facts are the foundation of all clear thinking about ourselves and the
universe we live in.” Lewis, Mere Christianity, 8.
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the moral law; even she too can feel the law’s inexorable demands. 386 Therefore, as Lewis says,
all human persons stand condemned, and all are conscious of guilt, not only of the existence of a
moral law, but of a law at once recognized and disobeyed. 387 If the feelings of guilt are taken to
be more than mere feelings, that is, something like a real objective condition of guilt,388 one is
left wondering if there is a solution. 389
A very helpful description of guilt is provided by A. E. Taylor in his The Faith of a
Moralist, where he identifies five phenomenological features of the guilt experience. These
features of guilt were previously mentioned in chapter 2, but they are again listed here, with
particular emphasis on the fifth feature. Taylor’s five features of guilt are as follows:
(1) Guilt involves dissatisfaction with our self and self-condemnation, and it differs in
kind from any discontent with our surroundings;
(2) Guilt has a peculiar indelibility—it cannot be “worked off and paid for” by
subsequent “making good” or by the infliction of a penalty;
(3) The sense of guilt is regularly accompanied by a demand for our own punishment;
(4) Guilt is associated with “pollution” 390—there is a sense of “dirtiness” that results from
one’s wrongdoing; and
386
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up.” Charles Darwin thought mankind’s capacity for experiencing the moral sense and a painful conscience to be by
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(5) What is felt to be outraged by sin or dishonor is not an impersonal law—the outrage is
felt as personal treason against a person, yet not against our own personality as it actually
is, but against a real personal embodiment of our ideal of good, treason against a “living
God.”391
Each of Taylor’s five features are valuable insights regarding the nature of guilt, but the
fifth is the most relevant to the present discussion. Regarding the fifth feature of guilt, Taylor
says that when one feels as he ought to feel about the evil in himself, he cannot help but
recognize that his position is not that of someone who has broken “a wise and salutary
regulation, as of one who has insulted or proved false to a person of supreme excellence, entitled
to whole-hearted devotion.” 392
What about those who deny God’s existence? Taylor anticipates this objection and
responds by noting that even in the lives of those who do not think of wrongdoing as a personal
offense against the living divine majesty, it is well-known that “an adequate sense of the
dishonour attaching to treason to a principle or a cause can only be awakened when one succeeds
in ‘personifying’ the cause or the principle.” 393 Stated differently, when one feels as he ought
about his wrongdoing, it is when he realizes that he has wronged living persons, not simply
failed to carry out a particular principle or cause. Taylor admits that this is an imperfect
analogical example, but it is an intriguing point nonetheless. What is different about the
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adequately conceived moral life, at least according to Taylor, is that it goes beyond anything that
is demanded of one’s loyalty to fellow human persons. It requires unremitting endurances and
sacrifices, that may, at any moment, require the sacrifice of the most intimate of attachments to
other human persons to a higher loyalty. By way of example, Taylor explains that a good man’s
duty involves not allowing “love of friend, or mistress, or wife, or mother, be the paramount and
final influence in all his choices.” 394 In moments like this, one sacrifices his loyalty to these
human persons to a higher loyalty. Taylor then asks whether this supreme loyalty can be felt
toward any object except for one whom it is possible to stand in personal relation to and with,
that is, to love. Can one love the moral law itself, or what about Kant’s Categorical Imperative?
Is it possible for one to love an abstract Platonic Form? According to Taylor, this “motive must
be found in another and a supreme love, and that such a love, like all loves, must have its real
personal object,” which is, in this case, the living God. Whether this must be the case one can set
to the side; for present purposes plausibility is enough.
Again, guilt is a nearly universal experience that involves painful feelings of remorse
following a moral failure of some sort. What about the nature of guilt: is it personal or nonpersonal? Generally speaking, non-personal rules and principles, such as mathematical formulas,
do not elicit feelings of guilt within individuals; only when one human person has wronged or
harmed another person (or group of persons) in some way does guilt arise. As John Henry
Newman avows, “Inanimate things [such as rules and principles] cannot stir our affections; these
are correlative with persons.” 395 Similarly, Owen posits, “Why should the failure to enact
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[values] engender guilt? I can betray a person and I know that I deserve the guilt I feel. But I
cannot see how I could betray values if they are impersonal.” 396 Likewise, R. Scott Smith notes,
[W]hen we experience moral failing, we often feel guilt or shame. However, it does not
make sense to feel that way in light of some nonspatial, timeless abstract entity with
which we cannot even interact. Instead, we have those feelings in the presence of a
person. This view does not make sense if morals are just abstract principles that do not
have some connection to us. 397
Presumably, as Newman, Owen, Smith, and others, such as Paul Copan explain, it would be odd
to feel guilt before an abstract, impersonal moral code. 398 Therefore, there is reason to think that
the moral code is personal.
Naturally, there are many occasions where guilt can be explained solely in relation to
human persons. There are other occasions where there is no human person in view and one still
feels guilty. For instance, there are times when individuals feel guilty for failing to use their
talents and abilities properly, and other times when persons experience guilt upon feeling as if
they have wasted their life (this usually occurs later in life or when one is on his or her
deathbed). Additionally, there are times when the person who has been wronged is no longer
around to confer forgiveness, and still other occasions when the wrong seems to be so

Interestingly, immediately after this quote, Owen boldly claims, “Personal theism gives the only
explanation by affirming that value-claims inhere in the character and will of God. In rejecting them we do not
merely reject an abstract good; we do not merely reject our own ‘good’ (in the sense of our ‘well-being’); we reject
the love which God is in his tri-une being.” Admittedly, this may be moving a bit too fast here, but it is interesting to
consider how Owen invokes the Trinity in order to explain the personal nature of value-claims and the guilt one
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grievous399 that no human person seemingly has the authority to offer forgiveness. 400 In
situations like these, before whom is one guilty? It becomes increasingly understandable that
many would suggest nothing less than a personal God who bestows such talents and abilities to
human persons. As J. P. Moreland says, “[I]f the depth and presence of guilt feelings is to be
rational, there must be a Person toward whom one feels moral shame.” 401 Moreover, who is in a
position of authority (besides God) to offer forgiveness in moments like these? For these reasons,
if the cause of conscience and the One before whom humans are ultimately guilty cannot be
completely accounted for in the visible world, then perhaps when individuals fall short they have
not merely broken a rule, but rather, as Taylor claims, “insulted or proved false to a person of
supreme excellence, entitled to whole-hearted devotion.” 402

Punishment
As indicated above, moral failure leads to feelings of guilt, with each (failure and guilt)
arguably pointing in the direction of a personal God who has been wronged and toward whom
feelings of guilt and shame are accurately felt. Moreland suggests another interesting feature of
morality, stemming from moral failure and guilt, which is that of retributive punishment.403

Similar to the way Taylor describes the indelibility and dirtiness of guilt, Lewis explains one’s response
to grievous actions in this way: “Much, we may feel, can be excused to human infirmities: but not this—this
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moment we really do know that our character, as revealed in this action, is, and ought to be, hateful to all good men,
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Retributive punishment, at least in part, is “punishment of a crime which is not merely for the
purpose of rehabilitation, protection of society, or deterrence.”404 As Taylor and others point
out,405 one’s sense of guilt is oftentimes accompanied by a demand for one’s own punishment.
Furthermore, there are occasions when one feels guilty, as described above, when there is no
human person in view. There are also times when no human victim is present and one senses the
need for his or her own punishment. How is one to make sense of this seeming demand for
punishment, especially when no human person is in view? Can one set the moral record straight
and thus balance the good and evil in the universe by paying the moral universe back for
wrongdoing, as some Eastern religions suggest? Or does such talk have in mind some sort of
being that has been a victim of crime, and therefore deserves retribution?406 On this score,
Moreland responds, “Such talk makes sense if God exists, for he is always a victim of crime, and
thus his justice deserves to be paid back in the presence of evil. But without God, there is often
no victim to pay back, and in such causes it is hard to make sense of retribution.” 407 Punishment
is, therefore, likely best understood as a category of personal relations. 408
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It is difficult to understand how a person can “pay back” a non-person for something. It presumably
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If there is a God and his character is essentially good, he must not merely let human
persons off the hook when they perform evil acts. A God who “let us off,” to use Taylor’s
terminology, would be One who did not care for human persons in the least. There could be no
inspiration drawn towards good from whatever relations one may have with a God who cares so
little for human persons that he has no concern for what they do. Actually, a God such as this
would be One who is presumably on a lower moral level than human persons themselves
because his careless condonation would be proof of his moral indifference to justice—and justice
is something that a good being ought to deeply care about.409 Instead of letting humans off, a
good God, One who really cares about justice, punishes persons for wrongdoing. 410 If this is the
case, human persons find themselves on the wrong side of God,411 having transgressed his law
and now in an ominous situation, certainly deserving of punishment and seemingly awaiting such
from God himself.412 Is there hope of something more, or is this humanity’s final destiny?
On the Christian view, God is just, which is basically another way of saying that he is
good, and being good, he cares deeply for his creatures and wants them to participate in the
absolute good which he himself possesses. 413 As a result, he does not leave human persons in
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their grave position. Rather, he offers them a lifeline, a rescue plan, hope for something more.
God the Father decides to send his Son, Jesus, the second Person of the Trinity, to earth as a
human (the God-man) in order to live a perfect life (free of every moral stain), and to suffer the
punishment of God the Father in place of human persons (who rightly deserve punishment) by
dying for them. Following his substitutionary death on the cross, he is placed in a tomb, where
three days later he rises from the dead, making possible humankind’s forgiveness and
redemption, among a host of other things. Taylor explains in this manner:
Because He is just, His forgiveness is no mere indifference, but a genuine moral
forgiveness which means so much to Himself that it can remake the very self of the
recipient, as, in a lesser degree, a man’s self may be cleansed and remade by receiving a
fellow-man’s forgiveness for a grievous wrong, though never by being “let off” as a
creature from whom nothing can be expected except that he should behave after his
worthless kind. . . . Thus the Christian paradox that God is at once the supremely just and
also the great forgiver of iniquities, so far from creating an ethical difficulty, is exactly
what we should expect to find in a religion which has one of its roots in the ethical
conviction of the absoluteness of moral “values.” 414

Grace and Forgiveness
A deep need that human beings possess is the need to be forgiven of their wrongdoings
instead of being defined by them forever. There are countless people who live their lives in a
state of perpetual guilt because they think forgiveness is impossible and that they are unable to
do anything about it.415 This is more than merely academic concern, but one of deep existential
import. Using Hare’s wording here, at this point, one could “puff up his capacity” to reach the
moral law, “reduce the demands of the law,” 416 or offer some sort of secular substitute for God in
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order to close the moral gap between moral failure and moral transformation. As Hare notes,
there is a fourth option, and in his estimation, this is the best option: God’s help, that is, his grace
and forgiveness.417 Ultimately, if failure to follow the moral law is transgression not of an
impersonal set of abstract principles, but transgression against the One behind the law, it appears
that the only hope for mankind is if the Person who has been offended extends forgiveness.418
Christian theism maintains that God’s forgiveness is possible because God does not leave the
guilty unpunished or simply overlook their moral failures; rather, he chooses to send his innocent
Son in order to be punished in place of the guilty. As Eleonore Stump puts it, to forgive means
“to fail to exact all that is in justice due,” so that if Christ paid the sinner’s debt (one function of
the atonement), this shows that God “has arranged that the debt be paid in full, not that he has
agreed to overlook any part of the debt.” 419 In a very profound sense, if this theology is true,
forgiveness is the language of heaven.
Interestingly, grace 420 and forgiveness, are deeply personal in nature. 421 Matter, nature, a
divine mind or Power, an impersonal force, or some other conception of the divine, likely cannot
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forgive—seemingly, only a personal God can forgive. When one person has wronged another,
there is a sort of estrangement and enmity that occurs between the one who has been wronged
and the wrongdoer himself. On a human level, forgiveness makes possible the overcoming of
estrangement and enmity between two or more persons. It is an operation between persons. The
same appears to be true with God and man. If God is the One who has been wronged and human
persons are the wrongdoers, then forgiveness on God’s part likely makes possible the
overcoming of estrangement and enmity between God and man, and thus, in turn, a personal
relationship between these two parties. Actually, the New Testament teaches that God’s
forgiveness of man serves as the basis for and ought to be the inspiration of a human person’s
forgiveness of his fellow man. 422

Moral Transformation
Centrality of Moral Transformation to Christianity
Although there are presumably other personal deities who offer forgiveness, there is an
unparalleled beauty of the Christian conception of God: the incarnate Son of God comes to earth
to not only offer forgiveness, but also provide the grace and power necessary to enable one to
repent and undergo complete moral transformation. Whereas the majority of the religions in the
world focus on moral improvement through humankind’s own moral efforts, the concept of
moral transformation is at the heart of the Christian message, and it is carried out not by man,
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who is unable to become a new creature on his own,423 but by God himself. According to
Luthardt,
Christianity acknowledges the world; it confirms all its natural laws, possessions, and
arrangements, and acquiesces in man’s position therein. But it gives him a new heart; and
this new heart, this changed disposition, we are to take into the various relations of our
life in the world. . . . It was in the soul of man that Christ deposited the sacred sparks of
love to God and man, and thus kindled the fire of love in the heart. From the heart, its
warmth and light have penetrated the whole man, and renovated his life in the world. This
is Christian morality (emphasis added). 424
As Luthardt recognizes, at the core of Christian morality is the striking reality that man can
undergo radical moral transformation by receiving a new heart where the fire of love is kindled
for God and others, thus allowing the whole man to experience a transformed life in the world.
Before further discussing the possibility of moral transformation, and even examining how it
possibly points to life after death, it is important to consider two potential objections.
Two Objections to Moral Transformation
First, consider the “I want to be myself” objection. Admittedly, there are those in this life
who simply want to be themselves—to go on with living their own lives, refusing to allow
anyone or anything to change them or to prevent them from being themselves in the fullest sense
of the term. However, if Christianity is true and these individuals, indeed, if all individuals, are
made by God, is it not God who not only made each person, but the One who also determines
what each person was intended to be? Again, if Christianity is true, then Sartre was wrong, and
essence precedes existence after all. Therefore, on the Christian view, one of the paradoxes about
the concept of becoming a new person is that when an individual allows God to take over,
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submitting his will to God’s will, it is then that this person becomes more truly himself, because
God made him. Furthermore, when one turns to Christ, giving up his own personality to Christ’s
personality, it is in that moment that one begins to have a real personality of his own.425 Again,
assuming Christianity is true, another problem that a man faces when trying to “be himself” on
his own, without reference to God as his Maker, is that he oftentimes aims too low, failing to
realize that God has much larger intentions for the man than the man has for himself. Borrowing
an example from George MacDonald, Lewis explains in vivid terms:
Imagine yourself as a living house. God comes in to rebuild that house. At first, perhaps,
you can understand what He is doing. He is getting the drains right and stopping the leaks
in the roof and so on: you knew that those jobs needed doing and so you are not
surprised. But presently he starts knocking the house about in a way that hurts
abominably and does not seem to make sense. What on earth is He up to? The
explanation is that He is building quite a different house from the one you thought of—
throwing out a new wing here, putting on an extra floor there, running up towers, making
courtyards. You thought you were going to be made into a decent little cottage: but He is
building a palace. He intends to come and live in it Himself. 426
God is making each human person who submits to him into something new, something more
beautiful than one could hope for or imagine on his own. This process is not without difficulty
and pain, however, as God has to chisel away the rough edges, and in some cases, completely
tear down certain areas in order to make an individual into what he (God) intends them to be.
None of the difficulty and pain in life is without purpose though, as God does not waste anything
that one goes through; rather, he uses every little trial and temptation in order to refine the
person, to make him into something tremendous, far beyond and much greater than one could
ever conjure up himself.427
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Second, consider the “Christians are hypocrites” objection. If Christians have undergone
moral transformation and are therefore new in Christ, why do so many “Christians” look like the
rest of the world? Posed differently, why do professing Christians look more like old selves than
new selves? There are several important points worth making here, but one must first admit that
it is true that Christians do oftentimes behave badly, failing to live up to the notion that they have
been reborn or made new in some sense. Careless living on behalf of Christians gives the outer
world grounds for doubting the veridical status of the Christian faith. This is probably a fair
judgment raised against Christians, especially since Jesus himself claimed in his Sermon on the
Mount that Christians will be known “by their fruits” (Mt. 7:16, 20).
Now, there are at least two ways of responding to this objection after admitting that
Christians do, in fact, behave hypocritically at times. First, and perhaps most importantly, one
must consider not the behaviors of Christians themselves as the primary reason for rejecting
Christianity, but the founder of the Christian faith himself: Jesus Christ. It is a non sequitur to
claim that Christianity is false because Christians behave badly at times. Indeed, their bad
behavior is a function of their departing from Christian dictates. However, one cannot put
Christianity off simply because his or her “Christian” neighbors, co-workers, or other
acquaintances are behaving badly; this is nothing more than evading the issue, predicated on a
sad but common fallacy. Again, when considering whether to accept or reject the Christian faith,
one should primarily consider the central figure of Christianity, the founder of the entire
movement, Jesus Christ. Are there any complaints about Jesus? Is there anything hypocritical in

to pay in order for humanity’s redemption: “It costs God nothing, so far as we know, to create nice things: but to
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but that he himself experienced pain and suffering, and to the highest degree, in order to make human beings into
new creatures. Ibid., 212.
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his life? Where did he fall short morally? Did he do what he promised to do? These sorts of
questions should be dealt with before one dismisses Christianity as a false belief system. Second,
to illustrate why it is a non sequitur to dismiss Christianity—and thus the possibility of real
moral transformation—on the basis of Christians living hypocritically, think about the following
example:
Imagine there is a man who hops into his truck each morning and drives around each day,
noticing as he goes about his daily business that there are frequently bad drivers who cut
him off in traffic and fail to keep other basic traffic laws. We will call this man Scott.
Finding this to be a common occurrence each day, Scott begins noticing that virtually
every “bad driver” that he encounters is driving a Toyota vehicle of some sort: Sequoia,
4Runner, Highlander, Sienna, RAV4, Tundra, Tacoma, Camry, Corolla, and perhaps
worst of all, the Prius. Consequently, in his anger, Scott vows to never purchase a Toyota
vehicle of any kind in the future. He completely rejects the Toyota brand because the
drivers of Toyota vehicles drive badly.
One does not have to think hard to see the problem with Scott’s total rejection of the Toyota
brand. It simply does not follow that because the drivers of Toyota vehicles drive badly that the
entire Toyota brand should be rejected. If Scott is going to reject the Toyota brand, he should do
so on some other more central basis (e.g., the reliability of Toyota vehicles, their cost, etc.).
Similarly, it does not follow that because Christians behave badly (i.e., act like hypocrites) that
Christianity as a whole, or any belief system as a whole for that matter, should be rejected.
Moral Transformation and Eternity
As a side note, it is actually possible to present an argument from moral transformation to
eternity. On this matter, it is at least conceivable to envision that if Christians do not fully live as
they ought in this world, that while God is making them into something new in this world, the
process will not be fully actualized until they reside in another world. If “ought” implies “can”
with God’s help, and one does not fully realize his moral potential in this life, on this basis one
can arguably postulate the existence of another life where God will ultimately bring about one’s
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complete and final transformation. 428 In other words, death is not the end; it appears there is an
afterlife where one undergoes complete transformation and the quest for moral perfection is
finally completed. Eternity is then lived as it was meant to be lived, free of the never-ending
quest to attain what is beyond every human person’s reach. Within Christianity, these are the
doctrines of sanctification (i.e., God is bringing about change in this life) and glorification (i.e.,
God will bring about complete and final change in the life to come). 429
In the history of the moral argument, Immanuel Kant is one thinker who presented an
argument for the afterlife, claiming that a “holy will” belonged to God alone, and that a
“revolution of the will” would forever reside beyond humanity’s reach. As a result, one needs
eternity in order to approach it asymptotically (ever closer but never quite there). It seems that
Kant was both right and wrong on this score. According to Christian theology, each person who
trusts in Christ will be entirely conformed to the image of Christ by God’s grace, so the process
of moral transformation, of being made new, will one day reach completion. It seems that Kant
was right in the sense that humanity’s eternal state involves more of a dynamic picture than a
static picture. Presumably, once a person’s moral transformation is complete (i.e., glorification),
that person’s growth will not cease. Indeed, completion of “the good work within us” will allow
each person to live as they were fully intended to live, with all of the obstructions and challenges
at once removed. Debates over whether morality will go away in heaven sometimes arise. It
seems that morality in Kant’s sense certainly will, with talk of rights and duties passing away.

A. C. Ewing once called the “ought implies can” argument into question by suggesting that one cannot
claim he or she ought to follow the moral law until it is first shown that it can be done. One way of replying to
Ewing involves explaining that the driving insight, the motivating factor of the moral law, is that it sets forth a
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However, they (rights and duties) will likely be supplanted by something far grander—gift and
sacrifice, as George Mavrodes would say. As a result, heaven will be a place where self-giving
love is the norm.430 It is true that more can be said on the matter of moral transformation and the
possibility of eternity,431 but the present aim of the chapter involves considering the nature of
moral transformation, to which the discussion now turns.
The Nature of Moral Transformation
As claimed above, moral failure, guilt, grace, and forgiveness are personal concepts, and
thus, indicators of a personal God of sorts. What is the nature of moral transformation: nonpersonal or personal? According to David Baggett and Jerry Walls, with moral transformation
“we come to understand that we can be made right not merely with some impersonal Power
behind the law. Rather, we can be restored to a loving relationship with a ‘superpersonal God,’
the God who is ‘begetting love’ as well as ‘love begotten.’” 432 The Judeo-Christian God is a
personal God of perfect love who invites sinners into communion with himself and such a
relationship is altogether transformative.433 As a whole, the entire process of salvation arguably
makes better sense in terms of a personal God. According to Hastings Rashdall,
[I]f there be there be any truth in the moral argument, we may be content with feeling
sure that the solution must be one which will give a real meaning to the idea of
salvation—a meaning which cannot be given to it by any philosophy which reduces

430

This paragraph relies heavily on a portion of an article written by David Baggett. See David Baggett,
“Moral Apologetics & Christian Theology,” Moral Apologetics, published February 10, 2021, accessed February 19,
2021, https://www.moralapologetics.com/wordpress/2021/2/10/moral-apologetics-amp-christian-theology.
431

The goal of this section on moral transformation and eternity is twofold: (1) Provide a possible
explanation for why Christians do not seemingly live “completely transformed lives” in this world; and (2) Bring up
an interesting connection between moral transformation and the possibility of eternity, which is a fascinating link
that emerges in the history of the moral argument.
432

Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument: A History, 173.

433

Baggett and Baggett, The Morals of the Story: Good News About a Good God, 229.

161

change, human effort, personal existence to unreal seemings within the being of a
changeless, unpurposeful, super-moral, and impersonal Absolute. 434
As Rashdall notes, the concept of salvation likely loses it meaning in terms of an impersonal
Absolute. Conversely, the recognition of personality in God plausibly adds to the intelligibility
and moral efficacy of ideas such as moral failure (i.e., sin), grace, forgiveness, justice, sacrifice,
moral transformation, union, and so on. 435
God for the Christian, rather than being an impersonal Absolute or some sort of
impassible deity, One who is untouched and unmoved by the world’s pain brought about
primarily through humankind’s moral failures, is “One whose Love necessitates His willingness
to share our infirmities, to work in us for our redemption, to achieve through us man’s conquest
of the many ills that flesh is heir to.” 436 On the Christian view, God’s purpose with men is
thought of in terms of a personal relationship, the kind of intention toward persons that is called
“love.”437 Speaking of the power of God’s love, Farmer eloquently writes,
Love, in fact, is an ultimate of the personal order, and cannot be expressed fully in terms
of other things and relationships. It has to be experienced in order to be known. Tell me
that God respects my personality, that He intends my highest welfare, that He will never
use me as a mere means, and you have no doubt told me something which it is very
important for me to know; but tell me that God loves me, and my whole being does not
merely know these things, but—how can one put it?—comes to rest in a final and allinclusive peace and joy, which the abstract phrases can neither evoke nor convey. On the
human level it is the difference between the proverbial coldness of charity and the
warmth of genuine love. It is the difference between being in a boarding-house, even of
the most comfortable and well-run sort, and being at home. 438
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Through experiencing the love of God, one experiences what is truly best for his life, what truly
transforms his heart, and what ultimately brings about one’s peace and joy—things which, as
Farmer points out, abstract phrases are neither able to evoke nor convey. 439 This new heart, this
changed disposition that one receives as a result of encountering God in loving relationship, is
what one is to take into his various relations in the world. 440 In short, if a personal God of perfect
love exists, and he is inviting human persons into communion with himself, such a relationship
makes complete moral transformation possible.
Catalyst for Moral Transformation
It is challenging to understand how an abstract moral law or a cold, indifferent deity
provides motivation or is able to serve as the catalyst for one’s total transformation. However,
perhaps a better explanation is, as Rashdall claims, “Belief in the moral ideal attains its
maximum momentum when it is identified with the love of a Person.” 441 Elsewhere, he states
that “Love for a Person is a stronger force than devotion to an idea.” 442 On a similar note, Relton
says, “The Divine Love of a Personal God is the motive of the ‘initial impulsion.’”443 In other
words, abstract truths likely cannot touch the will and motivate the feelings in the life of an
individual to the extent that the divine love of a personal God can. It is true that ideas motivate
and sometimes people are changed as a result of the ideas they encounter and adopt, but love for
a person is a stronger catalyst for moral improvement and finally a revolution of the heart, mind,
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and will. Ultimately, as Duns Scotus claims, the journey that human persons are on is a journey
towards their final good, which Scotus takes to be that human persons become “co-lovers” of
God (condiligentes), entering into the love that the three persons of the Trinity have for each
other.444 If a personal God of perfect love exists, Relton insists that death cannot frustrate such a
divine purpose as this because “[l]ove triumphant is God’s last word” and eternal life God’s final
end for man.445 Utterly convinced of the centrality of an essentially good, loving, personal God
to the moral enterprise, Taylor proclaims,
Thus once more I find myself forced back on the conclusion that, to be truly itself, the
moral life must have as its last motive love to God, and so become transfigured into the
life of religious faith and devotion. . . . Belief in the absolute reality of God, and love for
the God in whom we believe, are at the heart of living morality. The good of our fellowmen is unworthily thought of when we do not conceive that good as a life of knowledge
of God and transformation by the knowledge into the likeness of God. And the love
which arises from our belief is the one motive adequate to secure the full and wholehearted discharge of the duties laid on us by our ideal. 446
Of course, all of this talk about love indicates that the source of the moral law, if such there be, is
likely a personal God, because it would be odd to think of giving love to or receiving love from
an abstract principle, and on this basis, one is motivated to change morally. On the other hand, it
presumably makes more sense to say that one’s love for a person, and in this case, the very fount
of personhood, God himself, is an adequate and eminently plausible catalyst for moral
transformation.
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Human Conscience and Moral Transformation
Before wrapping up discussion of moral transformation, it is helpful to consider one more
piece of evidence that points in the direction of a personal God: the human conscience. It is true
that many things potentially serve as “channels” for moral improvement and transformation (e.g.,
self-help books, religious texts, etc.), but one interesting “channel” relevant to the present
discussion is the human conscience, which briefly came up in chapter 3 when moral knowledge
was discussed. The conscience sensitizes one to the need to be less inwardly curved on oneself
and calls one to be willing to change, to listen to “its” voice, and so on. This provides evidence
that there is “intentionality” here—a sign of personhood, owing to its purposiveness and such.
Furthermore, the conscience is deeply personal in that it is not merely “out there” but also “in
here,” deep within the recesses of who each human person is. It is a bit of “inside information”
that may very well come to human persons from some other source. 447 However, one must be
careful at this juncture to avoid falling into the trap of over-individualism. What helps with this
potential pitfall is understanding that the conscience itself points outward. Of course, one
apprehends his or her conscience best inwardly, but it points one outward. For example, when
one realizes her own selfishness (inwardly) and is moved to unselfishness (outwardly),
something significant has happened. This dual feature of morality is important to bear in mind,
especially when some thinkers overemphasize one aspect to the exclusion of the other. Kant’s
emphasis on autonomy, rightly understood, intimates at this duality.
The moral conscience is potentially evidence for God’s existence, as the conscience is not
entirely socially determined in all circumstances.448 In fact, there are times when one’s
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Lewis, Mere Christianity, 29.
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John Henry Newman is an important voice on this issue. See Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar

of Assent.
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conscience works when there is no social influence, such as when one is motivated to love an
enemy without being taught by someone to do so. How is the moral conscience evidence for
God’s existence? Perhaps more importantly, how does the moral conscience shed light on God’s
character? In an effort to answer these questions, consider what the human conscience does: it
challenges human persons, wakes them up, gets them out of their complacency, encourages them
to get serious about what really matters in life, alerts them to wrongdoing (or potential
wrongdoing), and motivates them to do what is good or right, among other things. The human
conscience is concerned with morality, as evidenced by its instruction-giving nature on how to
live decently. This emphasis on morality points to a standard or law beyond an individual person
or society of persons. Admittedly, this invites the question: Why is the conscience not just
another thing in reality, and how is the moral conscience indicative of ultimate reality? If there is
a standard of moral goodness, it excludes certain things (e.g., torturing children for fun), and if
certain things are excluded, there is evidence of intentionality. Furthermore, if the conscience
functions similarly to the way described above—it challenges, encourages, alerts, motivates, and
so on—there is additional evidence of intentionality, and intentionality (or purposiveness) points
to personal agency.
Matter (i.e., the material world) by itself does not have intentions; only persons have
intentions. At this juncture, one has evidence for a source of moral goodness 449 and a source that
has intentions. If only persons have intentions, and if morality is indicative of personal agency,
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Perhaps moral goodness construed in reductionist terms is at least conceptually possible without
reference to God (e.g., Platonism), but it is much more difficult to get lasting moral goodness apart from God. Plato
considered whether the morally good life can be offered as something sustainable and commendable as having
lasting value. This is the sort of meaning in life that monotheists talk about—lasting meaning. Put that way, a
naturalist view is at a serious disadvantage, as it does not have the resources necessary for lasting moral goodness or
lasting meaning. It seems that a Being who can sustain lasting moral goodness is preferable to all other options, and
a Being of this sort is only possible to account for on a theistic view.
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then this may serve as evidence for a personal God. If there is a God who embodies moral
goodness and provides instructions on how to live morally via the human conscience by speaking
to them through their conscience,450 this God is more valuable than an impersonal being or force
who does not (and probably cannot) care about these matters. Not only is this God more
valuable; this God is seemingly worthy of worship.451 A God who is worthy of worship is a
morally perfect God who is personal in nature, One who cares about how human persons live
their lives, desires the best for them, loves them, and so on.452 This sort of thinking brings to
mind a quote from Arthur Balfour, who once described God in this manner: “I mean a God
whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and
preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a
personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created.” 453 If this is the case, that the
moral conscience is evidence for such a God as this, one must then consider whether he is going
to submit to the challenges of his conscience, to undergo a change of priorities, to be led away
from his selfishness and instead genuinely care for others, and much more.454 Each human

If there is “someone” or “something” speaking to human persons via the conscience, it is helpful to
point out that there is likely no language apart from consciousness, and no utterance without a speaker. Language
and consciousness are evidences not only of a speaker, but plausibly of a personal Speaker (i.e., personal God).
450
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When considering ultimate reality, one has to deal with the question: Is there a Being (i.e., God) who
excels to the highest moral degree and therefore demands our worship? To ignore this conceptual option is to cheat,
and to cheat is not good philosophy. In all monotheistic traditions, God is presented as a Being who is worthy of
worship. A god who is not worthy of worship is lowering the bar, and one should not lower the bar when it comes to
the divine.
452

Worship is a personal act most appropriately directed toward a personal being. Worship does not seem
as robust if directed toward an impersonal object or being.
453

Arthur James Balfour, Theism and Humanism (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), 21.
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Credit for some of these ideas goes to Paul K. Moser, who discusses how the moral conscience is
evidence for God in this YouTube video: https://youtu.be/qiClbtO_qLI.
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person has a personal response before him: ignore his conscience and live his own way, or pay
attention to the challenges of his conscience and begin the process of moral transformation. 455

Summary
Chapter 6 began with a quote from C. S. Lewis, emphasizing two foundational facts that
virtually all human persons are aware of: (1) humans know they ought to behave a certain way;
and (2) they fail to behave that way. Humans fail morally, which gives rise to guilt and makes
them culpable, deserving of punishment for their immoral actions. If this were the end of the
story, it would be a sad story indeed. But all across the world, humans hope for something
more—something like forgiveness, even transformation, even to the point of completion. The
gap between the best one can do on his or her own and what morality demands, called “the moral
gap” by John Hare, is arguably best bridged by nothing less than the assistance of a personal
God.
This chapter focuses on moral transformation and seeks to determine whether moral
transformation and other related concepts, such as moral failure, guilt, punishment, grace, and
forgiveness make more sense on a non-personal or personal account. This chapter provides seven
pieces of evidence in favor of the latter, that is, a personal God. First, when one fails morally,
such as when he wastes his talents (or his life as a whole), to whom is he responsible to if not a
personal God who bestows such talents (and the gift of life itself)? The only other options are
that one is responsible to himself or to an abstract order of claims, and since the concept of

455
It is important to note that the conscience is not infallible in all situations. This is why, on the Christian
view, that one ought to make sure what his conscience is “telling him” is what Scripture actually says. If the
Christian God exists, and he (God) is speaking to one through the human conscience, it should align with what he
(God) has revealed in Scripture. Why? Because God cannot contradict himself by “telling” one person something
via the conscience, and then “tell” everyone else something completely different in his written Word.
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responsibility implies the idea of an “other” to whom responsibility is due, it is appropriate to
postulate the existence of a personal God to whom responsibility is due. Second, the nature of
guilt points in the direction of a personal God since it seems inappropriate to feel guilt before an
abstract, non-personal moral code of sorts. The experience of guilt typically implies that an
“other” has been betrayed in some sense, and it is before this “other” that one is guilty. Third,
punishment is best understood as a category of personal relations, and if there is an essentially
good God who cares about justice, it seems fitting to also understand this God to be personal in
nature. Fourth, grace and forgiveness for each human person’s moral failures, are deeply
personal, and if humans find themselves in desperate need of grace and forgiveness, it is
important to note that a divine mind or power, an impersonal force, or some other conception of
the divine likely cannot dispense grace and offer forgiveness—presumably, only a personal God
can truly offer these things. Fifth, the nature of moral transformation suggests that a personal
God of love exists, One who invites human persons into a transformative loving relationship
with himself. As one encounters the love of God, he experiences what is best for his life, what
truly transforms his heart, and what ultimately brings about lasting peace and joy—these are
things which abstract ideas and non-personal deities are arguably neither able to evoke nor
convey. Sixth, it is difficult to understand how devotion to an abstract moral law or a cold,
indifferent deity could provide adequate motivation for one’s moral transformation, at least not
in the same way that a personal God of love can. Simply put, love for a Person is probably a
stronger motivator than devotion to an abstract moral ideal or non-personal deity. Seventh, God
arguably “speaks” to each person via the conscience, urging them to wake up and take right
living seriously, motivating them to do what is right and alerting them to potential wrongdoing.
If this is the case, it is evidence of intentionality on God’s part, and intentionality is indicative of
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personhood, owing to its purposiveness. This makes it possible to suggest that a personal God is
the One who is speaking through the human conscience to each person. In sum, the seven pieces
of evidence presented in chapter 6 point toward the existence of a personal God of love.
Now that moral knowledge, moral values, moral obligations, and moral transformation
have each been discussed in the previous four chapters (chapters 3-6), and because each point in
the direction of a personal source, several possibilities will be briefly examined in the concluding
chapter in an effort to shed light on the plausibility of Christianity in explaining and accounting
for the personal nature of morality.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TOWARD A TRINITARIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONAL
NATURE OF MORALITY
Introduction
As stated in the introduction (chapter 1), the universe and everything within it are the
result of either a personal or non-personal source. Therefore, ultimate reality is either personal or
non-personal, and everything in the universe flows from one or the other. The present project has
examined some of the available moral phenomena in an attempt to gather evidence and draw a
conclusion regarding whether ultimate reality is likely personal or non-personal.456 Stated
differently, this project has aimed to better understand the nature of ultimate reality by
examining the nature of various moral categories, such as moral knowledge, moral values, moral
obligations, and moral transformation. Of course, classical arguments for God’s existence do not
take one all the way to the God of any particular religion, but it appears that the moral argument
may be able to move one a bit closer to a particular conception of God than the other
arguments—due to its ability to reveal more of God’s character (or nature).
Following the introductory chapter, chapter 2 provided reasons for believing in objective
moral facts, and then chapters 3-6 looked at the nature of moral knowledge, values, obligations,
and transformation. If there are objective moral facts, and chapter 2 suggested that there are, one
must consider what the facts are like, specifically, whether they are personal or non-personal.
Chapters 3-6 provided evidence that morality is personal, which at the least roots morality
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There is significantly more moral data for one to observe—data that arguably provides further evidence
for the existence of God (and perhaps even a specific God). For example, this dissertation could have looked at the
property of moral rationality, which focuses on the coherence between happiness and holiness. Interestingly, a
discussion on moral rationality (or moral providence) would have likely rendered additional evidence for the
existence of a personal God. Another piece of moral data is the evidence of evil, which is usually taken as evidence
against God’s existence, or at least a good God’s existence. However, construed properly, evil actually serves as
evidence for God, and perhaps even a personal God. David Baggett and Marybeth Baggett, The Morals of the Story:
Good News About a Good God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2018), 197-216.
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somehow in persons and might well point in the direction of a more ultimate or transcendent
personal source. When considering evidence of any kind, and in this case, evidence for God, it is
important to remember that an effect cannot have a quality not possessed by the cause.
Therefore, if morality is personal in nature, as suggested in the preceding chapters, one has
reason to look for a personal source as the most plausible explanation, perhaps even a personal
God. It is important to remember that the concept of “personal God” was defined this way in
chapter 1: A personal God is a self-conscious Being who thinks, feels, wills, and One who is
capable of loving and being loved by other beings. Consequently, this chapter, which serves as
the conclusion to this project, will consider several conceptual options and attempt to
demonstrate that the existence of a personal God in general, and Christian theism more
specifically, possesses the most explanatory power and provides the widest explanatory scope for
the personal nature of morality.457 Admittedly, this chapter is unable to provide a full treatment
of the issue, but hopefully it will tie up some loose ends and provide an adequate foundation for
further work in this area.

Summary of Evidence (From Chapters 3-6)
Evidence Chart
At the end of chapters 3-6, a short summary is provided of the evidences presented in
each respective chapter. A chart of these evidences is also provided below. In terms of the
cumulative evidence for the existence of a personal God, chapter 3 (moral knowledge) suggests
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I am approaching this final chapter largely from a Christian perspective, aiming to make a move toward
philosophical theology. (This is something I briefly mention in a chapter 1 footnote.) Philosophical theology has
apologetic significance if the fine-grained accounts of Christianity move the discussion forward and make ever
better sense of what we are able to glean from general revelation and ethical reflection, providing at least some
evidence of its truth.
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seven evidences, chapter 4 (moral values) six evidences, chapter 5 (moral obligations) five
evidences, and chapter 6 (moral transformation) seven evidences, for a total of twenty-five
evidences.458 See the chart below for an overview of these evidences (or indicators).459 (Note:
Chapters 3 and 6 both present the “human conscience” as an evidence. See “Evidence 6” below.
Also, chapters 3 and 4 both present “purpose” as an evidence. The “human conscience” is
counted as one evidence in the chart below, and “purpose” is counted as one evidence. As a
result, there are actually twenty-three evidences listed in the chart.)
Evidence 1
(ch. 3)
Evidence 2
(ch. 3)
Evidence 3
(chs. 3 & 4)

Evidence 4
(ch. 3))
Evidence 5
(ch. 3)

Evidence 6
(chs. 3 & 6)

Evidence 7
(ch. 3)

The moral law is information, and information is typically the product of a
conscious, intelligent mind (i.e., a person).
The moral law indicates that the source cares deeply about how humans live
their lives.
The moral law implies purpose, and purpose involves intent, and intent
reveals a personal will. Values themselves are personal because values play a
role in helping one satisfy his or her purpose in life, and purpose is a key
feature of personality.
If moral knowledge is contained within the mind of God, and if God has
revealed such knowledge to human persons, the act of revelation suggests
God is personal.
If morality is a reflection of God’s character and if God has chosen to reveal
this information to human persons, it follows that morality is very important
to God and that God expects human beings to pattern themselves after God’s
character.
The human conscience, if it serves as a channel through which God has
communicated the moral law, is evidence that God is personal (ch. 3). God
speaking to each person in the human conscience (to urge them to do what is
right, avoid what is wrong, etc.) is evidence of intentionality, and
intentionality is indicative of personhood, owing to its purposiveness and
such (ch. 6).
Perhaps one reason why God chose to dispense moral knowledge to human
persons stems from his desire to be in relationship with them.
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There are likely other evidences from morality for the existence of a personal God than the two dozen
(or so) presented in this dissertation. This is an exciting thought to consider, and one that will hopefully motivate
further research into this fascinating area.
It may be helpful to understand these twenty-three “evidences” instead as “indicators” of a personal
God, due to the fact that some thinkers may not count several of these items as “evidences.” Regardless of one’s
thoughts on this matter, if one denies the existence of God or adopts some other non-personal view of ultimate
reality, many of these “evidences” or “indicators” are still in need of explanation and should not be dismissed
without careful consideration.
459
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Evidence 8
(ch. 4)
Evidence 9
(ch. 4)
Evidence 10
(ch. 4)
Evidence 11
(ch. 4)
Evidence 12
(ch. 4)
Evidence 13
(ch. 5)
Evidence 14
(ch. 5)
Evidence 15
(ch. 5)
Evidence 16
(ch. 5)
Evidence 17
(ch. 5)
Evidence 18
(ch. 6)
Evidence 19
(ch. 6)
Evidence 20
(ch. 6)
Evidence 21
(ch. 6)
Evidence 22
(ch. 6)
Evidence 23
(ch. 6)

Ultimate goodness, which is not fully contained within any finite mind,
points in the direction of a personal God. (If goodness on a human level is
personal, it is logical to conclude that ultimate goodness is also personal.)
The value of justice, which is deeply personal, signals that a personal God
likely exists. If such a thing as ultimate justice exists, there is further
evidence for the existence of a personal God.
The ethic of love, which requires a subject and object, points in the direction
of a personal God.
Gratitude suggests that a personal God exists because there are occasions
when gratitude is not appropriately directed to any human person.
The intrinsic value of human persons is likely best grounded in the
personhood of God.
The idea of moral obligations involves the idea of a person or persons to
whom one is obligated.
It would be odd to think of a non-personal entity holding one personally
responsible for failing to carry out his or her duty in a given situation.
Duties toward inanimate objects and animals are also personal in nature,
albeit indirectly.
If moral obligations are understood to be divine commands, divine
commands imply a personal divine Commander.
Reverence before the moral law is likely best understood as reverence not
before the law itself, but rather the personal God behind the law.
Moral failure indicates that there is One before whom human persons have
been irresponsible, and One who holds human persons accountable for their
failures.
The nature of guilt points in the direction of a personal God.
Punishment is best understood as a category of personal relations, and if
there is an essentially good God who cares about justice, it seems fitting to
understand this God to be personal in nature.
Grace and forgiveness, which are important concepts in light of each human
person’s moral failures, are presumably best understood in terms of a
personal God.
The nature of moral transformation suggests that a personal God of love
exists, One who invites human persons into a transformative loving
relationship with himself.
It is difficult to understand how devotion to anyone or anything less than a
personal God of love could provide adequate motivation for one’s moral
transformation.
Cumulative Force of the Evidence

These roughly two dozen pieces of evidence, taken cumulatively, point powerfully to the
existence of a personal God. Arguably, these evidences cannot be accounted for on views that:
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(1) deny the existence of God completely; or (2) present a God who is non-personal or less than
fully personal (or instrinsically personal). For a look at the difficulty some of these views face,
see below.460

A Brief Word on Weighing Competing Hypotheses
By taking a look at the world and seeing what one can do in terms of explaining morality
and its distinctive features, it should not be surprising that one can make some progress. There
are many belief systems that have much to say when it comes to the moral enterprise. However,
one must then remind himself or herself of the full range of moral facts in need of explanation—
namely, the objectivity of moral facts, moral knowledge, moral values, moral obligations, moral
transformation, and others still—and then ask this question: What is the most plausible
explanation of such moral phenomena? In the case of this dissertation, one must ask, what is the
most plausible explanation of the personal nature of moral phenomena? Which view provides
the widest explanatory scope, possesses the most explanatory power, and is the most
plausible?461
There are three criteria commonly used when weighing competing hypotheses: (1)
explanatory scope; (2) explanatory power; and (3) plausibility. The criterion of explanatory
scope looks at the quantity of facts accounted for by a particular hypothesis, with the hypothesis
accounting for the most facts being deemed as the hypothesis with the widest explanatory scope.
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This is not an exhaustive look at the views that deny the existence of God or present a God who is non personal or less than fully personal (or intrinsically personal). The purpose of considering these options is to briefly
suggest the shortcomings of these views in accounting for the deeply personal nature of morality, and to lay the
groundwork for future work.
461

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 77.
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On the other hand, the criterion of explanatory power looks at the quality of the explanation of
the facts.462 The hypothesis that explains the data most clearly and with the least amount of effort
is said to possess the greatest explanatory power. In order for a hypothesis to be deemed
“plausible,” it must be implied to a greater degree and by a larger body of accepted truths (or
background knowledge) than other hypotheses. 463 Moreover, a hypothesis may be granted
plausibility status if it is not in tension with solid conclusions in other areas. Oftentimes,
simplicity serves as an additional criterion when judging competing hypotheses, with the
hypothesis that most simply and clearly explains the data being preferred. With these criteria in
mind, the discussion now considers several hypotheses in an effort to determine which
hypothesis possesses the widest explanatory scope, the greatest explanatory power, and is most
plausible.
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N. T. Wright basically combines these two criteria (explanatory scope and power) and lists two
additional requirements of a good hypothesis. He writes, “First, it must include the data. The bits and pieces of
evidence must be incorporated, without being squeezed out of shape any more than is inevitable. . . . Second, it must
construct a basically simple and coherent overall picture. . . . In any given field, it is quite likely that there will be
several possible hypotheses which will include more or less all the data, and do so with reasonable simp licity. There
is therefore a third thing that a good hypothesis must do if it is to stand out from the others. The proposed
explanatory story must prove itself fruitful in other related areas, must explain or help to explain other problems. ”
N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 99-100.
These criteria largely come from Michael Licona’s The Resurrection of Jesus. Admittedly, Licona is a
historian, but a process of this type is not unique to historiography, as Licona himself maintains. Similar approaches
are oftentimes applied by philosophers, for instance. Licona also lists “less ad hoc” and “illumination” as criteria for
claiming a particular hypothesis is the best or most plausible explanation. By “less ad hoc,” Licona explains, “A
hypothesis possesses an ad hoc component when it enlists nonevidenced assumptions, that is, when it goes beyond
what is already known. When two or more hypotheses seem equal, usually due to a paucity of data, historians often
employ a greater amount of imagination in order to account for the available data.” In terms of illumination,
sometimes a hypothesis not only plausibly explains the data at hand, it also provides possible solutions to other
problems without confusing other areas held with confidence. Michael R. Licona, “Arguments to the Best
Explanation” in The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 2010), 108-114.
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Considering Several Options 464
Naturalism
Naturalism is in a difficult spot when it comes to accounting for the personal nature of
moral knowledge, values, obligations, and transformation. This view is also in a difficult position
when attempting to account for the moral order of the universe, because nature is not moral
itself. There are other challenges that naturalism faces, some of which have been addressed
previously in this dissertation. However, the fundamental problem with naturalism in terms of
explaining the evidence in this work is that naturalism views ultimate reality as non-personal,
and things such as personality, personhood, and as this dissertation suggests, the personal nature
of morality, are likely best explained in reference to a transcendent personal cause. For example,
one may wonder how anything less than a fully conscious, intelligent, personal being could do
things like dispense moral knowledge, account for personal moral values like goodness, justice,
and love, give instructions (perhaps even commands), and make moral transformation possible.
Claiming that naturalism is able to account for the personal is likely similar to saying that a
stream can rise above its source or that an effect can have a quality that the cause itself does not
have to give. As Nancy Pearcey explains, “As water cannot rise above its source, so a
nonpersonal object of force could not have produced personal beings like ourselves.” 465 Based

464
This section briefly looks at several opposing views, treating each in a page or two. Admittedly, before
something like a full abductive case can be made, each of these views would need to be more thoroughly analyzed.
The point of this section is not to thoroughly dismantle these views as a whole, but rather to highlight a few
weaknesses of the opposing views in light of the evidence for a personal God presented in this dissertation.
Hopefully, these short analyses of opposing views will serve as a springboard for more work on these views in the
future, especially in terms of how they are able to account for the personal nature of morality.

Viewing Pearcey’s quote in its context is helpful: “Since He made us, He must have at least the qualities
we have as personal, moral, rational, creative beings. As water cannot rise above its source, so a nonpersonal object
of force could not have produced personal beings like ourselves. It is logical to conclude that God too is a personal
Being.” Her point is that an effect cannot possess a quality that the cause itself did not have to give. Therefore, if
there are personal beings and if morality is personal, they are best understood as deriving from a personal Cause
(i.e., personal God). Nancy Pearcey, Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from Its Cultural Captivity (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway, 2004), 89.
465
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upon observation, this is not the way things work in real life—a stream does not rise above its
source, not without a personal cause anyway (e.g., a pump installed in a stream by a human
person). Therefore, it seems that ultimate reality is plausibly personal in nature, that is, if it is to
adequately account for the deeply personal nature of morality. 466 This likely renders naturalism a
bad fit, an insufficient explanation and incapable ground of personal morality. As H. P. Owen
puts it, “The failure of naturalism in all its forms shows that ethical terms cannot be reduced to,
or explained by, non-ethical ones.”467 Using Owen’s quote, one may also conclude that the
failure of naturalism shows that personal terms presumably cannot be reduced to, or explained
by, non-personal ones. On this score, even Kai Nielsen, a contemporary advocate of atheism,
admits, “There can be no complete non-personal, objective justification for acting morally rather
than nonmorally.” 468
Platonism
At the end of his book Robust Ethics, Erik Wielenberg, a Platonist, states, “If there is a
moral to the story I have told, it is that the old-fangled ideas that reality includes objective, sui
generis moral features that exist independently of God and that ordinary human beings can
possess knowledge of such features of reality still have something to be said for them.” In the
next sentence, Wielenberg writes, “As our understanding of human moral cognition grows, we
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H. P. Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), 38,
70-71. Pearcey, Total Truth, 89.
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Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, 70. The comments of Pearcey and Owen found in this
section serve as somewhat of a summary of the issues facing naturalism. One might suggest that individuals like
Pearcey and Owen are friendly witnesses, and that one needs to engage more with the naturalists themselves (or the
Platonists, Buddhists, Muslims, etc.) before attempting to claim that something approaching a full abductive case
has been made. I could not agree more. Again, the aim of this dissertation is not to take on each of the opposing
views at length, as that would take a dissertation in itself, but rather to present potential evidence for the personal
nature of morality, which warrants explanation and seemingly makes mos t sense in terms of a personal God.
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Kai Nielsen in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations For a Christian
Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 393.
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should not be too quick to abandon these old-fangled notions.” 469 In short, Wielenberg urges his
readers to not forsake the “old-fangled idea” of objective morality, while also suggesting that
such a commitment does not make it impossible to remain or become an atheist. It is at least
possible for objective moral facts to exist without God (although many theists would
disagree),470 but on Platonism, it is difficult to account for the deeply personal nature of
morality.471 Is it possible to get the personal from a non-personal, abstract realm such as the one
suggested by Platonists? Or does it make more sense to claim that the personal exists as a basic
feature of reality, and that at the very heart of the universe there exists a personal God who is
able to account for personal, personality, personhood, and so on? Moral values seem to exist as
properties of persons, not as mere abstractions; moral obligations also seem more intelligible
when a person is in view. How do personal values such as goodness, justice, and love, for
instance, simply float about in some transcendent, abstract realm? Moreover, how is it that
anything could do things like give instructions or urge good behavior if it were anything less than
a personal being? For these reasons, among others suggested in this dissertation,472 grounding
personal morality in a personal God appears to be a more viable option.473
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Erik J. Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 176.
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For example, see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 179.
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Other objections to Platonism are mentioned in chapter 3 on moral values.
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See the chapters on moral knowledge (chapter 3) and moral transformation (chapter 6). There are other
reasons suggested in chapters 4 (moral values) and 5 (moral obligations) as well.
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In 2018, William Lane Craig and Erik J. Wielenberg participated in a debate at North Carolina State
University, addressing the question: “God and Morality: What is the best account of objective moral values and
duties?” Craig argued that theism provides the most plausible foundation for objective morality, whereas
Wielenberg contended that morality can be objective even if there is no God. This debate was later published as a
book. See William Lane Craig and Erik J. Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of
Objective Moral Values and Duties?, ed. Adam Lloyd Johnson (New York, NY: Routledge, 2021).
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Eastern Religions
Admittedly, there are too many Eastern religions to consider here, but most can be
categorized as pantheistic, polytheistic, or some blend of the two.474 Pantheism, at least broadly
speaking, typically views the divine as some sort of non-personal force. Considering the twodozen evidences presented in this work, each pointing in the direction of a personal source, it
seems inappropriate to speak of a force or substance existing as a conscious being who is capable
of entering into a mutual relationship of love and trust with others. 475 Furthermore, if one is
looking for a transcendent source that is personal to the highest degree possible, one must look
for a source that is intrinsically personal, and a force is unlikely to possess such a quality as
this.476 Regarding polytheism, if morality is truly objective, it seems unlikely to be the result of a
plurality of gods since the moral law seemingly implies the existence of one Moral Lawgiver. If
many gods existed, disagreements would abound over the nature of goodness, over what is truly
right and wrong, and so on.477 On polytheism, if the gods are personal in any sense, they are
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There are those who suggest the Holy Spirit is something like a force; however, this is not consistent
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Athanasius, in his Against Heathen, provides numerous reasons why a plurality of gods presumably do
not exist. In one section, Athanasius states, “For if there were more than one Ruler of Creation, such a universal
order would not be maintained, but all things would fall into confusion because of their plurality, each one biasing
the whole to his own will, and striving with the other….The rule of more than one is the rule of none. For each
would cancel the rule of the other, and none would appear ruler, but there would be anarchy everywhere. But where
no ruler is, there disorder follows of course.” According to Athanasius, if more than one god existed, there would be
no moral order, only moral disorder. Each deity would create rules according to his own will, and these rules would
likely be at odds with the rules of other deities. In another section, Athanasius writes, “And this you must know, that
if the universe had been made by a plurality of gods, its movements would be diverse and inconsistent. For having
regard to each one of its makers, its movements would be correspondingly different.” It seems that this same thought
can be applied to morality. For example, if a plurality of gods existed, there would likely be different, and even
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likely not intrinsically personal because their personal nature is likely dependent on other beings.
It is also helpful to point out here that personality is not the only feature God must possess in
order to account for morality as a whole. 478 For instance, he must also be holy and loving. For
the reasons suggested in this brief section, among other reasons, pantheism and polytheism seem
unable to account for the personal nature of morality in a robust sense. 479
Islam
Regarding Islam, the extent to which Allah is a personal deity is debatable. Islam denies
the Trinity, maintaining that Allah is “One and Indivisible,” as Surah 112:1 states. As the Islamic
scholar, Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes, “The Quran continuously emphasizes the Unity and the
Oneness of God, and it can be said that the very raison d'être of Islam is to assert in a final and
categorical manner the Oneness of God and the nothingness of all before the Majesty of that
One.”480 Arguably, without the concept of the Trinity, one cannot hold a fully personal
conception of God, because many attributes of personality are expressed within the context of a
relationship—things like love, communication, empathy, and self-giving, for example. On the

contradictory moral standards or laws existing, each owing its content to its particular deity. Interestingly, within
polytheistic religions, there is oftentimes disagreement among the gods over moral issues (e.g., Greek and Roman
mythology, Hinduism, etc.). In Athanasius’ estimation, in order for there to be moral harmony, there must only be
one God, who is the Creator and Governor of it all. Athanasius, Against Heathen in L. Russ Bush, Classical
Readings in Christian Apologetics: A.D. 100-1800 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983), 146-147.
Regarding Eastern religions, Webb notes: “If we may say that the God of much Indian worship is not
what we should usually call a ‘personal God,’ we must take care not to imply by this that the Indian’s religion is not
his personal concern, for nothing could be less true. Moreover the important and widely prevalent type of Indian
piety known as bhakti is admitted to be devotional faith in a personal God: while Buddhism, which originally
perhaps acknowledged neither God nor soul, has produced in the worship of Amitabha, the ‘Buddha of the
Boundless Light,’ the ‘Lord of the Western Paradise,’ a form of piety which has seemed to some scholars too similar
to the Christian to have originated except under Christian influence.” Clement C. J. Webb, God and Personality
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1919), 88.
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Although more needs to be said, it is important to briefly note a presumed weakness of Buddhism, an
Eastern religion that is largely atheistic in nature, so ultimately not personal. Buddhism says humanity’s goal is
dissolution of self, which seemingly helps the case attempting to be made in this chapter.
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Islamic view, which denies the Trinity, it is challenging to see how Allah intrinsically possesses
these personal attributes. If Allah does possess these attributes, it is presumably not until Allah
created the world. However, in that case, Allah would be dependent on creation,481 which
appears to be at odds with what Surah 112:2 says: “Allah—the Sustainer needed by all.” 482
Another reason to question whether Allah is personal has to do with how Muslims
express their faith in near-mechanistic rituals. For example, Muslim believers oftentimes recite
the Quran many times over,483 in unison with other Muslims, word for word, in the original
Arabic. Muslims seemingly do not pour out their hearts to Allah as a personal being as David
does in Psalm 51.484 According to the sociologist Rodney Stark, religions with non-personal gods
typically stress precision in the performance of rituals and sacred formulas, whereas religions
with a highly personal God are less concerned about such things, because a personal God will
respond to the personal approaches of impromptu supplication and spontaneous prayer. 485
It is certainly true that anthropomorphic language is used of Allah in the Quran. For
instance, it is said that Allah possesses a face and two hands (Surah 38:75), has the ability to see
and sits on a throne (Surah 57:4), is compassionate and merciful (Surah 1:3), and is responsive to
prayers (Surah 11:61). However, as Clement Webb suggests,
[I]t would seem that the tendency of that teaching is to reduce the personal relations
which can exist between man and God to the lowest terms, to those, namely, which may
exist between a slave and a master of absolutely unlimited power. Still this is a personal
481
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Another translation of Surah 112:2 reads: “Allah, Who is in need of none and of Whom all are in need.”
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relation, and on the whole it would seem best to describe the God of Mohammedanism as
a personal God.486
According to Webb, one should not speak of a personal God unless it is supposed that human
persons can be in personal relationship with him. 487 Therefore, technically speaking, Webb
understands Allah to be a personal God, but he points out that the personal relationship that
exists is likely not a warm, affectionate relationship that is characterized by mutual love, but
rather one that is reduced to the sort of relationship that exists between a slave and his master.
Regardless of one’s take on the personal nature of Allah, this much appears fairly clear: Allah is
not an intrinsically personal being.488
Christianity489
If a personal God—a self-conscious Being who thinks, feels, wills, and is capable of
loving and being loved by others—is the likely best explanation of the deeply personal nature of
morality, Christianity cannot be dismissed as a viable option. More specifically, if one is looking
for an intrinsically personal God, Christianity provides a powerful account that must be
considered. In what follows, an attempt is made to demonstrate that the Judeo-Christian God is
personal to the highest degree possible, that is, intrinsically personal. The discussion begins by
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Judaism is left aside here due to its complex relationship with Christianity. This is not to say there are no
important distinctions between a strict version of Judaism and Christianity, because, of course, there are. The view
presented in this section utilizes both the Old and New Testaments in an effort to demonstrate the intrinsically
personal nature of the Judeo-Christian God of the Bible. Admittedly, there are other views that are absent from this
analysis as well, such as deism, for example. Deism is not included here because it views God as Creator, but not as
One with whom human persons can be in personal relationship.
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considering some of the person-like acts of the Judeo-Christian God, but then moves to the heart
of the matter—the Trinitarian conception of this God—and explains how the Trinity provides the
proper basis for claiming that the Judeo-Christian God is intrinsically personal. Following the
discussion on the Trinity and the perichoretic relations of the three Persons within the Trinity, the
Incarnation is considered as further evidence of the deeply personal nature of the God of the
Bible.
Person-Like Acts
In the introduction to this dissertation, the person-like acts of the Judeo-Christian God
were referenced. Here, these items are revisited with a few additions. In the Hebrew Bible (or
Old Testament), God is One who decides to create (Gen. 1:1), walks in the Garden of Eden (Gen.
3:8), issues divine commands (Ex. 20:1-21), speaks “face to face” to people on occasion (Ex.
33:11), expresses emotions (Ex. 33:19; Is. 61:8), disciplines (Deut. 8:5), converses with human
beings (Job 38-41), receives expressed gratitude (Ps. 92:1), possesses a will to choose (Ps. 115:3;
Is. 46:10-11), reasons (Is. 1:18), has an intellect (Is. 48:17; Prov. 15:3), One who is both
transcendent and immanent (Jer. 23:23), shows mercy (Jon. 3:10). The New Testament depicts
God as One who responds to prayers (Mt. 7:7-8; Mk. 11:24), displays compassion (Mt. 9:36),
desires to be in relationship with human persons (Jn. 15:13-15; Jas. 4:8; 1 Pet. 3:18; 1 Jn. 3:1),
transforms those who trust in him (2 Cor. 5:17), offers grace (Eph. 1:7), reveals knowledge and
wisdom to those who ask (Jas. 1:5), provides good gifts (Jas. 1:17), judges (Jas. 4:12), forgives
(1 Jn. 1:9), and loves (1 Jn. 4:10).490 In several places, God is contrasted with idols, which can
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As Farmer puts it, “The conviction that God is personal, and deals personally with men and women, lies
at the heart of Christian experience and thought. Sufficient proof of this, if proof be needed, is afforded by the New
Testament. Every category, phrase, doctrine, movement of thought, presupposes and implies the possibility for all,
and the actuality for the writers, of a personal relationship to a personal God. ‘God is love; and he that abideth in
love abideth in God and God abideth in him.’ ‘If God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.’ These
statements can have no straightforward meaning if God be not thought of as in some sense personal, constituting
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neither hear nor speak (Acts 14:15). There is also a distinction drawn between the living God and
non-living idols (1 Thess. 1:9). 491 In sum, there are numerous person-like acts carried out by the
Judeo-Christian God, which should be expected given his intrinsically personal nature. 492
The Trinity and Perichoresis
With the Trinity, one encounters a truly distinctive doctrine of Christianity; no other
religions in the world make the claim that God is one Being who exists in three Persons.493 Of all
the doctrines that are distinctively Christian, none are more fundamental than the doctrine of the

with men an ultimate order of personal relations. ‘The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.’ ‘He that hath seen
me hath seen the Father.’ Thus to use the term ‘father’ in respect of God, thus to derive its meaning and content
from Jesus, involves that whatever else may be true of God, this at least is true, that He is personal and personally
related to men. To see Jesus is to see a personal life entering into personal relations with, and seeking personal ends
for, men and women.” Farmer, The World and God, 9.
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No Greek god, not even Zeus, was the Supreme Being, and when pagan philosophers began to talk of such a Being
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Erickson, Christian Theology, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002), 203.
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They feel that the mysterious something which is behind all other things must be more than a person. Now the
Christians quite agree. But the Christians are the only people who offer any idea of what a being that is beyond
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something impersonal: that is, as something less than personal. If you are looking for s omething super-personal,
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The Christian idea is the only one on the market.” C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: HarperCollins,
2001), 160.
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Trinity. A proper understanding of this doctrine helps one understand “who God is, what he is
like, how he works, and how he is to be approached.” 494 Of all of the intricacies that this doctrine
teaches about God’s nature and how humans relate to him, the most important for the current
discussion is that God is, and has always been, personal. Christianity not only recognizes the
personality of God, but maintains that personality is in God—it is a fundamental part of his
divine nature rather than some sort of “add-on” that comes about later on in his existence (such
as when human persons were created). 495
Again, on the Christian view, there is one God who exists in three Persons. Therefore, it
is more appropriate to refer to the Trinitarian God as personal instead of suggesting that God is a
Person, because on Christianity, God is actually three Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The
three Persons within the Trinity, existing in relationship with one another, are distinct, yet not
separate, Persons within the Godhead. 496 Thus, it is a personal relationship, that is, a loving
relationship among Persons, which exists at the center of the universe. At its deepest level, this
striking reality points to the loving, interpenetrating personal relationships among the Trinitarian
Persons. Furthermore, all of God’s actions in history are expressions of this intimate, personal
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On this score, Webb posits, “Where, then, shall we look for an example of what is really meant by a
‘personal God?’ We shall plainly be most likely to do so with good hope of success in the one historical religion of
which, as we have seen, Personality in God (though not, until quite modern times, ‘the Personality of God’) has been
a recognized tenet—that is to say, in Christianity.” Webb, God and Personality, 81.
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God is “Three in One” on Christian theism. If one pushes the distinctness of each of the three Persons
too far, where they are understood as being completely separate from one another, this leads to tritheism—which is
not consistent with Christian teaching on the Trinity. If one pushes the “oneness” of God too far, it likely leads to
modalism, which is also inconsistent with a proper Christian view. Therefore, what is needed is a way of
maintaining both the “threeness” and the “oneness” of God (i.e., μια ουσία, τρεις ὑπόστασεις). One of the most
effective ways of doing this involves understanding that while the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct Persons,
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relationship that exists at the very heart of ultimate reality.497 This is the doctrine of perichoresis
(περιχώρησις) or circumincessio, the Latin equivalent,498 which goes back to at least Gregory of
Nyssa, one of the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century, who states,
For all the attributes of the Father are beheld in the Son, and all the attributes of the Son
belong to the Father, in so much as the Son abides wholly in the Father and in turn has
the Father wholly in Himself. Thus the person or “hypostasis” of the Son becomes as it
were the form and countenance by which the Father is made known, and the person or
“hypostasis” of the Father is made known in the form of the Son. 499
Here, Gregory points out that the Son beholds the attributes of the Father and the Son’s attributes
belong to the Father, “in so much as the Son abides wholly in the Father and in turn has the
Father wholly in Himself” (emphasis added). According to Gregory, the Father and Son abide
wholly in one another in intimate relationship, where each fully knows and beholds the other.
Although there were others who spoke on perichoresis before him, John of Damascus,
writing in the seventh and eighth centuries, was largely responsible for adopting the concept and
developing it in a fuller sense with respect to the Trinity. 500 According to John,
For the subsistences dwell in one another, in no wise confused by cleaving together,
according to the word of the Lord, I am in the Father, and the Father in Me…they are
made one not so as to commingle, but so as to cleave to each other, and they have their
being in each other without any coalescence or commingling. . . . For the Deity is
undivided amongst things divided, to put it concisely: and it is just like three suns
cleaving to each other without separation and giving out light mingled and conjoined in
W. David Beck, “God’s Existence,” in R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, In Defense of
Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 176177.
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one. . . . The subsistences dwell and are established firmly in one another. For they are
inseparable and cannot part from one another, but keep to their separate courses within
one another, without coalescing or mingling, but cleaving to one another. For the Son is
in the Father and the Spirit: and the Spirit is in the Father and the Son: and the Father in
the Son and the Spirit, but there is no coalescing or commingling or confusion. 501
As John indicates, the doctrine of perichoresis grasps the circulatory character of the triune God,
where the “subsistences dwell in one another” and are “established firmly in one another.”
Perichoresis is seen in the mutual cleaving of the Trinitarian Persons, where “[t]he Father exists
in the Son, the Son in the Father, and both of them in the Spirit, just as the Spirit exists in both
the Father and the Son.” 502
There are several instances where perichoresis is described in Scripture. First, as
mentioned by John in the statement above, perichoresis is seen in John 14:11, when Jesus says,
“I am in the Father and the Father is in me.” Second, the loving communion among the three
Persons of the Godhead is also evidenced in John 17:1 and John 16:14. In John 17:1, Jesus prays
to the Father: “Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son that the Son may glorify you.” In
John 16:14, Jesus says that the Holy Spirit “will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and
declare it to you.” Therefore, the Father glorifies the Son and the Son glorifies the Father, while
the Holy Spirit also glorifies the Son. The mutual giving and receiving of glory within the Trinity
is evidence of the close, loving relations that exist within God. Third, the Father sends the Son
(Jn. 3:16), and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and was sent by the Son (Jn. 15:26), which is
another example of perichoresis. Fourth, 1 John 4:8 says, “God is love.” This verse has profound
Trinitarian implications. As Erickson articulates,
The statement “God is love” in 1 John is a very basic characterization of God, which
cannot be understood simply as a definition or an equation, but is more than merely,
“God is loving.” The Trinity is three persons so closely bound together that they are
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actually one. In a sense, God being love virtually requires that he be more than one
person. Love, to be love, must have both a subject and an object. Thus, if there were not
multiplicity in the person of the Godhead, God could not really be love prior to this
creation of other subjects. For love to be genuine, there must be someone whom God
could love, and this would necessarily be more than mere narcissism. The Father loves
the Son; the Son loves the Father; the Father loves the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit loves
the Father; the Son loves the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit loves the Son. The fact that God
is three persons rather than merely two also is a demonstration of the character of love.
There is an old statement, “Two’s company; three’s a crowd.” It is possible for two
human persons to have a relationship of love for one another that is much more difficult
for three persons to have among themselves. Two persons may simply reciprocate love,
not having to share the other person’s love with anyone else. With three persons, there
must be a greater quality of selflessness, of genuine agape. Thus the Trinity founded
upon love is a demonstration of the full nature of agape.503
In order for genuine love to exist there must be both a subject and an object, a giver and receiver
of love. Therefore, if there were not multiple Persons within the Godhead, God could not really
be love prior to the creation of other subjects outside himself. 504 This is more than self-love,
which leads to narcissism. It is a self-giving love, where the fullness of love is shared in
reciprocal fashion among the three Persons of the Trinity. 505
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Similarly, Lewis proclaims, “All sorts of people are fond of repeating the Christian statement that ‘God
is love.’ But they seem not to notice that the words ‘God is love’ have no real meaning unless God contains at least
two Persons. Love is something that one person has for another person. If God was a single person, then before the
world was made, He was not love.” Lewis, Mere Christianity, 174. In The Screwtape Letters, he suggests (via a
demon), “This impossibility He calls love, and this same monotonous panacea can be detected under all He does and
even all He is—or claims to be. Thus He is not content, even Himself, to be a sheer arithmetical unity; He claims to
be three as well as one, in order that this nonsense about Love may find a foothold in His own nature.” C. S. Lewis,
The Screwtape Letters (San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2001), 94.
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The doctrine of perichoresis provides a proper ground for claiming that God is not only
personal in and because of his dealings with humans, but that God is personal within himself.
Because God is fundamentally a community of divine Persons who displays love and functions
in harmony within himself (i.e., tri-personal), a unified Being where each Person of the Trinity
dwells within the others in mutual communion, God’s very nature is personal. On a practical
note, perichoresis reveals that God is no distant deity who foregoes intimate interaction with
persons; rather, God is intrinsically personal and therefore reaches out in love and offers humans
what they most desperately need—a personal relationship with himself. The tri-personal God of
Christianity loves and can be loved, hears the prayers of individuals and forgives those who turn
to him in repentance, cares about the well-being of those whom he has created and offers them
guidelines, along with the ability (by his Spirit), to flourish as humans made in his image.
Incarnation
The Incarnation, another doctrine unique to the Christian faith, holds that the second
divine Person of the Trinity, became a human person at a specific point in time, being born as a
baby and living life on earth as the God-man.506 Jesus, as “the radiance of the glory of God and
the exact imprint of his nature,” further reveals the deeply personal nature of the Triune God
(Heb. 1:3). The personality of Jesus who appeared on earth did not begin with his human birth;
rather, it was the personality of an eternal Person—the eternal Son of God, the second Person of
the Trinity.507 Interestingly, it is the perichoretic relations of the three Persons of the Trinity that

A quote from Owen is helpful here: “The arguments of natural theology point to God as First Cause,
Designer, and Moral Ground. They also suggest that God is personal. The moral goes farther than the others in
requiring a God of love who will remedy our weakness and grant us the beatitude of life with him forever. Yet
however much the moral argument may require an omnipotent God of love it cannot reveal him with the fulness and
finality that we need for our salvation. The only full and final revelation is given in Christ who is God manifest in
human form.” Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, 109-110.
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allows Jesus, God’s Son, to refer to God as his Father, and God the Father to refer to Jesus as his
Son; this personal relationship is one that exists within the life of God.508 Further, it is the
Incarnation—the union of the human personality and the divine personality in the Person of
Christ—which makes it possible for the Holy Spirit to enter fully into human personality for the
first time, a more intimate and personal relationship between God and man,509 whereby God
dwells not only with, but within human persons.510
Not only does Christ further reveal the intensely personal nature of the Triune God; he is
also the embodiment of the moral law in human form (of course, Jesus was also divine). Jesus is
the objective standard of moral perfection in a Person, he dispenses moral knowledge throughout
his earthly ministry (e.g., The Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5-7),511 faultlessly exemplifies
the moral values that he teaches about (e.g., goodness, justice, love, gratitude, etc.), issues moral
obligations, and is ultimately the One who makes humankind’s moral transformation possible
through his death and resurrection. Moreover, Jesus not only pronounces the highest ideal of the
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moral and religious life; he also demonstrates a proper relation between God and man (e.g.,
consider Jesus’ relationship with the Father while Jesus was on Earth), and makes possible for
others to experience a similar personal relationship with God. This is an exciting reality, no
doubt—the very thought that God has personally and visibly entered into human history, making
possible humankind’s reconciliation to God, the very source of the moral law, should give rise to
excitement within one’s soul. The Christian affirmation is that God has made a saving revelation
of himself in and through the personality of Jesus Christ, and that virtually everything Christ
does for human persons while on Earth is for the purpose of taking them deeper into personal
fellowship with the eternal God.512 Therefore, as Owen puts it, “Christian ethics….are radically
personal. They are grounded in the person of Christ, the only Son of God.” 513
On Christian theism, God is understood to be personal, One who is “definitive of
goodness, love, justice, power and order, and that ‘his intention is to create a certain personal
relation between Himself and us.’” 514 Humans are made by the Trinitarian God, and made for
God; therefore, they are to find in God the very center of their lives and the end for which they
were destined.515 Man’s highest happiness is to enter into a loving personal relationship with
God, made possible by Christ’s death and resurrection, for this is the end for which he was
created.516 Therefore, on the Christian view,
Our end is not Nirvana, not annihilation, absorption, not a supra-personal or impersonal
existence within the divine, but Communion, with its sense of dependence, likeness, need,
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desire, knowledge of exhaustless possibility of a higher becoming as a result of its vital
union with the Eternal Divine Fullness of God. 517

Analysis of Hypotheses
Throughout this dissertation, twenty-three pieces of evidence were gathered, each
pointing toward the existence of a personal God. In this chapter, several metaphysical systems
were briefly examined against these evidences, with many seeming to fall flat in their ability to
account for the profoundly personal nature of morality and the apparent need for a transcendent
personal source. For example, it is hard to comprehend how naturalism and Platonism, which are
altogether non-personal, can account for the personal nature of moral phenomena. Of course, this
is not to say that naturalism and Platonism have nothing to say about morality; rather, they are in
lacking explanatory power when it comes to explaining and grounding its personal nature.
Additionally, Eastern religions (including both pantheism and polytheism) and Islam were
quickly discussed, and it was suggested that these belief systems arguably fail to provide a God
(or gods) who are personal to the highest degree possible, that is, intrinsically personal. Based on
the nature of these belief systems, they likely possess more plausibility than naturalism and
Platonism, at least when it comes to providing a transcendent personal source as the ground for
morality. Similar to naturalism and Platonism, these belief systems likely have much to say when
it comes to the moral enterprise as a whole, but they are found wanting when it comes to
providing a conception of God that is thoroughly personal in nature.
The final metaphysical system considered, Christianity, provides a plausible and robust
explanation of a God who is personal to the highest degree possible, namely, One who is
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intrinsically personal. If this is the case, the Christian view, in comparison to the other examined
views, likely possesses the most explanatory power. As with other conceptions of God (e.g., the
Islamic God, Allah), the Judeo-Christian God is described as One who performs person-like acts
and possesses person-like attributes, but the fundamental difference with Christianity—the two
doctrines that set Christianity apart from the rest when it comes to providing a God who is
intrinsically personal—are the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
The Trinity, particularly the perichoretic personal relationships of the three Persons
within the Trinity, demonstrate that the Judeo-Christian God is One who is, and has always been,
personal. In fact, on Christian theism, one can argue that it is precisely a personal relationship
that exists at the very center of ultimate reality. If one is looking for a God who is a selfconscious Being, One who thinks, feels, wills, and acts, and One who is capable of loving and
being loved by others, Christianity provides a convincing explanation.
The Incarnation further demonstrates the personal nature of the Triune God, whereby the
second Person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, steps down from his heavenly abode, taking on the
form of a human person, embodying the moral law in human form and further revealing God’s
desire to be in loving relationship with those whom he has created. In terms of explanatory
scope, Christianity is able to account for the two-dozen evidences provided in this dissertation, in
addition to accounting for a number of other important facts in additional areas. For these
reasons, Christianity arguably possesses the most explanatory scope and power, and is the most
plausible view to hold, especially when it comes to accounting for the immensely personal nature
of morality by providing a God who is intrinsically personal.
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Final Thoughts
Other Evidence That God is Personal
On top of the evidences for a personal God gathered in the present work on morality,
there are additional indicators of the existence of a personal God. First, one may argue that
design points in the direction of a personal God in several ways: (1) marks of contrivance—
evidences of inventing, devising, or planning—within the universe point to a divine Contriver;
(2) design implies purpose and purpose points to a personal will; (3) the earth is optimally suited
for human life, which indicates not just intentional design but that the Designer cares—and
caring is a personal attribute; (4) information, such as what is found in DNA, points to a personal
intelligence; and (5) the design of the universe evokes a sense of awe, wonder, and reverence in
human persons—which seemingly makes more sense when directed toward a personal God. 518
Second, another indicator of a personal God has to do with the miraculous. If there is
evidence that miracles occur,519 it is reasonable to infer that they are the result of a personal God.
A miracle is presumably an act of a personal God; therefore, any religion that denies the
existence of a personal God or lacks the idea of such a being in its belief structure arguably has
no conceptual place for a miracle. 520 Farmer puts it this way:
It is of the highest importance to approach the concept of miracle from within the sphere
of personal relations with God; only thus can it be rescued from the gross
misunderstanding and ill-repute into which it has fallen, and be restored in thought to that
position which, despite all the admitted difficulties and confusions, it has never entirely
lost in living and spontaneous Christian experience. It is significant that, whilst attempts
have often been made to retain a place for prayer and for a species of trust in Providence
518
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along with a fundamentally impersonal conception of God, the attempt is never made to
retain a place for miracle under the same conditions, saving in a form that evacuates it of
all its distinctive meaning. This would suggest that the issue between personal and
impersonal conceptions of God reaches sharpest definition in relation to the concept of
miracle.521
Third, oddly enough, the hiddenness of God may be evidence of God’s desire to be in a
loving personal relationship with those whom he has created. This claim seems counterintuitive,
no doubt. However, if God were to boldly and powerfully reveal his existence in some manner,
perhaps through a miraculous appearance or event of some kind, in the face of such
overwhelming evidence, each person’s mind would likely be overpowered with light and belief
would be practically coerced. 522 True love is a respecter of freedom; in the absence of free
choice, the possibility of genuine love seemingly dissipates.523 If what God wants more than
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anything else of human persons is for them to love him (Mt. 22:37), and if love respects human
freedom, there is reason to believe that God’s hiddenness is what makes possible, at least in part,
each person’s free choice to enter into loving relationship with him. If God were to absolutely
prove it all, putting into place every final piece necessary for proving his existence both
empirically and philosophically, it is at least possible, according to John Henry Newman, that
human persons would take God for granted, much like a tree outside one’s window. As Chuck
Colson once said to Antony Flew during the question and answer time of Flew’s conversation
with Gary Habermas at Oxbridge in 2005, “If we knew for certain that he were God, or if he took
away our free will, then we would not have the capacity to love him. That is exactly why he
created us. Do not think you will ever get past that point. If you ever do get past that point, you
will have talked yourself out of the ability to love God.” 524
Practical Implications
It is important to note that the loss of a personal foundation in morality is not merely an
academic concern; it is a concern that also stretches to the practical realm due to its effect on
humanity’s understanding of who God is and how one relates to him. As Farmer once noted,
“[T]o expound the thought of God as personal, and to help to restore it to a more living and
central place in the experience and witness of Christian men and women, is one of the major
tasks of the theologian today.” 525 For many people in religious traditions across the world, the
concept that God is personal is a necessary and fundamental part of religious belief. If God were
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not personal,526 it would be improper to think of him as intelligent, creative, moral, or loving; it
would also seem counterintuitive to speak of him as One with whom humans can have a personal
relationship, One who can be trusted, cares for his people and listens to their prayers, and so on.
In short, to talk of these matters in a sensible manner and experience them in daily living requires
that God is personal. 527
Not only is a non-personal conception of God deeply unsatisfying, it stands in stark
contrast to the nature of the Judeo-Christian God, as revealed in the Bible, and how he desires for
individuals to live in the world he has created. Morality in general and the Bible in particular
reveals that God is no distant deity who foregoes intimate interaction with human persons;
rather, he is intrinsically personal and therefore reaches out in love and offers humans what they
most desperately need—a personal relationship with himself—which ultimately makes possible
the restoration of their souls. To experience love in intimate, personal relationship with God is to
experience a final and all-inclusive peace and joy. In the presence of this God, one is no longer
faced with an argument demanding one’s assent, but rather with a loving Person who demands
one’s full confidence and trust.
A Foundation for Future Work
The attempt of this dissertation has been to present evidence for the existence of a
personal God of love. This has been no exhaustive treatment of the matter and has certainly been
unable to consider all possible objections. The goal has been to lay something of a foundation,
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hopefully prompting work in the future on this important topic. Lastly, if anything beneficial has
been said in this dissertation, and more importantly, if anything that builds the kingdom of God
in any way has been presented, soli Deo gloria.
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